Why? Someday we may know, but someday, as a result, what charges face him? What burden will he carry in his own heart and mind for the rest of his life? It was a cold and chilling performance, to see a young American so clearly used by his militant captors to further their cause, whatever the cost to this man’s future.
Ministry officials from time to time made a show of treating Laingen and the others as official emissaries, despite their de facto hostage status. Observing from the windows on the evening of March 22, Laingen saw a steady stream of limousines arriving at the ministry flying flags from various nations, and watched as formally dressed diplomats filed into the building. There was obviously a formal diplomatic event that evening. How could Iran and other nations maintain the pretense of diplomatic normalcy with the U.S. embassy forcibly occupied, its staff imprisoned, and the head of the mission held hostage upstairs?
Later that evening, however, Ghotbzadeh sent for the three, and they were escorted, with shaggy hair and rumpled clothes, before eight of their dapper colleagues and allowed to sit and talk about their predicament for more than an hour. Laingen later wrote in his journaclass="underline"
The whole affair is incongruous—the magnificent hall, now empty save for us and the eight, the [Iranian] chief of protocol staying discreetly out of earshot (he is a professional, too), our colleagues sympathetic but powerless to help. Diplomats in the ministry of the country to which they are accredited, “allowed” by a possibly embarrassed foreign minister to meet with fellow diplomats held hostage, in total violation of international law and practice…. Yet we conduct ourselves as if nothing had happened, sharing impressions and keeping our emotions under full control, despite our anger and frustration. After an hour or so, we bid our visitors goodbye under the enormous chandelier in the mirrored reception rotunda, acting almost as if we were the hosts of the glittering affair rather than the hostages generously allowed briefly to resume our diplomatic careers!
America’s highest-ranking diplomat in Iran, still washing his socks and underwear in the Foreign Ministry bathroom every morning, assembling jigsaw puzzles, reading books, and walking up and down a closed staircase for exercise, composed yet another futile, angry letter to the president after seeing news reports of Bani-Sadr giving a speech from the outer wall of the occupied embassy.
Dear Mr. President,
As you know, it is the view of my government, a view overwhelmingly supported by world legal and public opinion, that the seizure of the Embassy in Tehran and the holding of all its personnel hostage for political purposes was and is a flagrant violation of all precepts of international law and practice.
I must therefore record my deep sense of regret that by the use of the walls of that Embassy as a podium for yesterday’s National Mobilization Week march-past, the dignity of your office was so directly and graphically linked to the situation affecting the Embassy and the personnel still held there as hostages.
He was repeating himself and he knew it. Laingen sent off the letter, signed “Chargé D’Affaires ad Interregnum,” feeling like the one sane person in a world gone mad.
10. The Atmosphere of Restraint Cannot Last Forever
On March 13, in a hotel room in Bern, Jordan wrote out a three-page letter to Bani-Sadr in his cramped handwriting, a blend of cursive and printing. He discarded the third page and rewrote the final three paragraphs to get them right.
Dear Mr. President,
I am taking the liberty of sending you this personal and private message through a mutual friend, Mr. Hector Villalon. The only copy of this letter is in the possession of President Carter.
Because we have reached a critical point in this process of trying to peacefully resolve the differences which face our countries, I thought it was important that I convey my thoughts to you personally and in complete frankness. I would welcome your reaction to these suggestions.
…I believe that we share a single objective: to put an end to the present crisis and build a new relationship with your country and government based on equality and mutual respect. But, quite frankly, the possibility of having such a relationship in the future will not be possible unless all hostages are returned safely to our country at an early date.
From the outset, President Carter had pursued a policy of patience and restraint…. However, the atmosphere of restraint…cannot last forever. A growing number of political figures and journalists who have supported President Carter…are now advocating extreme measures as a result of the commission’s departure from Tehran. Despite this growing frustration, President Carter has not abandoned his policy of restraint. As soon as we learned of the commission’s decision to leave Iran, [he] called on the American people and the Congress to be patient. He also conveyed to the UN Commission through Secretary General Waldheim and Secretary Vance his desire that the Commission not abandon their work and be prepared to return to Tehran under the proper circumstances.
We believe the process negotiated by Misters Villalon and Bourget represents an honorable way to resolve our problems. We are prepared to renew our commitment to that process, but must have evidence of your government’s willingness and ability to abide by the process. The transfer of the hostages to the custody of the government would be evidence of Iranian good will.
Beyond the present problems, I can assure you that our government will adopt a reasonable attitude in resolving the numerous bilateral issues we face.
Finally, I appreciate the opportunity to be able to communicate directly with you. Please know that we will do everything possible to bring an early and honorable conclusion to the present crisis. I hope that you will accept my frank analysis and that time is working against U.S.
I hope I have the honor of meeting you someday.
It was not a bluff. The pressure was growing on Carter to act. His approval ratings had fallen sharply in polls, down to 40 percent, and Ted Kennedy had picked up several early primary victories. Indiana Republican senator Richard Lugar charged that the president was bungling the crisis and called for an immediate naval blockade of Iran and the mining of its harbors. Republican presidential candidate George H. W. Bush, a former CIA director, accused Carter of “pussy-footing around” with the ayatollah, and of “appeasement.” Ronald Reagan, the governor of California and front-runner among the Republican candidates, offered his own homespun analysis of the Iranians, suggesting that it was a waste to pursue diplomacy with such faithless negotiators: “They keep slicing the salami up. They lead us to believe that if a certain thing is done, the hostages will be released, and as soon as we say, ‘That’s fine,’ then they add another term, another condition. As long as we are willing to negotiate these additional conditions, then they’ve got a reason for keeping the hostages.” Asked what he would do instead, Reagan said he didn’t know, that he was “waiting for a miracle.”
Days after the UN commission returned to New York, Brzezinski, long an advocate for more forceful measures, suggested to the president that power in Tehran was so confused there was little point in continuing to work with Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr. He found the plans of both would-be leaders, despite their official titles, had “an unrealistic quality,” because neither Iranian seemed to fully comprehend all the forces at work. Days later, Brzezinski complained further about Iran “diddling along” the United States, and urged the president to issue an ultimatum. The administration had considered blockading Iran and mining its harbors, but Carter was fearful that such a step would lead to a much broader conflict. So Brzezinski proposed another approach. Why not seize Kharg, an island in the northeastern Persian Gulf about sixteen miles off the Iranian coast that was the world’s largest offshore crude oil plant and the principal sea terminal for Iran’s oil industry? It would be a limited military strike, self-contained, and the island could be held until the hostages were released. That way, the decision to escalate the conflict would be Iran’s.