The attack had failed completely, due mainly to the erratic performance of the torpedoes, which was thought to be due to the unfavourable water depth. Half the available aerial torpedoes had been expended without result. This poor outcome caused Vizeadmiral Schmidt, Chief of the Special Unit, to order that the I Torpedo Staffel be used primarily for bombing attacks and to conduct torpedo attacks only on especially rewarding targets and under favourable conditions.
After the failure of the torpedo-bombers it was decided to dispatch a hydroglider, under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Peytsch, to attack one of the steamers. The hydroglider was a small light craft, weighing just a few tonnes with a crew of three, and powered by 2 or 3 aero engines driving aero propellers. It was armed with a single torpedo. On 24 August Peytsch had sunk the transport Penelope with a torpedo in almost the same position. On 10 October at 1500hrs, the hydroglider put to sea from Windau and took course northeast along the coast, intending to conduct the attack in the evening twilight. The boat steered to Michaelsturm and from there took course through the mined area toward the roadstead off Mento. About 1718hrs the battery at Michaelsturm observed the boat traveling on a northeast course, but just a few moments later, at 1727hrs, the battery at Gross Irben observed a heavy detonation and bright flash, where just previously the hydroglider had been. The boat did not return and was probably destroyed by either a shallow positioned mine or an internal explosion.
The German airships were also active during the preparations for operation Albion. In addition to reconnaissance missions they also conducted bombing raids. During the night of 24/25 September at about 0245hrs, LZ120 (commanded by Kapitänleutnant von Lossnitzer) dropped 3,700kg of bombs on the Zerel battery and was followed up by LZ113 (Kapitänleunant Zaeschmar) with 2,000kg of bombs. The bombs were reported to have been dropped accurately. On the evening of 1 October, L30 (Oberleutnant zur See Vermehren) , L37 (Kapitänleutnant Paul Gartner) and LZ120 attacked Salis, Salismunde and the surrounding areas, dropping a total of 8,000kg of bombs. This area was poorly defended and L30 bombed from just 4,000 feet. The results of the attack remain unknown.
CHAPTER TWO
October 12th: The German Landing
The German operational plans for Albion called for a surprise landing by pioneer troops inside Tagga Bay on the northwest coast of Ösel, and simultaneously near Pamerort, a little further to the east. A breakthrough in the Irben Straits, to mount a landing somewhere inside the Riga Gulf, was not considered because the mine defences and battery No 43 at Zerel were simply too strong. Nevertheless, minesweeping work would be undertaken in the Straits in preparation for the later phases of the operation. Tagga Bay was not so well protected by mine barriers, although the approach route would have to be swept. It offered a secure, protected shelter, inside which troops could be landed and which could be sealed off with net barriers to protect the transport fleet from submarines. The first wave ashore, the pioneers, would be landed by torpedoboats and small steamers, which would provide supporting gunfire. After the beaches were secure, more troops and heavier equipment would be landed from the larger ships and transports.
The forces to be landed in Tagga Bay were the 131st Infantry Regiment (131 Regt) under Oberstleutnant Fischer, the 255th Reserve Infantry Regiment (255R Regt) under Oberst Berring, and the 65th Infantry Brigade commanded by Oberst Matthiass, which consisted of the 138th Infantry Regiment (138 Regt) and 17th Infantry Regiment (17 Regt). The four regiments were to be landed on the first operational day and spread out to the east and south; their bold objective was to capture the entire Russian garrison. After initially acting in support, 131 Regt was to strike south and capture the Sworbe Peninsula, including the Zerel Battery, and therefore facilitate the forcing of the Irben Straits by the naval forces. The 255R Regt were to strike SE towards Arensburg and capture the town. The 65th Brigade would move to the south and east and try to cut off any Russians retreating towards the east and Moon Island, and prevent any reinforcements coming westward. In consideration of this it was clear that the Island of Moon and its connection to Ösel by a 4 to 5 metre-wide, 3.5 kilometre-long stone dam were of vital importance, particularly to the Russian defenders of Ösel. Reinforcements could come across the dam from Moon and the mainland, and the garrison would also have a secure line of retreat. With this in mind the Russians had constructed bridgeheads at both ends of the stone dam. On Ösel a 6 to 7 km bow stretched from Masik to Saika to Neuenhof. It consisted of field fortifications and barbed wire. The stone dam was also important to the Germans, as to possess it not only prevented reinforcements and precluded the defenders from retreating, it would also isolate them. The earthwork defences were not permanently occupied by the Russians so the German leadership determined on a plan to land some mobile forces, cyclists, on the northern tip of Ösel near Pamerort; they would immediately race across the north of Ösel through Orrisar to the stone dam, in an effort to take the Russians by surprise and occupy the defences first. The Russian line of communication would then be severed. The forces allocated for this task were the I and II Cyclist Battalions and the sturmkompanie (assault company) of Hauptmann von Winterfeld, together with a half battery of guns. The Germans hoped that they would be able to hold the stone dam, or at least delay the Russians.
The German preparations for Operation Albion did not go unnoticed by the Russian forces. The Russian Intelligence Service (SNIS) was still operating with a good deal of efficiency. Vice Admiral Bakhirev wrote:
On September 24th I received news about the arrival in the Baltic of large enemy units in the near future. I let Captain 1st Rank Knüpfer know about this.
On October 3rd the XII Army communicated to me that a night attack and landing on Ösel was expected. I notified the Moon Sound chief in Arensburg about this, and again notified Captain 1st Rank Knüpfer.
On October 10th the Chief of the Operations Department of the Fleet Commander notified me that on the 11th a German fleet operation unknown to us would begin in the Baltic. I communicated the contents of the telegram to Rear Admiral Sveshnikov and ordered Captain 1st Rank Knüpfer to maintain a state of increased readiness.
With the disturbing news about the German fleet I detained some units in the Riga Gulf that were previously detached for leave.
It is clear, therefore, that the Russian fleet commander knew of the commencement date of the German operation. Vice Admiral Bakhirev also passed on this news to the commander of the land forces on Ösel, Kontre Admiral Sveshnikov. Yet when the German sea forces arrived off the Ösel coast it appeared as if their appearance came as a surprise to the defenders.