Nevertheless, both Hamilton Jordan and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, talking on the phone on April 10, agreed that it was the right move.
“Neither the naval blockade nor mining the harbors will bring the hostages home, except in boxes,” said Brown. “And if they begin killing our people, then we’ll have to take punitive measures, and God only knows where that would lead. The rescue mission is the best of a lousy set of options.”
Carter surprised Jordan by talking about blockade instead of rescue at the next morning’s policy breakfast, but it was just because the president was hiding his bombshell. The chief of staff was on his way to the airport later that morning when he was summoned back to the White House for an off-the-books lunchtime meeting with the president, Brown, Vice President Mondale, Brzezinski, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher (Secretary Vance was vacationing), CIA director Stansfield Turner, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Jones, and press secretary Jody Powell, whom Carter had invited to attend only if he felt comfortable keeping an important secret.
Powell had given the matter some thought. He concluded that he was comfortable lying to the press in order to protect a state secret and figured that, if the occasion demanded it, knowing the truth would make him a more effective liar.
“If you lie to the press, I may have to fire you before all this is over, you know,” Carter teased his longtime friend.
“It would be doing me a real favor,” said Powell.
The meeting began with the president announcing, “Gentlemen, I want you to know that I am seriously considering an attempt to rescue the hostages.”
Jordan knew immediately that the president had made up his mind. The rescue option had been regarded as a last resort, a drastic step to be avoided, and all the efforts the White House had made since the embassy takeover were toward that end, but as the president launched into a list of detailed questions about how it was to be done, his aides knew he had mentally crossed into new and dangerous territory. He had met the outrage in Iran with tremendous restraint, equating national interest with the well-being of the remaining fifty-three hostages, and his measured response had elicited a great deal of admiration, both at home and abroad. Carter’s approval ratings had doubled in the first month of the crisis. But as the months wore on, restraint had begun to smell like weakness and indecision. Three times in the past six months carefully negotiated secret settlements had been unilaterally ditched by the inscrutable Iranian mullahs, and each time the administration had been made to look more inept. Carter’s formidable patience was badly strained. He had a long list of questions about the proposed mission, but his mind was set. Jones unrolled a big map and walked the meeting’s members through the raid’s elaborate course, pointing out the location of Desert One and the various hide-site locations, the embassy in central Tehran, the soccer stadium, and the airfield from which everyone would escape. Christopher said he had not discussed the rescue option with Vance, so he couldn’t speak for the secretary, but everyone else in the meeting was in agreement.
“It’s time to bring the hostages home,” Carter said. He deferred making a final decision until he had a chance to talk directly to Vance.
“The president is going to go through with this thing,” Powell told Defense Secretary Brown. “I can sense it. If we can bring our people out of there, it will do more good for this country than anything that has happened in twenty years.”
“Yes,” said Brown, “and if we fail, that will be the end of the Carter presidency.”
“We don’t really have much choice, do we?” said Powell.
In order to maintain appearances, Carter sent Jordan back to Paris for a scheduled second secret meeting with Ghotbzadeh at Hector Villalon’s apartment. The Iranian foreign minister was deflated. He complained that the White House decision to break diplomatic ties had been a tragic mistake; it would drive his country into the arms of the Soviets. Ghotbzadeh confirmed the intractable nature of the impasse, predicting now that it would be many months before the hostages would be released. He was apologetic, but explained that to take a “soft” position on the hostage issue in Iran at that point was tantamount to political, if not actual, suicide.
“I just hope your president doesn’t do anything rash,” he said, “like attack Iran or mine our harbors.”
“Don’t worry,” said Jordan. “He won’t. President Carter is not a militaristic man.”
That conversation itself, however, further hardened the decision to send Delta Force. Ghotbzadeh’s prediction of “many months” confirmed the White House’s grim assessment. At that point, the only things that might have averted the rescue was word that release was imminent.
Vance was alarmed when he learned of Carter’s thinking. The president listened coolly to his secretary of state’s impassioned argument against going, which Vance delivered in person when he returned from vacation. He pointed out that in just about any projected scenario some of the hostages would be hurt or killed and reminded the president of his pledge to the families. There were hundreds of American journalists in Tehran—they had been allowed back in after a brief period of exile. Even if the rescue mission was successful, what was to stop angry Iranians from seizing them? They might end up with more hostages and an even more volatile situation. There was some consideration given to taking a number of Iranians hostage and bringing them back as bargaining chips in the event more Americans were kidnapped in Iran, but this tack led to increasingly un-seemly scenarios. What would the United States do with its captive Iranians if the radical students began defiantly executing American reporters? Brzezinski responded with the kind of joke a man makes to poke fun at himself, exaggerating his own perceived worst tendencies: “They could always just fall out of a helicopter over the Red Sea,” he said.