The Monarchy
There is another side to the Iraqi officer and enlisted relationship, of course. The Iraqi officers treat the soldiers like servants. It is very difficult for enlisted soldiers to take orders from their officers if they believe the officers do not care about them. Here is a perfect example. One day we were rolling through the Haditha market and spotted a vehicle that looked like one of the vehicles on our BOLO (be on the lookout) list. Our Humvee immediately flagged the vehicle to pull over, then we called up the rear Iraqi Humvee to go search the car.
After five minutes the Iraqi Humvee finally pulled up. We waited for another five minutes and began to wonder why nobody was searching the car. We asked our terp Mark to call them on the Iraqi radio net to find out what the situation was. Mark explained, “Gents, the Humvee alongside us is full of Iraqi officers and they are refusing to do “soldier” tasks. They see their role as commanders and thus do not have a role in actually conducting any of the work.” Major Gaines and I each looked at each other, dumbfounded. Gaines replied, “Mark, are you kidding me or are you serious?” Mark replied, “I’m not joking, Gaines. The Iraqi officers just called on some enlisted soldiers from one of the front Humvees to come back and search the vehicle.” Confused, I said, “Mark, the officers are twenty feet from the car. The soldiers they called on are two football fields away. I don’t get it.” Mark smirked and said, “I know. It’s stupid. Welcome to Iraq.”
I guess none of this was surprising. The concept of king and servant seems to be pervasive in Iraqi culture. The sad part is that we are supposed to change these people somehow. In the words of one of our Camp Taji instructors, “Teach the Iraqis the concept of the leader being the servant of his men. Teach the Iraqi officers that they must respect their enlisted soldiers.” Are you kidding me? That’s equivalent to asking us to convince the American people that they need to stop watching NFL football and start watching professional soccer. Changing a culture is not a mission, it’s a pipe dream.
The Status Quo Cannot Go
Major Pyle and I spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Ali about promoting Sergeant Major Kasem to the highest position of enlisted leadership in the battalion. We suggested that he replace Sergeant Major Nayim, who maintained the current position and had failed miserably in his role. Major Pyle stated the facts. “Seyidi [Sir], Kasem is a stellar leader, has impressive initiative, and gets things done on camp. We believe Kasem should be in the highest enlisted position. He can have a positive influence on the entire battalion, show off his work ethic, and reinforce the concept that meritocracy wins over nepotism.”
Lieutenant Colonel Ali was visibly confused. He gave Pyle an odd look. “Why would I promote Kasem? If we promote Kasem we have to get someone else to fill his current job and he is doing a great job where he is. If I move him to Nayim’s position, he has to learn another job. It makes absolutely no sense. And if I give him a promotion, all of the jundi will want promotions. Finally, if Nayim gets kicked out of the top enlisted position, he will lose all respect in the battalion. I will not do this. Nayim is my friend.” Major Pyle’s jaw dropped to the ground—and for good reason. How can a Marine respond sensibly to something like this?
Sometimes the Iraqis just don’t get it. Their deep-seated tribal influences reinforce some of their least productive traits: maintaining the status quo, nepotism, playing favorites, and fixating on pride and honor. The concept that the hardest-working, most-qualified individuals should be rewarded for their efforts is completely foreign to them.
Chapter 13
Iraqis Speak on the Nation, Region, and Military
“Mark,” I said to our Kurdish terp, “I’d like to hear what your opinion is of the American invasion. When the plan was written up, we would free the country’s people from Saddam’s oppressive grip and these people would then rebuild the society and become the beacon of democracy in the Middle East. What went wrong?” Mark smiled and playfully punched me in the shoulder. “Jamal, I never thought an American could admit that something may have gone wrong in the Iraq invasion. Are you sure you are not an Iranian spy?” I said, “Mark, shut up. Get on with your story.” He said, “Jamal, I think America screwed up in four categories when they came in during the original invasion.”
The Nation
Mark lectured me on the situation in Iraq before the U.S. invasion. “The majority of people in Iraq were excited the Americans were coming, particularly the Kurdish, Shia, and highly educated,” he said. “Despite the misinformed Western vision of a Saddam-controlled media feeding Iraqi people propaganda that vilified the United States, many Iraqis had their eyes wide open to the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian media outlets through illegal satellite dishes. This opened our eyes to the good things Americans could bring to Iraq. Basically, the stage was set for a successful American campaign.”
Mark paused before going on. “Listen, Jamal, it was no secret Saddam was in a desperate fight for the population’s support. His groveling for support actually made the Iraqis feel more and more that what America had to offer was better, even if we weren’t sure what this offering would be. It got so pathetic that Saddam ordered banks to give everyone a hundred dollars if they would support him in the war against America. They would never admit it in public, but my guess is the majority of Iraqis wanted the Americans to invade.”
“Mark,” I asked, “if people were excited about us invading, why am I here three years later dodging IEDs?” He replied, “Well, everything went down the crapper because of four key mistakes: opening the borders, disbanding the army and police, leaving the military bases open and unguarded, and leaving the banks unsecured.” In his professional manner Mark elaborated:
When the Americans opened the borders, or at least left them unsecured, it let Al Qaeda fighters, Syrians, and Iranians come into the region to create chaos. This was the first sign to the Iraqi people that there was a weakness in the American’s ability to secure the situation. Then you guys had the brain-dead idea of disbanding the Iraqi army and Iraqi police. The Iraqis would have accepted this if the Americans had maintained the security these services provided, but instead you guys fired the security forces and at the same time let the thieves and bandits run rampant. This was strike two against America. Next you left the Iraqi army camps unguarded after the invasion. This allowed everyone in the country to arm and prepare for guerrilla warfare. Hell, with my own eyes I saw grandmothers carrying RPGs out of the camps so they could sell them for money. It was a free-for-all. If the United States put in a simple effort to secure these facilities the number of weapons and ammunition available to the subsequent insurgency movement would have been erased. Finally, strike four for America was leaving the banks unsecured. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back, Jamal. Iraq went from a semimodern banking system to the stone age after the invasion. Thieves were robbing banks without consequence and the American soldiers simply watched it happen. All the money that was once held in the hands of decent Iraqis transferred into the paws of the nefarious Iraqis. You guys fucked us, plain and simple.