Ike put his hand over the mouthpiece and turned to me, saying, “Jim, can I assure him that the Sixth Fleet is capable of doing all this?” I replied that it was a hard question to answer with a simple yes or no without some qualification. Ike leaned toward me and said in his most commanding voice, “Admiral, I have the President of the United States on the other end of the phone, waiting for a yes or a no. Yes or no?” I answered with a vigorous yes.
Afterward, as we climbed back up to flag plot for a cup of coffee, Ike said, “I hope you’re right. On what did you base your estimate of the situation?” I told him that it was based upon the experience of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, reinforced by my arrival briefings and discussions with Cdr. Bob Dunn, the air wing commander aboard the Independence. I had asked Dunn essentially the same question the president had posed. He had reminded me that more than half of his pilots were Vietnam veterans who had faced MiGs and SAMs in Southeast Asia. From what the current intelligence told us about the Arab tactical air capability, it was far below that of the North Vietnamese. The AA and SAM defenses at Hanoi and Haiphong had been much tougher than the current Syrian order of battle, even if it were reinforced by Iraq and Egypt.
There was good news from Jordan on 18 September. Hussein’s loyal army troops had evicted the Fedayeen from Amman in hard fighting and generally had restored order in the capital.
But there was to be no slack. The next day our intelligence reported to the NSC that Syrian tanks had taken up positions some 250 yards inside the borders of Jordan. Then, on 20 September, the Syrian tanks pushed well into Jordanian territory, where they were met by the Jordanian army. In two engagements near Ramtha, thirty Syrian tanks were knocked out and the column was temporarily stalled. King Hussein again requested U.S. air strikes to drive out the Syrians.
In Washington, the tension of the growing crisis was consuming the national security apparatus. Resisting the king’s request for U.S. armed intervention was difficult enough, but what was generating even deeper angst was the possible entry of Soviet and Israeli military forces into the fighting. The Israelis could justify their action as “survival”—with the collateral objective of doing grave damage to Arab military capabilities. The Russians would benefit by a substantial increase in their influence in the Arab world. The Americans would be pushed to the brink to avoid a new shooting conflict in addition to our ongoing war in Southeast Asia. The situation in Jordan could degenerate into a confrontation that carried the most dreadful potential for the escalation to World War III, with all of its nuclear connotations.
The WSAG under Kissinger, with Nixon in almost constant attendance, was meeting in marathon sessions. Israel seemed to be taking the first steps in their mobilization process, a forty-eight-hour operation that was almost a certain precursor to war.
The first good news with concrete implications broke on 22 September. The Jordanians, bolstered by the expression of U.S. support, mounted air attacks on the Syrian forces. At Irbid, Syria lost 120 tanks, mainly to air strikes, with perhaps a third to mechanical breakdowns. Significantly, the Syrian air force was held out of the battle on the orders of a field commander, a Syrian air force general named Hafez Assad, who must have seen the wisdom in avoiding any excuse for the Americans and Israelis to openly engage in Arab affairs.
This was the turning point. The Fedayeen were brought under control, and the Syrians pulled out of Jordan. Events quickly returned to the status quo ante. The Russians were again politically ambivalent. The Israelis cancelled any activity that could be interpreted as mobilization. In Washington, the WSAG sessions ground to a halt, and President Nixon made the decision to go through with his trip to Italy and his visit to the Sixth Fleet.
Commander, Sixth Fleet received firm information that President Nixon would like to visit a carrier on 28 September to see air operations and observe a live fire power demonstration during his official state visit to Italy. Always considerate, Vice Admiral Kidd asked me if I would “mind” staying at Camel Station in the Independence while he took the Saratoga to Naples and hosted the president’s visit. Ike was concerned that I would miss the opportunity to meet the president and run the air show. I agreed without any further discussion. There was really no other alternative, and I was privately delighted to forego the protocol of a presidential visit. The next day, I moved my flag to the Independence, taking along four or five key members of the staff while the rest of commander, Carrier Division 6 remained on board the Saratoga to handle administrative duties.
CAMEL STATION
Camel Station operations continued, but at a reduced tempo, with the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron looking on. That was a normal occurrence. They always showed great interest in what the U.S. carriers were doing, trailing the Americans and attempting to rationalize our movements and dispositions. This was only natural. The Sixth Fleet was doing something different, and the Soviets wanted to find out what and why. They were showing professional curiosity. Neither the Task Force 60 commander nor the intelligence people in TF 60 ever evaluated the Soviet motivations as other than that. I remain convinced that these Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean were not, as has been suggested by some journalists and naval analysts, either threatening or provocative. The Soviets may have been an ally of Syria, but they were not about to tee off a nuclear war by an unprovoked surprise attack, conventional or nuclear, against a major U.S. Fleet unit. And that is what would have happened. An attack against a U.S. operating carrier would have elicited a general war response. U.S. policy was sensitive to the enormous advantage that accrues to the side conducting the first strike. With the anticipated rapidity of escalation to nuclear warfare in a general conflict with Russia, U.S. policy was designed to ensure little chance for the U.S. forces to be left at the gate by a surprise attack. The Russians understood this, and it was clear to both sides that a Soviet attack on the Sixth Fleet, even with conventional weapons, could result in a retaliatory preemptive nuclear strike. This would be a poor tradeoff for the Russians.
The Soviet squadron was meticulous in avoiding confrontation. On one memorable occasion, the Syrians announced that a Syrian navy submarine, a diesel boat, was being sent into the eastern Mediterranean. The next day, as if on signal, all eleven of the Soviet navy submarines known to be in the Mediterranean, came to the surface and operated on the surface in plain view of our forces. It was the Soviet’s most positive way possible to show the Sixth Fleet what Russian submarines were deployed to the Mediterranean, and that they were not threatening the fleet. The Soviets well understood that the Sixth Fleet’s rules of engagement were to initiate an attack on any non-U.S. submarine submerged in the vicinity of a U.S. warship. The Russians wanted to make sure we understood it wasn’t one of theirs.
With the striking force of the Sixth Fleet deployed in a disposition for attack or containment around the littoral of the eastern Mediterranean, the other Sixth Fleet task forces had quickly moved into supporting roles. The Sixth Fleet’s Marine amphibious group had been moved eastward to be available for contingencies and had been augmented by the arrival of the helicopter carrier Guam with a deckload of large transport helicopters, CH-53 Sea Stallions, as well as additional troops. The underway replenishment forces continuously provided fuel and provisions to the ships on Camel Station. Navy P-3 patrol planes and submarines maintained surveillance on all non-U.S. vessels approaching or transiting the surveillance area.