On 8 September, President Nixon ordered the carrier Independence to move with its task group to the eastern Mediterranean just off the coast of Lebanon. As a precautionary measure, Ike Kidd and I agreed that it would be useful and timely, in anticipation of any contingency, if we followed up by getting all of TF 60 to sea. Washington confirmed this decision by emphasizing that a sudden but well-ordered fleet movement would be sending the proper signal to all of the players in the Middle East. So there was no attempt to disguise our intentions, and on the ninth, the Soviet embassy in Washington reacted with a strongly worded message to the State Department questioning the intentions behind the redeployment of the Sixth Fleet assets.
When Commander, Sixth Fleet had ordered Carrier Striking Force (TF 60) to proceed without delay to the vicinity of Cyprus and to take up positions at sea under conditions of increased readiness, many TF 60 ships had been making port calls in Spain, CTF 60’s flagship Saratoga among them. The carrier Independence and its task group were visiting ports in the Aegean. All got underway immediately, forming up their tactical dispositions as they steamed east.
The Independence’s air wing included a Marine A-4 Skyhawk squadron with a reinforced complement of twenty aircraft, six more than the normal fourteen planes in a Navy carrier squadron. I ordered six of the A-4s to be flown off and temporarily based at the NATO airfield at Souda Bay, Crete. Ostensibly this was for weapons training and carrier-landing refresher operations. The real purpose was to make room for additional F-4 fighters. It was obvious that in any Middle East contingency, control of the air would be the first priority. I wanted as many fighters as possible in the eastern Mediterranean as soon as we could get them there. The Saratoga and her task group (TG 60.2) of cruisers and destroyers were in the western Mediterranean when TF 60 was ordered to sortie, so they would be several days later than Independence in arriving on station. Four F-4 Phantom IIs from the Saratoga were flown off to land on board the Independence, replacing the six Marine A-4s detached to Souda Bay.
As they arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, the Task Force 60 ships were assigned stations in the vicinity of Cyprus to take advantage of the geography of the Levant and the location of friendly air bases. This disposition of TF 60 was termed a “dispersed randometric formation,” an operational concept based upon my experience with Point Oboe in Korea and Yankee Station in Vietnam. The main reference point was Camel Station, a geographic point located between Crete and Cyprus. Ships would be assigned to positions referenced to Camel Station and selected for specific tactical or strategic reasons. The British had airfields and a long-range air search radar on Cyprus that would be available to support Sixth Fleet operations. The ships would operate within the radius of their stations specified by the operation plan.
For this randometric formation, the stations were selected to provide a coordinated and complete visual and radar surveillance of the entire eastern Mediterranean from Syria to Egypt. The distances between the cruisers and destroyers were as much as ten miles, with pickets extended even farther to the east of Cyprus. Continuous fighter combat air patrols were maintained over the force, and all non — U.S. Navy air and surface traffic was intercepted, identified, and, if appropriate, diverted. At the same time, the carriers were maintaining a constant antisubmarine patrol of the surveillance area with their embarked antisubmarine helicopters. Task Force 60 had, in effect, established an air defense and identification zone (ADIZ) in the eastern Mediterranean. This was another concept adapted from the Task Force 77 operating procedures for operations in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Meanwhile, the situation in Amman was deteriorating. With the large number of Palestinians in the capital egged on by the Fedayeen activists who were asserting that the movement of U.S. warships was an obvious precursor to U.S. intervention in Jordan, law and order in the city had collapsed. It was virtual civil war. Jordan was disintegrating. Through it all, the Kremlin remained enigmatic, silent since 9 September.
In Jordan the beleaguered king stiffened, and on 17 September, Hussein boldly ordered his loyal troops to enter Amman and restore order. Large-scale fighting ensued, and Hussein repeated his request for U.S. support, specifically, tactical air strikes. This request was received in Washington with a flurry of increased activity. The WSAG was meeting several times daily, and the National Security Council was torn on how far the United States could go in support of the Jordanians without emboldening the Russians to become actively involved. The carrier John F. Kennedy, then in its predeployment work-up at Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico, had been ordered to deploy early to the Sixth Fleet but would not arrive in the Mediterranean for nine days.
By 17 September, Task Force 60, comprised of two carrier task groups, TG 60.1 (the Saratoga) and TG 60.2 (the Independence), was well established at Camel Station conducting surface and air surveillance of all shipping and airline traffic in the area. It was at this point that President Nixon called commander, Sixth Fleet on a secure voice communications setup. It was so secure that, although the system was installed in the Carrier Division 6 flagship, I had forgotten of its existence.
Ike Kidd had been alerted by conventional dispatch, and he helicoptered over to the Saratoga. Asking me to accompany him, the two of us descended to the very lowest decks of the carrier. There, in a small compartment, was an electronics technician with a telephone handset. He merely said, “The White House is on the other end,” gave Ike the phone, and departed, leaving the two admirals alone with the “White House on the other end.” I also started to go, but Ike motioned me to stay. I heard only one side of the conversation: Ike’s “Yes Mr. President,” “No, Mr. President, I am not alone. I have Admiral Holloway with me,” and “Let me repeat this, Mr. President. You plan to make a public announcement to the effect that the United States stands by its friend, the King of Jordan. The Sixth Fleet is moving to the eastern Mediterranean to ensure the national integrity of Jordan, to protect U.S. citizens and interests in the area, and to militarily defeat any effort that might interfere with these objectives. And you want my assurance that all this is within the Sixth Fleet’s immediate capability.”