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(5) American Embassy ID photo of Violetta Seina.
(6) Violetta Seina posing with a rose in photo sent to Clayton Lonetree while he was stationed in Vienna.
(7) Violetta Seina at age thirteen.
(8) Violetta Seina as she appeared on the CBS newsmagazine Eye to Eye in January 1995.
(9) CIA photo of “Uncle Sasha,” who was identified as KGB agent Aleksei Yefimov.
(10) CIA photo of “George,” who was identified as KGB agent Yuri Lysov.
(11) The editorial cartoon that infuriated Marine Commandant General P. X. Kelly.
(12) Sgt. Clayton Lonetree (second from right) being escorted into his court-martial by three Marine guards.
(13) Lanny McCullah, Director of Counterintelligence for the Naval Investigative Service at the time of the Lonetree affair, and the man who headed the espionage investigations.
(18) A copy of the letter Violetta sent to Clayton Lonetree in prison accepting his proposal of marriage.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As tricky as it is to research and write about intelligence issues, acknowledging everyone “without whose help…” can be just as problematic. There are people who gave me their trust and time and who, for legitimate personal and professional reasons, spoke only on condition of anonymity. There are people who continue to be employed in sensitive positions whose careers would be jeopardized were I to credit their contribution publicly. And there are people in Russia who spoke openly to me only on the assurance their names would never be revealed, because a lesson of their country’s history has been that what it is permissible to say today could be grounds for punishment tomorrow. So to all those who helped but do not find themselves mentioned—and you know who you are—you have my gratitude.

While I’m still in a covert state of mind, I’d like to thank the Central Intelligence Agency—for nothing. I share the frustrations expressed by virtually everyone in this story who had to deal with the CIA. Direct letters to the public affairs office, requests under the Freedom of Information Act, intervention by sympathetic congressmen, all elicited the same response: “We can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any information relating to your appeal.”

The KGB was more cooperative with this endeavor than the CIA. It was Soviet intelligence agents, not American, who initially parted the veil for me on the Vienna intrigues involving Yuri Lysov and the CIA “hooded witness” at the court-martial. The CIA, it turns out, had been aware of Clayton Lonetree’s espionage activities before he turned himself in.

As I later learned, Yuri Lysov had been servicing other American personnel at the embassy, some in positions significantly higher than Lonetree’s, and the CIA was allowing him to continue to operate in order to determine the full range of the people he was in contact with until it sprang its own recruitment trap on him. This was an operation it had been committed to before Lonetree came on the scene, which was why it took so long for the Agency to make up its mind how to handle Lonetree. It was considering whether or not there was a way to use Lonetree to get to George. Detailed questioning of John Doe at the court-martial could have jeopardized the CIA’s plans, which were still in progress at that time.

Perhaps it will come as no surprise that information relating to CIA activities as they pertained to the Lonetree case comes, in part, from Aldrich Ames. Mr. Ames’s efforts to shed light on whether or not and how the KGB might have used Lonetree to divert attention from his activities, as well as the way losses due to him factored into the CIA’s perception of the seriousness of the Lonetree case, were helpful and he deserves to be thanked.

As long as I’m dipping the pen in gall, this appears to be the place for me to mention Ronald Kessler, author of Moscow Station: How the KGB Penetrated the American Embassy, which covered some of the same ground I have, although in dramatically different fashion. Published within two years of the Marine Spy Scandal, Mr. Kessler’s book alleges that the NIS had criminally mishandled the investigation, the KGB had successfully penetrated the embassy code room, and the U.S. government was engaged in a massive cover-up. Mr. Kessler was kind enough to share with me the transcripts of many of the interviews he conducted, for which I am appreciative. But in all honesty, looking at his book now, I feel it is so full of erroneous presumptions that it is best viewed as a cautionary tale that illustrates the trap a writer of fact-based spy books falls into when he’s in a hurry to publish provocative claims. Time magazine reached a similar conclusion when, just months after turning its cover and eight inside pages of extracts over to the book, it conducted its own investigation into Mr. Kessler’s assertions: The printed results amounted to a remarkable retraction. Even Aldrich Ames, in a letter to me, described Moscow Station as a significant piece of disinformation that provided him with almost as much cover as the Lonetree case did. According to Mr. Ames, when Kessler resuscitated the fear that the embassy had been penetrated, the CIA took a second look at the case, which meant more wasted energy and diverted resources. “It was sensationalism and lies… but of course I was rooting for the Kessler thesis.”

In the process of reconstructing the internal consciousness of Clayton Lonetree, I drew on a number of sources, including a personal conversation and letters from Lonetree to me; interviews with his mother, father, and sister; interviews with all his attorneys; notes taken by the defense team’s investigator; interviews with psychologists who interviewed him; letters he wrote to a variety of people; published articles and books; and conversations with teachers, counselors, and friends of his. My ability to do the same with Violetta comes from personal conversations with her; questions submitted to her and answered through an intermediary; interviews with her mother, her sister, close friends, former instructors, and her coworkers in the KGB; and letters she wrote to Clayton Lonetree.

From the Marine Corps, both active and retired, I want to especially thank Lt. Col. Dave Beck, Maj. Dave Henderson, and Lt. Col. Mike Powell for the hours they gave me. As well, Col. Craig Mayer, Col. David Breme, Col. Jim Schwenk, Maj. Jay Drescher, Maj. Dwight Sullivan, Col. Tom Bowman, Mast. Gun. Sgt. Joey Wingate, Cap. Andy Strotman, and Brig. Gen. Mike Rich. And for allowing me to experience what it was like to be a Marine security guard in training for a day, my thanks to Major Milburn, Colonel Benson, Master Sergeant Roland, and Captain Whielden.

From the Navy, my appreciation to Lt. Comdr. Forrest Sherman, Commander Mounts, Capt. Phil Roberts, and Lt. Comdr. Jerome Cwiklinski.

From the Naval Investigative Service (now called the Naval Criminal Investigative Service), which was understandably reluctant at first to participate in what might have been another round of NIS bashing but took a chance in order to have its side of the story told more fairly, I’d like to extend my appreciation to Lanny McCullah, Goethe “Bud” Aldridge, “John Skinner,” and Angelic White. As well, Kent Walker, Dave Moyer, John Triplett, Robert Powers, Vic Palmucci, Ron Larsen, Diana Collins, Al Reese, Al Billington.