Unfortunately the damage had been done — politically in the United States — in spite of the outcome of the campaign, which resulted in heavy losses to Hanoi’s interests. In the aggregate, the reversal of the Tet offensive ended up as a significant military victory for the allies in Vietnam. For Hanoi, it was a defeat of major proportions of its clandestine forces in South Vietnam, resulting in a virtual annihilation of the subversive Vietcong political organization in South Vietnam. After Tet, Hanoi had to rely almost entirely on its regular North Vietnamese army for the invasion and conquest of South Vietnam.
In the United States, Tet came as a surprise, a perceived failure of intelligence. It was erroneously portrayed as a repeat of Pearl Harbor. The psychological and political damage to the continued prosecution of the war in Vietnam was not reversible. It was at this point that President Lyndon B. Johnson, disappointed and dispirited in his failure to disengage and facing the prospect of a continuing war in Vietnam with its political repercussions, decided not to run for president in the coming election. In November 1968, Johnson, in a move calculated to convince the enemy of our desire for an end to hostilities, declared a complete halt of U.S. air attacks into NVN. This so-called bombing pause was initiated on the basis of shaky “understandings” with NVN negotiators, which were never clearly validated or accepted by either side.
With the inauguration of President Nixon there was little change in the strategy for fighting the war. The objective of our Southeast Asia policy continued to be disengagement. The U.S. ground forces would be incrementally withdrawn beginning in 1969, and by August 1972, only forty thousand troops — all advisory personnel — would remain in the country. The ARVN would be increased to more than a million men and equipped and trained by U.S. advisors to take over the defense of their country. This strategic approach was described by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird as “Vietnamization.” During the Vietnamization process, President Nixon continued the effort to negotiate an end to the hostilities, depending largely upon the diplomatic skills of his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger.
Then, on 30 March 1972, the Thursday before Easter, the minister of defense for North Vietnam, Vo Nguyen Giap, launched a major offensive, sending three divisions of infantry, two hundred tanks, and a corps of heavy artillery — guns up to 130mm — across the provisional borders into South Vietnam in a headlong attack against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
As the well-trained North Vietnamese regular army divisions poured south into South Vietnam, they more resembled the Blitzkrieg forces of World War II rolling across the plains of Europe than a traditional Asian army. The troops were in the open, their trucks and tanks moving in columns along the main roads, with heavy artillery in tow. The furtive tactics of black-clad guerrillas terrorizing hamlets from hidden bases in the jungle had been abandoned. The ARVN — caught off guard by the surprise and the scale of the attack — was sent reeling.
President Richard Nixon responded immediately to the Communist invasion by directing a dramatic increase in the U.S. air support of the ARVN and against the invading North Vietnamese forces in the South, as well as ordering the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam. As the U.S. air offensive gained momentum with the deployment of additional carriers and reinforcing land-based air units, a new air campaign, Linebacker I, was initiated. This new offensive was more comprehensive and less restrictive than that of Rolling Thunder. It commenced on 10 May 1972, coincident with the mining of Haiphong Harbor by Navy carrier aircraft, and incorporated Air Force tactical fighters, Navy carrier planes, and SAC B-52s. To supplement the air offensive, C7F was directed to commit a substantial segment of the cruiser and destroyer force to Linebacker I in shore bombardment missions against the North Vietnamese, targeting the invading army’s lines of communication. In several situations the warships were able to take the North Vietnamese forces under direct fire as the troops moved down the coastal roads.
SEVENTH FLEET CHANGE OF COMMAND
On the scheduled day for the change of command ceremony, the Oklahoma City had been assigned a shore bombardment mission on an urgent basis in an area where the North-South highway ran fairly close to the coast and the enemy trucks, tanks, and troops could actually be seen as they proceeded south from North Vietnam to Quang Tri Province in South Vietnam. The Oklahoma City was scheduled for a pause in their fire support for one hour at 0900 for the change of command ceremony. At about 0910, Adm. Chick Clarey, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, arrived by helicopter on the Oklahoma City with several members of his staff. After landing, he freshened up and donned full dress whites, and the entire group moved back to the fantail, where all of the officers and men of Seventh Fleet staff were assembling, with a contingent of Marines and sailors from the ship’s company. The Seventh Fleet Band provided the military music that was so much a part of a shipboard change of command ceremony. The sailors were filing aft to fall in, and some of them were already in ranks on the fantail, when there were two splashes on either side of the cruiser. The flagship was being straddled by enemy shore battery fire.
With that, the general alarm rang, the crew departed the fantail area and went to battle stations, and the cruiser quickly added turns, heading for a spot five thousand yards farther away from the coast, where it definitely would be beyond the range of North Vietnamese artillery.
So we started over. The Oklahoma City took a course downwind to provide a comfortable five-knot breeze over the main deck, the sailors and Marines fell in again, the band resumed the martial music, and the principals took their places in the formation, made brief remarks, and read our orders. After a gun salute, the fantail was cleared. The crew went below to change back into dungarees, and half an hour later, a Navy helicopter arrived on the stern to pick up Admiral Clarey, his staff, and Vice Adm. Bill Mack to return them to Saigon and the long flight back to Hawaii.
Meanwhile, I changed to khakis, and when battle stations were called away to resume shore bombardment fire, I took station on the flag bridge to observe the Oklahoma City’s 6-inch shells impact enemy positions on the coastal highway.
Commander, Seventh Fleet and his staff were an entirely seagoing outfit. There were no offices ashore for the staff. The entire functioning of the commander, Seventh Fleet staff in carrying out the command responsibility of the fleet commander was all provided in the fleet flagship, which at this time was the USS Oklahoma City, built at the end of World War II as a standard 6-inch gun cruiser. Subsequent to the war she underwent modification to equip the ship with a Talos battery, making her a missile cruiser. Talos was a very long range surface-to-air defensive missile system that could reach out and shoot down aircraft at distances of one hundred miles or more. The flagship was semi-permanently deployed from the United States to the Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, where she was homeported. The families of the crewmen and officers lived in quarters on the base, or in the case of some in specially built housing on the economy. Those officers and men without dependents lived on board ship in compartments and staterooms. The Oklahoma City was configured to have a good-sized flag mess, which could accommodate twelve to sixteen people at the one sitting for each meal. The seats in the mess were assigned on the basis of seniority. Those officers on the staff who were not members of the flag mess ate with the ship’s officers in the officer’s wardroom. There was also a flag bridge that was one level above the navigation bridge. It was not utilized extensively, as most of the tactical operations of the fleet were delegated to the various task force, task group, and task unit commanders. But it was good to have a comfortable area where the admiral and the staff could observe what was going on in the vicinity or on board the flagship. Most of the operational work of the staff was in the Plans Division, and much of that was accomplished in flag plot. This was a form of combat information center that was provided with displays to show the relative positions and status of units in the fleet. It was in flag plot that the daily briefings took place.