On 19 May a flight of four A-6s had launched from the Enterprise to bomb a truck park in the suburbs of Hanoi, a complex well defended by SAMs and MiG fighters. A fighter escort of eight F-4 Phantom IIs provided high cover and flak suppression. The Intruders crossed the coastline at fifteen thousand feet and immediately got a continuous blinking red light from their missile warning systems, indicating that they were being tracked by multiple SAM sites. The Intruders descended to eight thousand feet as they approached the target area, and through a break in the overcast they sighted three MiG-21s. The North Vietnamese fighters pulled up in a climbing turn as the Intruders attempted to use the cloud cover for protection. At this point, the escorting F-4s joined the melee and, in driving off the MiGs, themselves became targeted by the SAM sites. As the Intruders broke left in a diving turn to attack their target, a barrage of missiles, more than fifteen by one crewman’s count, was launched, most of them tracking the A-6 bombers. One Intruder was fatally damaged by a detonating SAM warhead, and both its crewmen ejected at four thousand feet behind a ridge line northeast of Hanoi known as “Banana Alley.” The pilot, Lt. Cdr. Eugene “Red” McDaniel, the operations officer of Attack Squadron 35, the Enterprise’s A-6 squadron, was captured almost immediately. He was flying his eighty-first mission into Vietnam. His bombardier/navigator, badly injured in the ejection, managed to evade the enemy for three days before being captured. He, unfortunately, did not survive captivity.
Meanwhile, the Phantom II fighter cover was having problems from the continuing barrage of SAMs. The leader of a two-plane section had been driven down to low altitude by the successive diving turns required to evade the missiles, and the two Phantoms were now under intense automatic-weapons fire from the ground. The flight leader, the executive officer of VF-96, one of the two Enterprise fighter squadrons, flew into the ground, his plane on fire. It is not known whether it was due to a SAM hit or heavy automatic AAA fire. Both he and his rear seat radar intercept officer were killed.
In his book Before Honor, Lieutenant Commander McDaniel describes an exchange he had on the flight deck that morning:
Captain Holloway was checking things on the flight deck as the pilots were manning planes for the big strike on Hanoi and he climbed up to the cockpit of my A-6 as I was strapping in. He asked me where my target was and I told him “downtown Hanoi.” Captain Holloway said, “You’ll be okay, we’ve scheduled a lot of MIG killers and flak suppressors for you today.” I told him, “I hope you are right,” and Holloway slapped me on the back and answered, “Good luck. I’ll tell them to save lunch for you.”. . Six years later, when I got out of prison camp, I called Vice Admiral Holloway, who was then Commander Seventh Fleet and asked him, “Are you still saving lunch for me?” I carried the memories of his final sendoff remarks all though my POW years.
TARGETING
The targeting source for Task Force 77, in terms of general policy guidelines — but sometimes even specific objectives — came from Washington to CinCPac. The specificity in the Washington targeting directions varied, depending upon political circumstances in the White House and the degree of involvement on the part of key individuals in the Pentagon. From the Washington guidance provided through JCS channels, CinCPac prepared a target list, which was drawn on by the military assistance commander, Vietnam (MACV), Gen. William Westmoreland, and commander, Carrier Force, Seventh Fleet, who coordinated carefully to ensure that national and JCS priorities were followed, that all assigned targets were covered, and that Air Force and Navy units were given targets that best suited their special capabilities. Commander, Task Force 77; commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F); and MACV could also add targets, as long as the national requirements were fulfilled and the target eligibility criteria adhered to.
Commander, Task Force 77’s target list and general guidance were provided to commander, Task Group 77.0, a rear admiral aviator who, with his staff, was embarked in one of the carriers actually on Yankee Station. Commander, TF 77.0 then assigned the daily strike responsibilities to each of the carriers, depending upon how many carriers were available at Yankee Station and the aircraft composition of their air wings. Upon receipt of the daily air plan, each carrier’s operations department then made up a schedule assigning specific mission sorties to the squadrons. It was up to the squadrons to ensure that adequate planes were available and that pilots and strike leaders were detailed.
Mentioned previously was the particular concern to combat flight crews throughout the entire Vietnam War for the very ROE under which they had to fly. Originally, these required the aircraft overflying Vietnam not to shoot unless shot at first. This theoretically was to keep the planes from attacking suspected military sites that were in reality civilian installations. The direction of approach and pullout from bombing attacks were often mandated from Washington so that aircraft with bomb loads were not flying over the inhabited parts of Hanoi or Haiphong, where the inadvertent release of a bomb or weapon might fall in a nonmilitary area.
The sort of micromanagement from Washington that dictated altitudes to be flown and directions of attack could be infuriating to the pilots that had to fly the missions, because the rule-makers in Washington did not necessarily consider the height of the terrain in assigning altitudes, or the direction of a rising or setting sun when prescribing attack and recovery directions. These are but two examples of restrictions that could critically favor the defenders on the ground. The rules of engagement were only one of the many seemingly bureaucratic difficulties that the combatants on our side had to live with throughout the Vietnam War.
BATTLE EFFICIENCY PENNANT
In February 1967, the commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet (ComNavAirPac) was making his annual visit to the operating units of his command — the carriers and squadrons on the West Coast and operating in the Pacific. The Seventh Fleet was an important stop on his itinerary, and the Enterprise was one of the carriers assigned to his command.
The Enterprise was informed that ComNavAirPac, Vice Adm. Al Shinn, would be flying aboard at Yankee Station by COD on 25 February for an informal visit with the air wing and the embarked staff. He had emphasized ahead of time that this was not an inspection and that no special preparations were to be made nor elaborate briefings prepared. Those of us that knew Admiral Shinn felt comfortable taking him at his word and we looked forward to a pleasant visit from the admiral who would be writing our fitness reports. Shinn and his small party of about a half a dozen officers from his staff landed on board the Enterprise about noon, just after the final event of the day’s operational flying.