Even if we recognize that significant elements of Tibetan "national" identity preceded the twentieth century, it is only the interaction with modernity and colonialism that gave specific meanings to elements of a common identity. Tibetanness is a product of the processes of modernization, colonialism, and displacement. Before moving into a detailed discussion of diasporic Tibetanness, let me make a brief observation on the discourse of Tibetan national identity as circulating within Tibet.
DISCOURSE OF TIBETANNESS AS ARTICULATED IN CHINA'S TIBET
Discussion of Tibetanness as being processed and produced in diaspora should not ignore Tibetan identity as articulated within Tibet, that is, in China's Tibet. After suffering severe repression during the period of Cultural Revolution, Tibet has witnessed "economic liberalization" followed by some relaxation on religious practices. This, in turn, has led to a revival of cultural and religious identity. While there is little doubt that some cultural elements were encouraged by Chinese- Tibetan authorities in a typical modernist pattern of museumizing "exotic'Vminority cultures, active support of the local people has been more important in this revival. However, as contributors to Goldstein and Kapstein (1998) point out, "revival" is a problematic term for what is happening in Tibet both because it fails to appreciate changes and because its meaning is often conflated with restoration. Despite attempts to objectify, culture is always in flux. In the case of Tibet, some individual traits are common with the past, some have changed in appearance and some in the importance attached to them, and some are now extinct (see Adams 1996, 1998; Kolas and Thowsen 2005). Moreover, one should realize that what passes as revival is deeply informed by contemporary politics. The key issue affecting the revival is the Tibet question-the conflict over the political status of Tibet vis-a-vis China (Goldstein, in Goldstein and Kapstein 1998, 14).
As the much-studied Lhasa demonstrations that took place more than a decade ago indicate, religion still plays an important role in the assertion of national identity by the Tibetans. Most demonstrations started at the initiative of monks and nuns [59] and most centered on the Jokhang temple in the Barkhor area of Lhasa. However, something fundamental has changed. While earlier revolts broke out for explicitly religious purposes, now a more instrumentalist and activist view of religion is taken (see Schwartz 1996; for a different view on the significance of the political in these protests, see Mills 2001). The official policy of religious tolerance is used to make political demands. The priority of many monks and nuns who participate in the demonstrations, often at high costs (including arrest, torture, expulsion from their institutions, and in extreme cases, execution) seems to be the political struggle for independence (see Barnett and Akiner 1996). [60] They are willing to risk the religious freedom granted to them for their political demands. Even in the name of religion, what is emphasized is not aspects of Buddhism (which is limiting for any nationalist aspiration on account of its universalistic dimensions) but specifically Tibetan elements of the religion.
The religious/cultural revival as well as instances of political protests inside Tibet exemplifies a rich mixture of traditional and innovative strategies in Tibet's struggle for survival against an authoritarian state system. The Chinese official rhetoric of a "multinational" state has offered the opportunity to Tibetans to reclaim, in part, a heterodox vision of history in which separateness and Tibetanness are highlighted and valorized. Often, the target of sporadic protests in Lhasa and elsewhere are the Western tourists who are considered potential supporters for the Tibetan cause. The main factor influencing the political protests and assertion of national identity in Tibet, therefore, is not religion per se or its suppression but Chinese political occupation.
In all these struggles over national identity, the key symbol for Tibetans has been, not surprisingly, the Dalai Lama. The Chinese realized the potential subversiveness of allowing Tibetans the religious freedom to worship his figure. They have thus tried to ban his worship and "encourage" other Tibetan lamas to denounce him as a "splittist" (one who is trying to split Tibet from its motherland, China). The Dalai Lama's traditional dual role as the head of religious and political systems has indeed been important. However, the political side of chos srid gnyis Idan is increasingly identified with democracy, and young Tibetans look upon the Dalai Lama as a world leader and as a symbol of democracy and human rights (Schwartz 1996). As happened to former imperial powers, such as the British in India, the nationalists to a large extent have taken the discourses of the dominant power and used it against them. China's claim that it is modernizing Tibet is questioned by those who have developed an alternative vocabulary (and alternative meanings) on the basis of a continuing flow of information and ideas from China as well as the outside world on democracy, human rights, and national struggles (see Sperling 1996). Observers of Tibet are increasingly recognizing this resilience among the Tibetans and the various innovative uses to which traditions have been put in the service of national identity. Such critical endeavors are certainly a way forward as compared to the idea and practice of Exotica Tibet, of a
"lost horizon," a Shangri-la lost forever to the world, as espoused in most popular literature in the West.
