Earlier that afternoon Vizeadmiral Schmidt received a message from the Intelligence Department in Libau stating that a deciphered Russian wireless message indicated four submarines had departed Hango at about 1300hrs. With that the battleships not required in Tagga Bay were immediately detached to supplement their fuel stocks. At 1630hrs III Battle Squadron, with the exception of Markgraf, were detached to Putzig Wiek from where Grosser Kurfürst and Bayern would be dispatched to Kiel for repairs. The 15th Torpedoboat Half Flotilla would escort them. The Markgraf would remain with the Special Unit and anchored in Tagga Bay. The IV Battle Squadron were likewise to remain in Tagga Bay and towards 1930hrs passed through the net barrier and anchored. Meanwhile, the III Battle Squadron began their journey at around 1700hrs but proceeded at slow speed to allow Bayern to catch up. Towards 1820hrs she joined her squadron at a speed of 11 knots, but soon had to reduce speed as her bulkheads were beginning to suffer. Further speed reductions followed and finally at 2000hrs she had to stop near Point Gamma for an hour while her collapsing bulkheads were shored up with timber. Bayern’s situation was becoming serious and Vizeadmiral Behncke decided to detach her back to the Tagga Bay. This message was passed by searchlight and Kronprinz and three torpedoboats were dispatched as escorts. Towards 2230hrs Vizeadmiral Schmidt sent a recovery group consisting of 3rd Torpedoboat Half Flotilla to Point Gamma to assist. By 2100hrs Bayern was making just 4 knots and only at 0130hrs on 13 October did she reach Point White. Now Bayern was again forced to stop and only recommenced her journey at 0530hrs. The whole time torpedoboats circled her as an anti-submarine screen. Finally the stricken battleship entered Tagga Bay and at 0930hrs dropped anchor, whereupon the difficult and time-consuming temporary repair work was begun. On 17 October, minesweepers found the Russian mine barrier onto which Bayern had run. It consisted of spherical, lead-capped mines with an explosive charge of 100 to 120 kilograms. In consideration of this charge and the resulting damage it seemed likely that the compressed air accumulators in cell 12, which were used to launch torpedoes, had exploded with the detonation of the mine, and added to its destructive effect.
After the appearance of the German invasion fleet the Russian command had been quick to react. Already at 1025hrs Vice Admiral Bakhirev received the following telegram from the Commander of the Fleet, Rear Admiral Razvozov:
A copy for your attention. I confirm the commitment to hold Sworbe and Zerel as I think they are entirely necessary for the conduct of resolute, active operations against the enemy’s armies landed on Ösel. For this purpose I have requested the Commander in Chief for reinforcement of the Ösel group of armies. I myself have dispatched the ‘Death Battalion’ and in addition the 173rd Regiment.
Command of the ‘Death Battalion’, a special unit created by the provisional government of Russia for use in special actions, was given to the hitherto commander of Gavriil, Captain 2nd Rank P. O. Shishko, who had previously successfully led the landings at Domesnas in October 1915. Further troops were to be assembled in Hapsal. However, not all of the Russian commanders were of a like mind about resolute defence. When he received reports about the landing, the commander ashore, Rear Admiral Sveshnikov, immediately planned to leave Arensburg for Hapsal on the mainland, to lead the defence from there. Vice Admiral Bakhirev believed it was necessary for him and his staff to remain on Moon Island to maintain communications with the Army. Nevertheless, Rear Admiral Sveshnikov boarded the gunboat Chrabry, which was transferring to Kuiwast together with the gunboat Chivinetz, and arrived in Kuiwast at 0600hrs on October 13th. Later that same day, during the evening, and after discussions over the telegraph with the fleet commander, Rear Admiral Sveshnikov departed for Hapsal of his own volition.
During the evening of 12 October, Vice Admiral Bakhirev requested Rear Admiral Stark to assemble the division chiefs to determine, in detail, the condition of the forces and to develop plans to expel the Germans from the Kassar Wiek, which as Vice Admiral Bakhirev said, ‘had a tremendous importance to the safety of Moon Sound’.
At the conference it was learned that the condition of the torpedoboat-destroyers had been found to be satisfactory in general. It was also decided to try to clear the Kassar Wiek of German torpedoboats the following morning; the modern destroyers of the Novik type were designated for this task, with the support of the heavy and long- ranged guns of the gunboats Chrabry and Chivinetz from Arensburg. By far the most important part of the plan was the operation that was to blockade the Soelo Sound. This would be accomplished by sinking the steamer Latvia in the channel and laying a mine barrier there. An order was sent to Rogekul to prepare Latvia for this purpose and for the shallow-draught minelayer Pripyat to take aboard sixty mines and go to the Moon Sound. Admiral Bakhirev entrusted execution of this operation to Rear Admiral Stark.
A further event occurred during the night. A train carrying mines was wrecked in Rogekul and the mines detonated. Red hot glowing splinters started spontaneous fires on the breakwater and flames threatened to burn Pripyat. The minelayer was compelled to cast off. There was general panic but Leitenant Shternberg and some sailors and workers successfully extinguished the flames and prevented potentially enormous destruction at the base. Admiral Bakhirev believed the wrecking of the train was the work of German agents.
Vice Admiral Bakhirev’s final action for the night was to organize a landing party of eighty-six men from the big ships, under command of Michman Klesti, to bolster defences at the stone dam.
CHAPTER THREE
13 October: The Germans Trapped at Orrisar
The quiet, foggy weather which had dominated the first day of the operation was replaced on the morning of 13 October by a fresh wind from the south-southwest at strength 6 to 7, and although Tagga bay was sheltered, this increased the difficulty of the unloading work. In addition there were periods of rain.
At dawn the destroyers Avtroil and Leitenant Il’in were dispatched to Domesnas for reconnaissance. Near Rüno they were overflown by two German aircraft which were taken under fire. They did not find any German units and subsequently returned to Kuiwast.