Meanwhile, the Slovaks’ “independence” was turning out to be that “of a dog on a leash.” Their leaders were mismanaging their economy, the Hungarians were openly coveting their territory, and the Slovaks themselves, who were hardly pro-Czech, were beginning to realize that they were not apt to fare as well as they had before dismantling their former shared state. If war broke out, the Bratislava regime would prove too undependable to be of use to the Germans, and they would take it over as well.20
Jews had even less to hope for. There had been no Jew-baiting in the streets of Prague, as had followed the Anschluss in Vienna, Kennan reported at the end of March; still, Jews could hardly expect a fate much different from those in Nazi Germany. In Ostrava, near the Polish border, he found Jews being excluded from all public places. “One doctor, I am told, has attended thirty-three Jewish suicides since the occupation.” And in Slovakia, legislation had relegated Jews to the status of “thieves, criminals, swindlers, insane people, and alcoholics.” None of this made any sense in countries still dependent on Jewish capital.21
The Czechs, being realists, might have reconciled themselves to German rule had it been “firm in its purposes, conscious of its responsibilities, integrated in its activities, and incorruptible in the performance of its duties.” But it had been none of these things; instead the Germans had given the impression “of a regime in an advanced state of moral disintegration.” All of this had implications for the future of Europe, because until the Nazis developed greater maturity, they would stand little chance of successfully managing responsibilities borne for centuries—“and at times not uncreditably”—by the Roman Catholic Church and the Hapsburg Empire.22
Although Messersmith praised Kennan’s reports, there is no evidence that they went beyond the State Department, or that they had any impact on American foreign policy in the final months of peace in Europe. They did reflect, though, a conviction that would grow stronger in Kennan’s mind, the more he saw of the Germans over the next few years: “that even in the event of a complete military victory the Nazis would still face an essentially insoluble problem in the political organization and control of the other peoples of the continent.” The reason was that Nazi ideology had nothing to offer apart from “glorification of the supposed virtues of the German people,” an argument that had “no conceivable appeal” to anyone else.23
That conclusion, in time, would also shape Kennan’s view of the country that eventually defeated Nazi Germany and sought its own domination of Europe. For the moment, though, the Soviet Union was moving toward an uneasy alliance with Hitler, the surprise announcement of which, on August 24, 1939, made possible Germany’s attack on Poland a week later, and the beginning of the Second World War.
IV.
For all of his skill in analyzing Russia and Germany, Kennan failed to anticipate the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He had noted, in 1935, the Soviet Union’s propensity to seek “non-aggression” treaties with capitalist states while building up its military strength for an eventual confrontation with them. He had wondered, after Hitler extinguished Czechoslovakia’s independence in 1939, why the Germans were discouraging the Ruthenians’ ambitions to make themselves the nucleus of a Nazi Ukraine. But Kennan did not put these two things together, assuming instead that if the Soviet Union aligned itself with anyone, it would be Britain and France. He did not know that an old Moscow acquaintance, Hans-Heinrich (Johnnie) Herwarth von Bittenfeld, a part-Jewish German diplomat, was using tennis matches and horseback rides at the American dacha to pass along top-secret information to Bohlen on the negotiations leading up to the Hitler-Stalin accord. But Bohlen hedged his reports to Washington, and when the State Department did at last alert the British and French ambassadors, their governments did nothing.24
Kennan, still in German-occupied Prague, had no espionage service to draw upon. The only people “who could tell us things,” he explained to Messersmith in April, were no longer people worth trusting—presumably Germans. The best alternative was to attempt to guess, from an understanding of the past and an analysis of the present, what they might be planning. But his reports could go only by courier, and by May he was not even sure that he could continue sending those out. “[A]t the moment,” he acknowledged, “it is a rather lonely job.”25
Grace and Joan stayed in Prague through the first months of German occupation; in June, though, George and Annelise sent them to Kristiansand while treating themselves to a brief vacation in England. The sailing from Hamburg, he wrote, was “the saddest I have ever seen,” with only a few forlorn passengers present as the ship’s band tried to cheer things up with “Deutschland über Alles” and the “Horst Wessel Lied.” London was disconcertingly normal, as equestrians rode badly in Hyde Park, while a fascist heckled a communist at Speaker’s Corner. George got to meet Anna Freud, “a very fine psychologist in her own right,” and then went off on his own for a few morose days on the Isle of Wight, where the food was “unimaginative beyond belief.”26
There was time, after returning to Prague, for an automobile trip through Slovakia to Budapest, and then in early August for a family visit in Norway. George got back in midmonth and on the nineteenth sent his last long prewar dispatch, describing the summer as a strange and unhappy one: “Everything is in suspense. No one takes the initiative; no one plans for the future.” Annelise arrived on the day the Nazi-Soviet Pact was announced, only to be sent back, “in high indignation,” on what turned out to be the last train from Berlin into Sweden. “I didn’t want to leave as I didn’t think there would be immediate danger in Prague, but G. thought I ought to.” After a few days in Oslo, she arrived in Kristiansand on September 3, the day of Great Britain’s declaration of war against Germany. “I hope all the time that this war is just a nightmare and that I’ll wake up soon and find that it isn’t true.”
George was still in Prague when the war began. The State Department decided to transfer him to Berlin, and he drove himself there on empty highways in mid-September, carrying extra supplies of gasoline since there was none to be bought along the way. Embassy wives and children had departed, strict rationing was in place, and “I am settling down,” he wrote Jeanette, “to what is bound to be a nasty assignment.” Berlin had become provincial and dreary. “If there are any nice Germans left, it is practically impossible to have any normal association with them…. But it’s all experience and it’s what we’re paid for.”
During the past few weeks, he added, “I have felt myself overcome by wave after wave of sheer patriotism and gratitude to our poor old country for the relative quantity of good humor and decency which, thank God, it still contains.” This was unlikely in itself to be enough, however: “If we are unwilling to make any serious move toward the prevention of the disintegration of Europe, I wish that we would at least start now on a rearmament program which would make everything we have done before look like child’s play. Because if Europe disintegrates much further we may need it.”27
V.
The State Department expected Kennan to continue the kind of political reporting he had been doing from Prague, but it soon became clear that the embassy in Berlin was overwhelmed. Having taken over British and French interests in Germany, it was keeping track of prisoners of war, assisting civilian nationals left behind, managing diplomatic properties, and arranging exchanges of official personnel. Out of sympathy for Alexander Kirk, the chargé d’affaires, Kennan volunteered his services as administrative officer and continued in that capacity throughout most of the time he was there.28