The UHF radio handset was on the bulkhead of the Newport News’ pilothouse. I pulled it from its cradle, punched the power button, and hit the guard channel switch. Now every operational Navy unit within a twenty-mile radius would hear my transmission in the blind: “Attention any Seventh Fleet Aircraft in the vicinity of Haiphong. This is Blackbeard [Commander, Seventh Fleet’s personal call sign] on board Newport News with a shore bombardment force in Haiphong Harbor. We are engaged with several enemy surface units and need illumination to sort things out. Any aircraft in the area give me a call on guard. What we really need are high-power flares. Blackbeard out.”
Almost immediately an answering voice came up loud and clear on the guard channeclass="underline" “ Blackbeard, this is Raven Four Four, inbound with a flight of two Corsairs [Corsair IIs, Chance Vought A-7s] for an armed recce in Package Six [the sector north of Hanoi]. We have flares and Rockeye on board. I can see all the shooting down there. I wondered what was going on. I am overhead and ready to help.”
Staying on the guard channel so all friendly forces in the area would be aware of the tactical situation — and also to avoid any chance of losing communications — I instructed the flight leader, Raven 44, to light up the area with flares, report on what he could see, and stand by for further orders.
In less than thirty seconds, the entire seascape of the Haiphong Harbor approaches and the Île de Norway islands was suddenly, and almost blindingly, lit by a million-candlepower flare. Raven 44 reported he had the Newport News in sight with an accompanying destroyer and could see a cruiser — the Providence—and a destroyer to the east. He had also spotted two North Vietnamese fast attack boats closing the Newport News from the direction of Île de Norway. With a warning not to get too low because of friendly gunfire, Raven 44 was cleared to attack the hostile surface targets with Rockeye, a weapon that distributed a cluster of lethal bomblets in an oblong pattern over a large area.
The Newport News’ guns increased their rate of fire to the maximum. The gunners could clearly see their targets now. While one Corsair dropped a flare, the other attacked with Rockeye. It was almost impossible to miss a ship with Rockeye, even a small craft moving at high speed, and a single bomblet could cause fatal damage to a P-6-sized boat. Under the continuing flare illumination, the Rockeye and ships’ gunfire finished off three of the skunks (hostile surface contact), but not until the closest one had approached to within three thousand yards.
At 2342 the Newport News and Rowan ceased fire. There was nothing left to shoot at. The battle was over. The action had been intense while it lasted. In the seventeen-minute firefight, the two warships had fired 294 major-caliber rounds at the P-6s. Skunks Bravo, Charlie, and Delta had been sunk. Alfa was out of range, on fire, and limping north, about to be eliminated by the two Corsairs. The night was dark again as the last flare hit the ocean. The Newport News, only three miles southwest of Île of Norway, shaped a southerly course and increased speed to thirty knots to retire from the objective area and head for Yankee Station.
The Corsairs were from Attack Squadron 93 (VA-93). Lt. (j.g.) William W. Pickavance was the flight leader, and Lt. (j.g.) Pat Moneymaker was the wingman. (Both pilots retired from the Navy with flag rank.) Once Skunk Alfa was on the bottom, they were cleared to return to their carrier, the Midway (CVA-41), the evening’s work done. With all flares and Rockeye expended on the patrol boats, their armed recce mission into Package Six was cancelled. For them the Battle of Haiphong Harbor had been far more productive.
Commander, Task Unit 77.1.2’s after-action report submitted to CinCPac and the JCS was professionally brief and properly modest: All preplanned targets had been fully covered with the allotted rounds, three secondaries had been observed, and Shrikes had been fired at radiating radars but apparently with no permanent results. Counterbattery fire had been effective in silencing some coastal defense positions, but the Vietnamese gunfire had been heavy. The Newport News reported 75 rounds of very accurate hostile fire; the Rowan reported 50 rounds of accurate fire as close as twenty yards and straddling the ship. The Robison reported 140 rounds of very accurate fire, the closest being fifteen yards off the port beam. The Providence had counted incoming 60 rounds. Commander, TU 77.1.2 almost laconically went on to report, “While retiring, task unit was approached by several fast moving surface contacts…. Newport News and Rowan took contacts under fire resulting in their catching fire and breaking up. Aircraft took others under attack and appeared to sink same.”
How successful was the operation? No photographic gun-damage assessment (GDA) was possible. Only three secondary explosions were observed. Yet the pumping of 710 rounds of 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch high-explosive projectiles into a crowded area of lucrative military and logistics installations, all in a period of seventeen minutes, must have done psychological as well as military damage to the North Vietnamese war effort. All of this was accomplished with no friendly casualties, just shrapnel on the weather decks of two ships. Lion’s Den was, as a front-page New York Times article reported, “a daring raid into strongly defended enemy territory. . The enemy has once again been reminded of the mobility of the fleet.”
The next morning my helo arrived on board the Newport News from the Kitty Hawk to pick me up for the one-hour ride back to our flagship. Task Unit 77.1.2 was disestablished, and the Newport News, Rowan, Providence and Robison continued south to rendezvous with the ammo ships of the URG in the Gulf of Tonkin to top off powder and projectiles. The Newport News alone had expended 433 8-inch rounds, 556 5-inch rounds, and 33 3-inch rounds during the thirty-three-minute operation.
18
Vietnam
The U.S. Navy’s mining of the navigational waters of North Vietnam and of its port areas had seriously impaired North Vietnam’s ability to fight the war and had undermined the morale of its people. On 8 May 1972, in Operation Pocket Money, three A-6s and seven A-7s from the Coral Sea had dropped thirty-six MK-52 1,000-pound magnetic influence mines in Haiphong Harbor off Vietnam’s largest port. The overall mining campaign had gone even further, with Navy aircraft dropping MK-36 Destructors and MK-52 mines in six other North Vietnamese harbors. The MK-36 Destructor was a 500-pound aircraft bomb converted into a magnetic influence mine by a special fuse. Naval carrier aircraft also mined some of North Vietnam’s most heavily used coastal waters. The mines were programmed to become active twenty-four hours after they were dropped. The existence, but not the location, of the minefields in the approaches to Haiphong Harbor was broadcast to the world so that foreign merchant ships would be reluctant to enter or leave the port of Haiphong. President Nixon had announced that the minefields would remain until all U.S. prisoners of war were released.