As Coy carefully studied the individual routines of the guard staff, he also began to select his co-conspirators. He understood that in order for the escape to be successful, his plan would require exquisite orchestration, as well as the total commitment and cooperation of his accomplices. It is clear that his choice would fall on individuals who were capable of following a prescribed plan, and doing whatever became necessary to carry it out, even if this meant murder.
During Coy’s rounds of delivering books and magazines to inmates, he routinely stopped at cell #152 to visit Joseph Paul Cretzer, also known to many of the inmates as “Dutch.” Cretzer was an ideal choice as an accomplice and he had already proven his capabilities during an aborted escape attempt in May of 1941. That attempt had involved taking guards hostage, which was also an element of Coy’s plan. Although the previous attempt had failed, inmate Clarence Carnes stated afterward that Cretzer had kept calm when it became clear that the plan was doomed and this had won him a solid reputation with the other convicts. It is likely that Coy took this into consideration in deciding that Cretzer would make a perfect accomplice.
Carnes later commented that Coy had consistently reminded his accomplices of the virtue of patience and thorough planning. Coy had prepared himself for the day of the escape both physically and mentally, continually refining the procedures and chronology of the plan. He lost over twenty pounds by adhering to a strict diet regimen over a period of several months and improved his muscle tone and physical strength by performing exercises in his cell. He also arranged for pre-placement of the crudely fabricated tools that would be needed to spread the bars in the West End Gun Gallery. It is believed that inmate and cellhouse plumber Ed Mrozik smuggled pliers to Coy, and also assembled the makeshift bar spreader with the help of a fellow inmate in the Machine Shop.
Cellhouse Plumber Ed Mrozik.
The inmates of Alcatraz had developed a complex system for smuggling items past the elaborate security mechanisms within the prison. Inmates who risked smuggling contraband for others generally were given special payoffs or rewards. Despite the watchfulness of the correctional officers, inmates often successfully used covert networks to pass and smuggle items to one another. For example, if an inmate working in the machine shop wanted to “mail” a contraband item, he could wrap it in a soiled rag and send off to the laundry, making sure that the laundry bag carried a special secret marking. The contraband could then be folded in with clean kitchen linens and delivered to an appropriate recipient in the kitchen. Since problems such as clogged drains were common occurrences in the kitchen, the inmate plumber could intercept the smuggled item, which could be disguised as a common plumbing tool or fixture, and he could introduce it into his tool kit, thus ensuring final delivery. The security focus was generally on the inmates themselves, so these covert activities went largely unnoticed.
It is likely that Coy and Hubbard extended special food and reading privileges to inmates who helped smuggle materials for the escape. It is also possible that Coy granted favors to some correctional officers, who would eventually contribute to the success of the plan. Coy had earned a great deal of trust amongst the custodial staff through his frequent interactions with the guards. He was thus allowed to make his rounds within the cellhouse with minimal supervision. Several books written on the escape have further speculated that Coy actually helped to determine the officers’ routines, by distributing popular reading materials at specific time intervals to the guards posted in the gun galleries.
The Scene of the Battle
Correctional Officer Bert Burch was assigned to the West End Gun Gallery for the afternoon watch on the day of the escape attempt, May 2, 1946, and it is clear that Coy had been able to study his work habits in advance. It was at first believed that during his preparations for the escape, Coy had observed that Burch usually spent the after-lunch hours in the D Block end of the gallery, where he would read for most of the afternoon. But a second theory, extracted from notes handwritten by Carl Sundstrom a few days after the escape attempt, held that Burch did not always maintain a strict routine. Instead it is suggested that he would be lured into that section of the cellblock for an extended period of time by the acting-out of an inmate in D Block.
Correctional Officer Bert Burch.
Access to the West End Gallery was from an exterior catwalk located on the southwest end of D Block, with entry and exit monitored by the Road Tower officer. Changing shifts in inclement weather was no easy task, since the correctional officer would have to climb the metal staircase on the side of the cellhouse, battling the rain and wind that was intensified by the oceanfront exposure. It was, however, one of the most secure areas of the cellhouse, and several officers considered it a good assignment. Officers who worked in the gallery brought their own meals, since they would be locked inside for their entire shift, which usually lasted eight hours.
A view inside the West End Gun Gallery. An officer is seen here lowering a key to a fellow officer. Gallery post assignments were considered the most favored by the prison officers. Up until the events of 1946, it was also considered the safest.
The gallery was a dual-level, narrowly enclosed area with a passage width of only about four and a half feet. The west end of the gallery was situated over the area known to inmates as Times Square,and ran from each end of the cellhouse through the southwest end of D Block. This arrangement allowed the officer on duty to patrol all three main cellblock aisles (and to pass through a door into D Block), simply by walking the length of the gallery, which generally provided an excellent and protected view of all cellhouse activity. Most importantly, the officers assigned to the East and West Galleries each carried a .30-06 Springfield rifle and a semi-automatic Colt .45 handgun. Should any of the unarmed officers walking the cellhouse floor find themselves in a compromising situation, the gallery officer could regain control with this powerful and accurate weaponry. This impression was projected to the inmates on a daily basis, as the heavily armed gallery officers paced the length of the shielded passage.
Directly across from the Mess Hall at the opposite end of the cellhouse, and located off the main entrance corridor, was the prison Armory. The Armory was considered the most secure part of the prison, and it was the center of communications as well. Situated across from the control room, it had a secure switchboard, and also contained the prison’s weapons reserves. The Armory could only be unlocked from the inside, and it was considered almost impossible to infiltrate. Encased in steel and bulletproof glass, the Armory was the operational nucleus of Alcatraz, and the vital hub for island activities and correctional officers’ posting status. It housed the prison’s arsenal, and its control center monitored the movements of anyone leaving or entering the cellblock. The Armory switchboard linked the telephones throughout the entire prison network for internal communications. There was also a special marine radio for prison launch communications, in addition to a short-wave transceiver, standard telephones, and a Teletype machine that could be used to wire messages to the mainland. In the event of a large-scale riot or takeover of the cellhouse, the integrity of the Armory could always be maintained.