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If this scenario were just one of Pat Robertson’s more outrageous demands, it could be safely ignored. In fact, though, such thinking is widespread among Christian and social conservatives. For example, in 1997, Chuck Colson wrote in Christianity Today about his displeasure with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boerne v. Flores, which held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed by Congress to address the standard under which religious practices could be curtailed by government, was unconstitutional. Colson raised the question of who determines what the Constitution means: the Supreme Court, the Congress, or the president? Colson claimed that “contrary to what most Americans think, the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court final say on constitutional questions.” He further asserted that in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison, “the Court assumed the power of judicial review,” yet “three presidents have resisted Court orders: Thomas Jefferson refused to execute the Alien Imposition Act; [Andrew] Jackson spurned a Court order in a banking case; [and] Lincoln rejected the Dred Scott decision.”[81] Colson, like Robertson and others on the religious right, is seeking, in effect, to nullify Supreme Court decisions of which he does not approve. Because such arguments are being made increasingly in lengthy law journal articles, which are later cited by conservative judges, it is worth taking a look at conservative scholarship in this area, and Colson is considered a scholar by his contemporaries.[82]

First, contrary to Colson’s suggestion, the practice that is now called “judicial review” (the ability of federal courts to overturn acts of Congress) did not start with Marbury, but was already well established by 1803 and the Marbury ruling. In fact, the Court noted in Marbury that “[t]he question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land” was to be resolved by relying on “long and well established” principles.[83] Even before the Constitutional Convention, high state courts had held legislative acts unconstitutional in several states, and references in the constitutional debates suggest that the delegates to the convention assumed federal courts would have such review authority. Members of the First Congress certainly understood that Supreme Court justices would decide constitutional questions. For example, Abraham Baldwin of Georgia stated during a debate of the First Congress, when speaking of the judiciary, that “it is their province to decide upon our laws; and if they find them unconstitutional, they will not hesitate to declare it so.” During the same debate, Peter Sylvester of New York added, “It is certain that the Judiciary will be better able to decide the question of constitutionality in this way than any other. If we are wrong, that can correct our error.”[84] Also long before Marbury, the newly created federal circuit courts, with Supreme Court justices presiding, reviewed the constitutionality of acts of federal officials and scrutinized federal statutes on no less than twenty occasions. Justice James Wilson, appointed by President George Washington and one of the more scholarly of the first justices, prepared a series of now famous lectures in 1790 and 1791 in which he explained that the courts must decide constitutional questions as a check on the legislature. In 1794 the Supreme Court declared a law passed by Congress in 1792, the Pension Act, was unconstitutional.[85] In short, the Court has had this power from the outset, and contrary to Colson’s claim, it did not suddenly “assume” it in 1803.

Colson’s historical examples, suggesting that presidents and Congress need not be bound by Supreme Court rulings, are red herrings. His claim that Thomas Jefferson did not execute “the Alien Imposition Act” is incorrect, for there is no such law. If Colson is referring to the infamous Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, it had nothing to do with a court order, and the example is therefore very misleading. When Jefferson was vice president, President John Adams asked him for his legal opinion of the sedition act (which made seditious libel a crime); Jefferson replied that he believed it to be unconstitutional. Nonetheless, Federalist judges upheld the law, and John Adams prosecuted under it—to his everlasting historical shame. When Jefferson became president he pardoned those who had been convicted. Because the act expired on March 3, 1801, and Jefferson was not inaugurated until March 4, 1801, he could not execute it anyway, since the law no longer existed.

Colson’s claim that President Andrew Jackson “spurned a Court order in a banking case” is also misleading. Presumably, Colson is referring to Jackson’s veto in 1832 of a bill to recharter the Bank of the United States. In taking this action, Jackson relied on the constitutional argument that Chief Justice John Marshall had rejected in McCulloch v. Maryland two years earlier, when the court upheld the constitutionality of the bank. President Jackson’s veto, however, was not in defiance of a court order, for the Supreme Court had not said it was unconstitutional to not have a bank, so Jackson was under no obligation to recharter a national bank.[86]

Finally, in regard to his claim that Lincoln rejected the Dred Scott decision: Colson added in his commentary that “Lincoln even asked Congress to overrule the Court—which it did; passing a law that reversed Dred Scott.” That is a stunning summation, not to mention distortion, of history. What actually occurred was that the Supreme Court issued its abominable opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford in 1857, asserting that slaves were neither citizens nor persons under the Constitution; that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories; and that the Declaration of Independence’s statement that “all men are created equal” referred only to white men. In 1858, during the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates when Lincoln was running for the Senate, Dred Scott was discussed. Lincoln, who later lost the race, argued that the Court had misread both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. He believed Dred Scott to be a political ruling, and rejected its politics, arguing, “We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.” Seeking reversal is not defiance of the law. Not until the outbreak of the Civil War did Lincoln actually defy the Supreme Court, when he suspended the writ of habeas corpus.[*] As for the Dred Scott decision, contrary to Colson’s inference, it would take more than a law passed by Congress to overturn the decision. In fact, it required two amendments to the Constitution: the Thirteenth and Fourteenth. Lincoln, as it happened, asked for neither, although some historians believe he encouraged Senator John B. Henderson to introduce the joint congressional resolution to abolish slavery that eventually became the Thirteenth Amendment.[87] The Fourteenth Amendment was not proposed until June 13, 1866, over a year after Lincoln had been assassinated.

Colson’s baseless arguments are unfortunately typical of those that authoritarian conservatives insist on making, using facts that are irrelevant or misleading, if not demonstrably wrong. The self-righteousness of authoritarians, particularly of Double Highs like Colson and Pat Robertson, has become so pronounced that at times it seems as if they believe themselves actually to be speaking ex cathedra. Their contention that the president of the United States is not bound by rulings of the Supreme Court, or, for that matter, by the laws of Congress, when these rulings or laws relate to the functions of the presidency has gained increasing currency with authoritarian conservatives, both leaders and followers. As I will show in the close of the following chapter, this claim is truly frightening in its implications.

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81.

Charles Colson and Nancy Pearcey, “Who holds these truths?,” Christianity Today (October 6, 1997), 144.

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82.

For example, Mark Noll mentions Colson’s works when exploring the question “Is an Evangelical Intellectual Renaissance Underway,” in Mark A. Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1994), 223.

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83.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 147 (1803).

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84.

See David E. Engdahl, “John Marshall’s ‘Jeffersonian’ Concept of Judicial Review,” Duke Law Journal (November 1992), 279, 284–89.

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85.

Ibid. Professor Engdahl’s examination of often neglected data is the basis for the summary I have provided of pre-Marbury practices regarding judicial review.

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86.

See Michael Stokes Paulsen, “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,” Georgetown Law Journal (December 1994), 217, 259 n.159. Professor Paulsen argued that presidents do have the power to interpret the law.

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*

Military authorities had arrested a number of suspected secessionists, including John Merryman. Chief Justice Robert Taney, who had written the Dred Scott opinion, ordered the Army commander holding Merryman to produce him, but the Army commander, under orders from Lincoln, ignored the Court’s order. In holding the commander in contempt, Taney wrote in Ex parte Merryman that he had done all he could do by issuing his order, and that he believed Lincoln now had no constitutional power to suspend the writ. Lincoln disagreed, and on July 4, 1861, gave a full explanation to Congress of why he had suspended the writ: to preserve the Union.