That would mean, however, educating the American public to the seriousness of the problem, for “[t]here is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown.” It would involve maintaining the “health and vigor of our own society,” because international communism was “like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.” It would demand putting forward “a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past.” Europeans, exhausted and frightened in the wake of the war, were “less interested in abstract freedom than in security…. We should be better able than Russians to give them this.” Finally, “we must have courage and self confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”48
Kennan regarded the “long telegram,” years later, as resembling “one of those primers put out by alarmed congressional committees or by the Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to arouse the citizenry to the dangers of the Communist conspiracy.” But if the task at hand was to shift Washington’s policy from afar—and Kennan had been trying to do that since the summer of 1944—then his “outrageous encumberment of the telegraphic process” was just the right instrument. The “long telegram” expressed what Kennan knew, in a form suited for policy makers who needed to know, better than anything else he ever wrote. No other document, whether written by him or anyone else, had the instantaneous influence that this one did. “My reputation was made. My voice now carried.”49
Part III
ELEVEN
A Grand Strategic Education: 1946
“I WAS PERMITTED TO READ A VERY LONG AND WELL-WRITTEN DISPATCH from Moscow from Kennan of our Embassy staff there,” David E. Lilienthal, soon to become the first chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, recorded in his diary on March 6, 1946. “When he says that the position of the U.S.S.R…. presents the greatest test of diplomacy and statecraft in our history, he certainly does not overstate the matter.” With his own responsibility for managing the American atomic arsenal in mind, Lilienthal added: “I didn’t sleep well last night, and little wonder. I find myself in the midst of wholly strange and fearsome things.”1
Lilienthal wrote this a day after Harry S. Truman sat next to Winston Churchill on a stage at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, nodding approvingly as the former prime minister warned of an “iron curtain” that had descended across the center of postwar Europe. No speech of that era—not even Stalin’s a month earlier—more clearly proclaimed the demise of the wartime grand alliance. Churchill’s address in that sense paralleled Kennan’s telegram, a more closely held obituary that was still top secret when Lilienthal read it.2 Both texts became iconic in Cold War history. Neither, however, brought about the shift in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union that took place during the first three months of 1946.
That was happening, J. C. Donnelly of the British Foreign Office noted on March 5, because circumstances had forced the Truman administration at last to give the world “some measure of the leadership which the United States ought to be providing.”3 The events in question were those Kennan had been reporting since arriving in Moscow in 1944. They showed the Soviet Union defining its postwar security requirements unilaterally, without taking into account those of the United States, Great Britain, and their democratic allies. That finding would have shocked most Americans while the war was going on, as Harriman and Bohlen were well aware: Kennan had been almost alone in insisting on it. The coming of peace, however, accomplished the only objective—military victory—that the U.S.S.R. shared with anyone else. The disillusionments that followed made balancing hopes against fears increasingly difficult, and Stalin’s “election” speech on February 9, 1946, ended the effort altogether for all but his most abject apologists.
It was within this context that Truman took control of foreign policy, having for the most part delegated it, during his first months in office, to his secretary of state. There would be, the president insisted, no further concessions like the ones made at Moscow. Byrnes swung into line with an address of his own in New York on February 28: “We will not and we cannot stand aloof,” he warned, “if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes of the [U.N.] Charter…. If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world.”4
The secretary of state had seen Kennan’s “long telegram” before delivering this speech, but most of it had already been drafted by then. What 511 did do, Doc Matthews explained to his friend Robert Murphy, was to provide the rationale for the course upon which the administration had already embarked. With pardonable pride—he and Durbrow having elicited it—Matthews confirmed that Kennan’s analysis, “to my mind the finest piece of analytical writing that I have ever seen come out of the [Foreign] Service…, has been received in the highest quarters here as a basic outline of future Soviet policy. That goes for the Secretary [of State], the Secretaries of War and Navy, our highest Army and Navy authorities and also across the street.” Across the street for the Department of State in 1946—as when Kennan trained there in 1926 and in moments of boredom could look out the window to monitor the comings and goings of Calvin Coolidge—was the White House. “I am very much impressed,” Murphy replied. “I think that you deserve a large bouquet of orchids for having engineered this process.”5
I.
Donnelly had expressed doubt, in his March 5 assessment from London, that the new policy would stick: “It is unlikely that even the most ideal American administration imaginable would achieve what we should regard as a high standard in clarity of thought and consistency.”6 Kennan would not have disputed that view. Nothing had prepared him for the possibility that his country might devise and carry out a coherent grand strategy, much less one based on his own thinking. Yet this is what happened: the “long telegram” became the conceptual foundation for the strategy the United States—and Great Britain—would follow for over four decades. How then did a single dispatch sent from a distant post by a relatively unknown diplomat produce such a result?
One way to answer this question is to compare Kennan’s telegram with a review of policy toward the Soviet Union that had been under way in the State Department since the fall of 1945. Authorized by the new under secretary of state, Dean Acheson, its principal authors were Bohlen and Geroid T. Robinson, a Columbia University historian of Russia who had worked in the Office of Strategic Services during the war. The Bohlen-Robinson report was meant to reflect both Foreign Service and academic expertise on the U.S.S.R., but it differed from Kennan’s analysis in several ways.