The Agent leveled his weapon to fire at Peter’s car but, at the last minute, wisely held back due to the amount of bystanders on the busy street.
Peter wasted no time, his tires squealed as he quickly sped off. With his cover blown he had no choice but to proceed with his backup plan.
Satisfied he had outrun his pursers, Peter steered his car to the main route moving south. No doubt the FBI and police would set up roadblocks going north towards Philadelphia. He had to outsmart them. Going in the direction they least expected.
Peter still had another hour until he reached his alternate site. He eased his seat back and turned off the cars radio. He wanted to focus on the list the former KGB agent had provided him. According to his Syrian trainers the KGB list would include the exact location of two, suitcase sized, nuclear warheads. The Syrians said the Soviets buried the weapons in the United States during the late 1970’s for “insurance” to hold off the United States and still maintain its deadly threat — a subtle one, but one ever so present. For this “insurance,” the Soviet Union chose to smuggle a total of thirty-four, “suitcase” sized warheads into the US via diplomatic shipments.
Using this cover, the Soviet Union shipped the 40 pound, 3 foot by 2 foot by 2 foot thick black lead-lined cases to the US with routine cargo traveling to the Soviet Union’s Embassy in Washington DC during the 1976-79 timeframe. Upon their arrival in the United States, each suitcase was dispersed to a predetermined location personally chosen by the Soviet Premier and the KGB Directorate Chief.
Once all the warheads were all dispersed, the Soviet Union’s KGB Washington office purposely leaked information about their existence to the American CIA. At first, the Americans brushed it aside as another KGB hoax. Brushed aside, the Soviets then offered to provide one of the weapons as a “sacrificial lamb” for the Americans. What had they to lose? Once a deal was brokered between the two agencies, a lone CIA agent accompanied one KGB Agent to suitcase number seventeen’s location. Number seventeen lay buried on the grounds of the Washington DC Headquarters of the Treasury Building, 2–1/2 feet below a row of Abraham Lincoln rose bushes on the eastern side of the building—and a mere 1 block from the White House. When the suitcase weapon was retrieved from its earthen grave, the CIA weapons expert was horrified, knowing instantly that it was no longer a hoax.
The expert knew the weapon was of such sophistication that it would have instantly wiped out everyone and everything with-in an 8-block radius of detonation; eventually killing many more through radiation poisoning that would linger for weeks after the initial explosion.
The 8-block area they presently stood in included: the White House, Capitol Building, FBI Headquarters, Treasury Building, and the Supreme Court.
The CIA expert reportedly blessed himself and said a prayer as the KGB Agent verified the weapons status.
Once removed from its concealed location, the KGB Agentcarefully re-packaged the weapon for shipment and escort it back to its Washington Embassy — all as agreed before hand with the CIA.
The Soviets were not about to turn over one of their most potent and complex weapons for dissection to an adversary such as the American CIA. This was just a game of show and tell. The Soviets had revealed their hand, now it was time for the Americans to run off like Paul Revere.
After the information and the initial shock wore off, the CIA realized the Soviet Union’s vast spy network located with-in the United States was to be considered even more potent and dangerous then its master. The possibility existed that a small cadre of undercover personnel could strike back at the US even if the Soviet Union were to become incapacitated during a first strike. Even more troublesome to the boys at Langley was the realization that the Soviets also had the ability to perform its own first strike on US facilities. Under this scenario, the United States Command structure at NORAD would have no warning of the actual strike until it was already over. This meant it would already be too late for a response since the Soviets would have wisely planted the weapons near the only persons and facilities authorized to strike back.
For a generation the US military planned for a nuclear response if its command at NORAD-Cheyenne Mountain detected a weapons launch. Now the rules of engagement had suddenly changed.
How could they respond to a weapons detonation, on its own soil, without proof of responsibility?
If the US held any advantage up to this point, this effectively evened the playing field or even tilted it slightly in the Soviets favor. As the CIA would discover years latter via their own Soviet spy network, the weapons were ultimately buried near major military and high profile civilian installations. Included on the short list was a location in Langley, Virginia — a mere 4 blocks from CIA headquarters.
The Russian Government reportedly kept the “need to know” list short. Only 9persons knew the exact locations of the buried weapons. What the Russian Government overlooked was the possibility of the list having been compromised by someone else — possibly a trained spy who also spied on his own people when it suited his own best interests. With this type of person included, the list reached a total of 10 or 11 who possessed the Godlike knowledge.
Boris infiltrated or “examined” his boss’s office on a periodic basis to keep abreast of situations that had or might arise, always wanting to stay ahead.
On one such occasion, the list of suitcase weapons locations presented themselves by making an appearance on his boss’s desk, right in the open for all to see. Boris simply copied the list in shorthand, and then memorized the locations over the next several days and nights. This allowed Boris to burn any evidence of the list and keep this one piece of information as his potential trump card for years to come, waiting until the time was right to prudently make his move.
This was just such a time — but he would only lay down two of his aces — keeping the remaining 32 for some future actions should the need arise.
The person in receipt of those “aces” was one Peter Zarinsko nee Muhammad Maizf, thanks to the actions of Boris Stevensky.
The short list who knew of the existence of the suitcase weapons had now grown by a one, making Peter’s small homeland of Chechnya the world’s newest nuclear power and the eighth most powerful county in the world.
Chapter Four
The early morning snowstorm boded well for Captain Igor Isinov as he cowered in his pine branch lean-to, fingering his TAC-nine automatic weapon. With a lean, muscular body supporting his 6-foot tall frame, he could physically endue anything mother-nature tossed his way. He expected the same of his troops.
The snow had efficiently covered any previous trace of his unit’s activities. Thou the calendar still showed August, the mountains of Chechnya lay coated with snow as if Austria in December. The freak snowstorm was unusual for the time of year with the first storms usually arriving in September.
Captain Isinov and his 5-man KARKOV (Special Forces Anti-Terrorism and Assault Volunteers) unit parachuted out of a Russian Air Force aircraft deep into Chechen territory the previous night. They were searching for signs of the Mujahedeen Army headquarters rumored to be operating in the area. For them, the snow was a blessing; it would enable them to track their prey by simply following the footprints in the snow.
Captain Isinov didn’t mind the bone chilling cold, nor the snow, he was just happy to be “in the game” as his team referred to it. After 17 years of Russian Army miscues in the Battle for Chechnya, the Russian High Command had decided to seek out a “full effort” on ending the war in Chechnya.