The second book deals with the numerous “oddities” related with Russia's preparation for the clearly anticipated military conflict in the Far East, traditionally attributed to the imperfection and lack of resourcefulness of the state controlling mechanism in the Russian Empire. When viewed systematically, all the steps taken by Russia in preparation for the war do instead form a cohesive stream of ventures, not subject to any arbitrariness or lapses. All those 'oddities' will rather present themselves as a series of energetic, well-planned and well-organized acts that led to the notoriously unfavorable conditions for Russia's involvement in the future conflict.
Book II also considers the very peculiar command of the Russian Manchuria Army, also traditionally explained away by the “lack of talent” in Russian military commanders. The documents and witness accounts presented in the book rather cause one to conclude that he commandment was indeed brilliant. The big question however is s whose interests were actually pursued?
For especially serious and politically correct persons may we note that the title of the second book in no way refers to any territorial claims, nor indeed to any other claims that Russia may have to China, but rather has the exclusively metahistorical meaning.
At the center of the Author's attention in this treatise was the Tsushima Battle, which is the subject of the third part of the Trilogy, in conjunction with the contemporary local and world-wide historical events. During this relatively short period, the forces that would normally prefer to stay back in the shade, had manifested themselves in full measure.
What did actually happen in the Tsushima Strait on May 14,1905?
In finding this out the author, who was investigating the circumstances of the Battle itself and the preceding events, was helped a lot by the witness accounts by those participants whom the author calls trustworthy.
This approach proved to be very productive. As a result, a practical criterion was developed for the assessment of the trustworthiness of the participants9 accounts and vision of the historical events, which the author has called the Tsushima Criterion. The Tsushima Criterion may well be used as a practicable instrument for investigating any historical situations, especially of extreme nature.
It should be noted from the outset that Tsushima was treated not only as one military action of the Russo-Japanese War, important as it was, but as a salient geopolitical factor in the history of both Russia and the world at large, or metaphorically, its bifurcation point.
The author therefore saw as his most important task to clarify the circumstances of the preparation, long and meticulous, for the action, and pointing out some other factors that determined both the progress and the results of the Battle. It was not the author's special concern to break fresh ground, yet he was able to unearth something in the peripetiea of the battle that had to date been “the best kept secret”.
As an example, obviously the most unexpected, if not perhaps the most crucial, result of the entire work was the conclusion that the Tsushima Battle, or in any case its preliminary operation s the first offensive by the Russian squadron s was a doubtless tactical success, a victory of the Russian naval martial art. The whole of Tsushima, in any case its first day, was a victory of the Russian martial spirit, not abated by any material factors.
The first to recognize this were the Japanese admirals who went to any lengths to distort the truth about the first stages of the Battle in their reports and schemes, despite the fact that their material success during the daytime action of May 14, s the annihilation of the majority of the best battleships of the 2nd Squadron, s was really impressive.
Only in the light of this factual truth, concealed from the world right to this day, can we get an understanding of why the Minister of Navy of the victorious Japan, the Admiral-Baron Yamamoto Gombay, already after the Tsushima, undertook frenzied efforts to persuade his Government to “agree to concessions for the sake of peace”1{555}, which he did in concord with the Minister of War, the Minister of Economy as well as the commanding officers of the victorious Japanese Manchurian Army.
The possibly true pattern of the battle reconstructed in this work in the graphical as well as in other forms, shows clearly that it was not the brilliant tactical talent of the Japanese Commanders-in-Chief that was the genuine reason of our national tragedy.
The true reasons are pointed out of the Russian Fleet's perishing in Tsushima.
In the Tsushima Battle the officers and seamen of the Russian Imperial Navy manifested the loyalty and steadfastness that were far beyond human nature, such in fact that way ahead in 1941, Japan deemed it more expedient to stand out against two most powerful navy fleets of the world, the British and American.
And Yamato's sons were very nearly right!
In this sense, Tsushima was indeed a strategic victory of Russia and her Navy!
The discovered historical facts have aroused interest in the officers and admirals of the contemporary Russian Navy who were able to read the manuscript.
Please note that the author has deliberately clad this manuscript, which is comprised almost entirely of documents that are introduced for the learned society's attention for the first time ever, and is therefore a full-fledged scientific treatise in nature, in the form of a historical crime story written in a rather free style. In the author's opinion, this free-style approach to presenting the material that might otherwise be found boring, renders the book a pleasant reading for a mass reader rather than only a narrow circle of professionals.
In this the author strictly follows the behest of Lev Gumilev who believed clothing the scientific ideas in a “funny Russian style” to be the most effective way of driving those ideas home to the mass reader.
The same purpose is promoted by the super-detailed tables of contents for each book, making them sort of a brief introduction, or perhaps even separate chapters, within the larger context of the books.
Despite its rather bulky size the Trilogy is just a beginning, an invitation to a discourse, or probably a reflection, about the genuine aspects of the Russian and World History, especially the New and the most recent History.
The author is grateful to the reader for his/her interest in the issues raised and the points made and would appreciate any response, positive or negative alike.
Галенин Борис Глебович родился в 1947 году в Москве. В 1970 году закончил механико-математический факультет МГУ. им. М.В. Ломоносова. Много лет работал в системе Минморфлота СССР.
Кандидат технических наук, специалист по защите портов от волнения. Автор многих научных работ по данной проблематике, в том числе «Ветер, волны и морские порты» (Л., 1986).