(DIS)PLACED TIBETANS: NATIONALISM IN EXILE
A repressive state regime is not the only limitation on articulations of national identity within Tibet. Lack of organized opposition to China may also be attributed to the fact that significant numbers of religious and lay elite of traditional Tibet (along with the Dalai Lama) fled across the border to India. Since 1959 more than a hundred thousand Tibetans have become refugees. Most of them live in various settlements in India and Nepal. Others have dispersed to several countries, including Australia, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States. The nerve center of the refugee community, however, is Dharamsala, which is the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Dalai Lama's government from the outset has sought to project itself as a continuation of the pre – 1959 Lhasa government. Though this government is not recognized by any state in the international community, for all practical purposes the Tibetans living in the diaspora, and many inside Tibet, consider it the legitimate authority. Continuity with the traditional Tibetan state (pre-1950) is stressed. The authoritarian state apparatus in Chinese-occupied Tibet, combined with censorship of information, ensures that Tibetan nationalism is far more developed in the diasporic community. The discourses of international human rights, democracy, decolonization, and self-determination have allowed sophisticated articulations of national identity among the Tibetans in exile. The idea in the world media of what constitutes Tibetanness often comes from the words and actions of the exile community.
Tibetanness, as many observers of Tibetan diasporic communities realize, is a highly contested and pluralistic identity. Tibetanness is articulated, in theory and in praxis, at several hierarchical as well as overlapping levels. It is a discursive product of many complementary and contesting dynamics such as the policy pronouncements of Dharamsala, the politics of more radical elements, gendered and generational practices, Exotica Tibet, and so on. Several factors influence and shape it, some of these directly related to the politics of representation. These include refugee status, [61] space-time projections of homeland, [62] the personality of the Dalai Lama, the overriding need for the preservation of culture, Western audiences with preconceived notions about Tibet and Tibetans (Exotica Tibet), self-perception, and most important, the desire to project a sense of continuity in a changing external environment. In order to understand what the category "Tibetan" means, it is important to look at some of these factors. Discussion of Exotica Tibet as a major factor foregrounds the productive role played by representational practices.
[59] Their role may be seen as that of the disgruntled traditional intelligentsia described by Gellner (1983, 14).
[60] Though some observers such as Grunfeld are of the opinion that "independence is an abstract notion which most Tibetans do not seem to think about very much" (quoted in Sperling 2004), others have provided a convincing rebuttal of such views (see Schwartz 1996; see also Barnett and Akiner i996).
[61] Tibetans have been successful in avoiding assimilation with the host society by following a policy of limited acculturation. In Nepal and in parts of north India, Tibetans contribute substantially to the tourism industry, especially in the regions in which they live. Elsewhere, they concentrate more on specialized craft industries (see Methfessel 1996). Rather than competing with local Indians or Nepalese over scarce resources, they have established new enterprises, which also benefit locals with their spill-over effects. This does not mean that the relationship between refugees and locals is totally harmonious. As 1999 riots against Tibetans in Manali (India) show, there are potential trouble spots that need to be addressed by community leaders as well as the Indian establishment. Since isolation is hardly a viable choice for most migrant communities (and individuals) when faced with the problems of adjusting in the host society, the Tibetan establishment opted for a policy of limited acculturation as opposed to assimilation. While influences of popular Indian cultures including Bollywood are marked among the lay Tibetans, a sense of separate and distinct identity is prevalent (see Diehl 2002). Both in rhetoric as well as in practice, the Tibetan refugee community has largely avoided the assimilative process of sanskritisation that affects most minority groups in India.
[62] A particular space-time projection of "homeland" is another constitutive factor in fostering Tibetan identity in the diaspora. Diasporic longing for the homeland is reflected in material as well as artistic production among exile communities. Images of Tibet, such as the Potala Palace, are favorite motifs. This nostalgia for space is complemented by nostalgia for time. It is not contemporary Tibet but pre-1959 Tibet, frozen in time, that defines the longing. As Harris points out, many Tibetan refugee craftspeople and artists are involved in "a nostalgic recreation of temps perdus; an inevitable process of conscious archaism" (1993, 112; see also Ahmed 2006). In the diaspora, the role of memory is central to imagining Tibet as a nation, since re-creating and preserving the memories of Tibet is crucial for maintaining the vision of "Free Tibet" as a common cause. These memories also provide the tools of expression, the language and the idioms of Tibetan unity and identity.