The tactics employed by the carrier task groups and their embarked air wings were the standard doctrines set forth in the U.S. Fleet tactical publications and the Naval Air Training and Operational Procedures. NATOPS by that time had largely eliminated the procedural differences that had crept in during and immediately after World War II between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. However, some modifications to the NATOPS were made specifically for “special operations,” the euphemism used to describe combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. The carriers and their air wings trained and exercised in these special doctrines during their work-up periods in preparation for deployment to the western Pacific.
The targeting, in terms of general policy, broad guidelines and sometimes even specific objectives, came from Washington to CinCPac. The specificity of the Washington targeting directions varied, depending upon political circumstances in the White House and the degree of involvement on the part of key individuals in the Pentagon at the time. From the Washington guidance provided through JCS channels, CinCPac prepared a target list, which was drawn on by MACV and TF 77, which coordinated carefully to ensure that national and JCS priorities were followed, that all assigned targets were covered, and that Air Force and the Navy units were given targets that best suited their special capabilities. Commander, TF 77 and USMACV could also add targets, as long as the national requirements were fulfilled.
Commander, TF 77’s target list and general guidance were provided to commander, TF 77.0, who then assigned daily strike responsibilities to the individual carriers, depending upon how many carriers were on the line and the aircraft composition of their air wings. Upon receipt of the daily air plan, each carrier’s operations department then assigned specific mission sorties to the squadrons. It was up to the squadrons to ensure that adequate planes were available and that pilots and strike leaders were detailed.
As of 1972, the Navy carrier force level consisted of fifteen attack carriers, although this number included one CVS operating in the role of a CVA. Administratively, eight attack carriers were assigned to the Pacific Fleet and six to the Atlantic Fleet. However, all carriers, regardless of fleet assignment, shared in the combat deployments to special operations (SpecOps). This was different from practice in the Korean War, when Atlantic Fleet carriers largely continued to deploy to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, while the Pacific Fleet carriers made most of their deployments to Korea. For the Atlantic Fleet carriers deployed to Vietnam, CinCLant retained administrative command (AdCom) but the units were chopped (meaning that their operational control was changed) to CinCPac when the ships entered the geographical boundary of CinCPac’s theater. In addition to keeping five or six carriers in the Seventh Fleet, the U.S. Navy also was committed to maintaining at all times two carriers in the Sixth Fleet. The pressure of maintaining half the carrier force deployed over the long period of the Vietnam War eventually caused severe deterioration in the material condition of the ships, from which the carrier force really didn’t fully recover until the late seventies.
MUSCLE FOR THE SEVENTH FLEET
By the end of May 1972, the reinforcement of the Seventh Fleet had been largely completed, and the fleet now was at its largest size and capability since World War II. The complement was 73,275 Navy people, 27,443 Marines in the Seventh Fleet Marine Force, six aircraft carriers on a continuous basis, sixty destroyers and escort ships, thirty-one amphibious ships, and twelve submarines. In addition, there were thirty-four logistic-support vessels — tankers, ammunition ships, supply ships, tenders, and special types — all in the Gulf of Tonkin, underway, supporting the combatants.
The tempo of combat operations had risen fast. On 24 May 1972, the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force, consisting of three ARGs — a total of about a dozen large ships — initiated Operation Lam Son 72. This was a combined amphibious and vertical envelopment supporting operation with South Vietnamese marines being inserted twenty miles northwest of the city of Hue. Three Seventh Fleet cruisers and seven destroyers provided naval gunfire support for this operation, including the flagship Oklahoma City, whose 6-inch guns were essential to reach to the landing zone. All U.S. ground forces had been withdrawn from combat, and U.S. troop participation was limited to advisory and logistics roles. The South Vietnamese marines were transported by landing craft operated by U.S. bluejackets and in helicopters flown by Marine Corps pilots with Marine flight crews manning the waist guns. This airborne insertion in the rear of the North Vietnamese troops turned out to be very effective in seriously disrupting the North Vietnamese army’s drive to the south, forcing Hanoi to halt their offensive and redeploy to the rear to deal with the threat from the ARVN marines, who were then extracted by the Seventh Fleet Marine helicopters.
This operation was so successful that, on 11 July, Phase II of Lam Son 72 was initiated with thirty-five helicopters from the USS Okinawa and USS Tripoli lifting 840 South Vietnamese marines to a landing zone southeast of Quang Tri City. The Marine helicopters ran into heavy defensive fire. One CH-53 was destroyed by an SA-7 shoulder-fired heat-seeking missile, and two CH-46 helicopters were damaged.
This operation was quickly followed up by Phase III of Lam Son 72, when two waves of helicopters from the USS Okinawa lifted 689 Vietnamese marines into a landing zone behind enemy lines seven miles northeast of Quang Tri City, which had the effect of easing the North Vietnamese pressure on Quang Tri and contributing to the subsequent recapture of the city by the South Vietnamese army.
MARINE HUNTER-KILLERS
The port of Haiphong had been idled by the minefields laid by carrier aircraft. Twenty-three merchant ships had been trapped in Haiphong and were unable to leave the port. Cargo ships from other Communist countries such as China, Poland, and the USSR, carrying war material and supplies intended for North Vietnam, were unable to enter the port to discharge their cargoes. The blockade of North Vietnam from seaborne commerce was working at 100 percent effectiveness. Then, in June 1972, we discovered that the Communists had developed a new technique for resupply. Communist cargo ships would anchor in the lee of a small island in the approaches to Haiphong Harbor and unload cargo into small craft, such as junks and sampans. These would then slip into coves and creeks east of Haiphong to land their cargo over unimproved beaches with coolie labor. This operation was first noted by Seventh Fleet carrier aircraft ingressing to North Vietnam for strikes in the Hanoi area, and this information was quickly passed to the amphibious forces, which sent Marine helicopters to investigate. The density of the native small craft near Han La Island indicated that this was going to become a major operation. Large numbers of small craft were being assembled in the coves and small harbors along the coast and some were already proceeding to the vicinity of the merchant ships.
According to our rules of engagement, the cargo ships flying the flags of the USSR, Poland, China, and other Communist nations could not be attacked, even though they were unloading goods. But the small craft were not only fair game but also extremely vulnerable to the machine guns of the Marine helicopter gunships. Within hours, I initiated a new operation on a priority basis called Marine Hunter-Killer Operation Number 1, or MARHUK One. The amphibious helicopter carriers were directed to move northward from the Bien Hoa area in South Vietnam, to the Haiphong delta and launch AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, which were to proceed to Han La and attack the small craft as they were making the trip in from the cargo ships to the unloading areas on the coastline. The initial results were spectacular. Large numbers of small craft were destroyed, forcing the North Vietnamese to abandon this ferrying of war material. The North Vietnamese tried to move small craft out to the cargo ships after the Marine helicopters had departed the area following the first strikes, but this was foiled when the helicopter gunships returned unexpectedly in a second wave of attacks. The tactics for MARHUK One were then to hold the Cobras out of sight in the vicinity of the anchorage. Then, when South Vietnamese boatmen reported that the North Vietnamese small craft appeared to be getting underway from the cargo ships or their landing sites, the Cobra gunships would be called in to attack and destroy them.