The Neutron was originally not considered applicable to environments like the jungles of Vietnam, but as the war progressed, more than one expert in the Pentagon suggested that it could be used on specific military targets in the North, for as much as a terror weapon as for its strategic value. By the spring of 1967, without any one source pushing it, the Neutron Option had emerged as the chief alternative to any further escalation in Southeast Asia. Yet even at this late date, nobody in either the military or civilian branches wanted to take the onus on themselves for going nuclear or all that it would entail. Then came the March on the Pentagon the third week of April.
It had been the stated purpose of these protesters to shut down the operations of the Defense Department, so at the Secretary’s direction, everyone was expected to be at work that day; many of us had come in the night before and had napped on hastily procured cots in our offices. Our victory would be the fact that we carried on as usual and conducted business despite the fact that there were a half a million screaming fanatics outside, blocking every exit. It was shocking that we had descended to this level of mob rule in America so quickly. There were assurances that there was adequate backup in case things turned ugly, which of course it did, but not before there occurred an incident that was completely overlooked at the time, but one which I believe had enormous consequences for the course of the war.
Despite the presence of the protesters outside, we were determined to conduct business as normal on the inside. Secretary Nixon refused to even acknowledge their presence even though Mr. Haldeman would whisper into his ear an update on the situation every half hour. In some ways it seemed ridiculous since we could easily hear their obscene chants through the closed windows. Sometime after lunch I was in the Secretary’s second floor office reviewing aerial reconnaissance photos of bombing sights. The mob was just below the window and even though the blinds were drawn, we were certainly aware of the rabble’s close proximity only a few feet below us. We were discussing the wording in the report with an Assistant Secretary when some kind of projectile exploded against the window glass. In an instant I had pulled the Secretary to the floor, where, along with everyone else in that room, we hugged the carpet with the roar of the crowd outside filling the air, certain that some gunman outside had us in their crosshairs; although it was determined later in the day that it was something vile like a bottle filled with urine. Aides quickly ushered us to safety and the Secretary seemed to be only momentarily flustered, but he made sure that not a word about the incident leaked to the newspapers.
The nearest analogy that I can make to this occurrence is when the Confederate shell struck a porch column at Union Headquarters that General Hooker was leaning against during the battle of Chancellorsville. Yet instead of losing his courage, like the stunned Hooker did, Secretary Nixon’s nerve steeled; overnight he became the biggest proponent of using the Neutron bomb in Vietnam. “We are losing control of the situation, more and more we are doing nothing but simply reacting to Hanoi, and now we have fight those spoiled bums right here in America. It’s becoming a two front war and we must regain the initiative right away.” That was how he explained his thinking to me a few days after the “riot.” In less than a week he had put together a proposal for using the Neutrons and took it to the White House, where it was hotly debated in the National Security Council. There was a lot of opposition from some of the civilian advisors, as expected, but we were able to line up the Joint Chiefs behind us. Most of our opponents were in a bad position to start with, since they had originally been opposed to any further widening of the war, and now they were arguing against a plan to end the war quickly and in our favor if we were willing to take the risk.
In the end only the President’s opinion mattered and the Secretary made it plain to him that using the Neutrons was worth setting the dangerous precedent of using tactical nuclear weapons for the first time and risk facing the firestorm of criticism that was sure to follow. Again and again he made it clear to the President that only a swift bold move now would avoid a stalemate that would force us into a negotiated settlement that would be seen as a victory by the Communists. And a triumph by the Communists after all the men that sacrificed their lives in Southeast Asia would mean the end of both men’s political reputations. “Dick, it looks like I’m going have to step in shit no matter which way I go.” The President said after a series of meetings in the Oval Office, “but this is going to raise one hell of a Goddamn stink.”
“Mr. President,” the Secretary replied, “our enemies are trying force us into a corner where we will be forced to accept their terms for ending the war. I propose we knock a hole in the wall and get out of that corner and settle this conflict on our own terms.”
In the end, and with much trepidation, the President accepted the Secretary’s recommendation with some reservations. Twenty-five warheads would be assembled and ready at Edwards Air Force Base in California by May 15, they would then be dispersed and flown to Clark Field in Philippines. From there they would be ferried out to the Task Force attached to the Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea and attached to the proper SSMs, where they’d await the final orders of the President. Humanitarian concerns demanded that we make at least a token effort to reach a cease fire with the North Vietnamese before we used such a devastating weapon, but we knew that it was a waste of time before it was even tried, but the President made a public statement announcing that it was time for the Communists to come to terms or face “dire consequences.” All we got from Hanoi was silence, although we later learned from the surviving members of Ho’s inner circle that there was a sizable minority in the Communist leadership in the spring of ‘67 who believed they were losing too much on the battle field and that it was time open negotiations with us. Unfortunately we were totally in the dark about what was happening in Hanoi and we couldn’t exploit the situation to our advantage.
I flew to Saigon on May 24 to brief Gen. Westmoreland and observe the situation from that vantage point. With no change in the North Vietnamese position, the President authorized the use of the Neutrons the next day. Starting on May 26, and for the following five days, we hit selected military targets in North Vietnam with a series of Neutron warheads mounted on the proper missiles; their targets would be ammunition dumps, supply depots, anti-aircraft batteries, rail terminals, and airfields-anything that would disrupt their ability to wage war and demoralize their will to fight. I saw the first aerial reconnaissance photos of the attack sites and knew the operation had been a complete success. They showed empty buildings surrounded by scores of dead bodies; we had taken them by total surprise.
There was no announcement from the U.S. Government or the Saigon Command concerning the Neutron attacks, a controversial decision in light of later claims that American soldiers were needlessly exposed to radiation in forward areas, but it was done with the intention of not tipping our hand to the enemy. The story did not break until a French reporter, based in Hong Kong, visited one the bombing sites and filed a report that was picked up by the AP on June 3rd. Within days every headline in the country was screaming about Nuclear War in Nam. Resolutions of condemnation were introduced in Congress, the President and Secretary Nixon were denounced as war criminals on every major campus, luckily for us the majority of students had gone home for the summer by then, and only their fellow traveling professors were left to spit poison. Still, on the second Sunday in June, over 100,000 marched in San Francisco protesting “US Nuclear Imperialism,” and there were similar demonstrations in London and Paris. A number of our fair weather friends recalled their Ambassadors. The foreign reaction we watched the most was in Moscow; they made fulsome noises about “nuclear terrorism” and there were reports in TASS of young Communists volunteering to go and fight with their socialist brothers in North Vietnam, but that was about it. Their real reaction wouldn’t come until later in the year.