In early February the Mine Force staff came on board the Seventh Fleet flagship, Oklahoma City, for a conference to prepare for final plans for the operation. Task Force 78 was well organized and had arrived in the Gulf of Tonkin with their gear in excellent shape. They would need, however, continuing logistical support with special attention to the spare parts and replacement units for their unique mine countermeasures equipment. Commander, TF 78 proposed that all material to be sent forward to the task force be given an “A Plus” priority, which means everything would be shipped by fastest means possible. That is the one area in which CTF 78 was overruled. My logistics mentor was Cdr. Charles T. Creekman, who had been my supply officer in the Enterprise. One of his fundamental logistics theorems was that priorities had to be assigned on realistic requirements based upon true need, not inflated to higher categories to provide “insurance” or to get ahead of the other guy. As he explained, that’s the only way that the Navy supply system could run at its maximum effectiveness. If every item addressed to TF 78 were given one priority — the very highest — aftershave lotion would have the same priority with replacement transmission parts to repair grounded helicopters. Since all items being shipped to the forces afloat must compete for limited shipping space in aircraft and for special handling, there is no way for the outshipping activity to discriminate between aircraft parts and aftershave lotion, and what the ships in TF 78 would eventually have delivered on board would be pure pot luck. In 1970 I had seen this very thing happen. Commander, Sixth Fleet at the time of the Syrian-Jordan crisis had insisted that all material shipped forward to the Sixth Fleet units should have the highest priority, in spite of my protestations. As commander, Task Force 60, I had to keep the carriers’ planes flying and the ships’ radars working. Vice Adm. Ike Kidd, however, persisted, thinking that as an experienced line officer he was in a better position to judge how to “optimize” the system. The result was that the supply channels from the U.S. supply depots were clogged with junk that we really didn’t need. Having been at the bitter end of the supply line in a squadron in Korea and on board the Enterprise in the Gulf of Tonkin, I had seen how well the supply system could work when run by the supply officers according to their system procedures. It turned out that there was never a crisis during Operation End Sweep due to a lapse in our logistic support.
The plan was for most of the initial minesweeping to be conducted by the CH-53M minesweepers of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 (HM-12) supported by two additional Marine Corps helicopter squadrons of CH-53s. These large helicopters operated from the decks of the New Orleans (LPH-11) and Inchon (LPH-12), in which Commander, Task Force 78, flew his flag. There were a total of thirty-one CH-53M Sea Stallion helicopters in all attached to the task force.
Because of the separated location of Task Force 78 in the approaches to the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam, more than 150 miles north of the provisional boundary between the two countries, I thought it was prudent to maintain an attack carrier task group in the vicinity to provide cover for the mine logistics force. Over the period of End Sweep, the carriers Coral Sea, Enterprise, Oriskany, and Ranger were positioned to provide around-the-clock coverage in the event of any untoward actions or hostilities on the part of the North Vietnamese.
An important feature of the mine clearance operations was to provide an extremely precise navigation system that would enable the minesweepers, both airborne and ships, to ensure that the coverage of the mined area was complete and that there were no gaps in the lanes that were swept. Also, it would avoid repeating operations over previously cleared areas. To provide this level of precise navigation, the Navy had contracted for a civilian system RaDist, which used an array of electronic beacons fixed at known geographic locations on the ground. The small area covered by RaDist was a key to the precision that was required. But before the beacons could be erected on North Vietnamese soil in the vicinity of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, we had to explain these devices to the North Vietnamese and get their approval for U.S. technicians to install them in their territory. I sent CTF 78 to Hanoi to negotiate this installation. The arrangements were conducted without incident between the CTF 78 staff, and Colonel Thai of the North Vietnamese army.
About mid-February, four ocean minesweepers were able to deploy their equipment and sweep the approaches to Haiphong to ensure the safety of ships operating in support of the helicopter sweep. Task Force 78 helicopters flew their first End Sweep mission on 27 February 1973 and continued their work during daylight hours, operating from the LPHs New Orleans and Inchon. The operation proceeded smoothly with flight operations taking place during daylight hours. The navigation system performed satisfactorily, although on several occasions civilian technicians were required to be put ashore to service the beacons. The sleds and ancillary gear used by the minesweeping helicopters suffered from wear and tear and required constant repair and basic maintenance. Considering that this was the first use of airborne mine countermeasures in a real tactical situation, 150 miles ahead of the front lines, the record of success reflects considerable credit on the people in Task Force 78.
During the clearance operations, only one MK-52 mine was detonated. All of the others had sanitized themselves at the end of their scheduled life, as programmed, which occurred prior to the end of February. To fully test the safety of the channel, Task Force 78 had rigged an LST as a test vehicle. All loose equipment and unnecessary material had been removed and spaces filled with Styrofoam. A special shock-mounted deck was rigged for the conning and navigation of the ship, and forty volunteers were embarked. All precautions possible were taken to protect these crewmembers in the unlikely event of a detonation. A detonation was not anticipated, but there was always the chance of a stray mine or perhaps some sort of device planted by the North Vietnamese themselves. The test vessel, the Waccamaw County, made eight transits of the channel without setting off any mines, and I was able to report that the minesweeping operation had been completed. In retrospect this was a truly remarkable accomplishment.
Secretary of State Kissinger had proposed to the North Vietnamese negotiators that the U.S. Navy clear the minefields at the port of Haiphong and do it in thirty days. He made this proposal without the availability of any expert technical advice with him in his negotiating group. It is interesting how accurately Kissinger had predicted the time that would be required. It was on the thirtieth day of actual sweeping that the CTF 78 was able to signal that the mission had been accomplished.
After the North Vietnamese were notified that the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha were free from the threat of U.S.-laid mines, Task Force 78 proceeded out to sea on 18 July 1973, officially ending Operation End Sweep. During the operation’s period, the flagship Oklahoma City had remained in the Gulf of Tonkin, except for a brief return to Yokosuka for a five-day period of maintenance availability.
PEACETIME CRUISING