In keeping with the secret protocol, Carter announced on February 13 that he would support the creation of a UN commission to study the crimes of the shah, and announced at the same time that there were “positive signs” about the hostage standoff. To savvy Washington watchers, there was clearly a connection. The president’s surprising retreat on the commission, which would certainly reach conclusions critical of the United States, coupled with this suddenly optimistic assessment, strongly suggested that a deal had been struck. As anticipated, the good news eclipsed criticism of the concession.
One way that would-be important men advertise their proximity to power is to predict events. In Tehran, Ayatollah Mohammed Behesti, secretary of the Revolutionary Council, declared that the crisis would be resolved soon, and Secretary-General Waldheim, after announcing formation of a five-man commission—a French lawyer, diplomats from Algeria, Syria, and Venezuela, and the former president of Bangladesh—told reporters that he had received “general assurances” that the hostages would be released soon after the group met.
Christian Science Monitor reporter Louis Wiznitzer wrote that the hostages “can be expected to return home at or near the end of the month,” citing sources at the UN, and gave credit for the agreement to Waldheim. He reported that the UN secretary-general had worked out the basic outline of the agreement in January, but that his efforts to sell it to the White House had at first been “rebuffed” by an administration bent on responding to the Iranians with “pressure.” No doubt the secretary-general saw it that way but, in fact, Carter’s initial refusal to support creating the commission had given the United States the key bargaining point and concession. Otherwise, Wiznitzer had it right. He reported that first the hostages would be removed from the embassy and transferred to the custody of Iran’s revolutionary government, probably to the Foreign Ministry, where Laingen, Tomseth, and Howland were trapped. Two days later the Washington Post reported that the president had obtained “a commitment in principle,” and editorialized that the frustrating episode seemed to be reaching “its final chapter.”
Those following the story closely saw plenty of evidence to support this optimism. The State Department asked a federal judge in Manhattan to delay legal proceedings aimed at seizing $1 billion of Iranian assets to cover defaulted loans. The government asked a publisher to delay release of a book by Kermit Roosevelt about the CIA’s role in the 1953 Iranian coup.
Bani-Sadr kept insisting that the United States had to “apologize,” but the White House seemed to feel it could finesse that demand with Jordan’s linguistic artifice. The Iranian president formally invited the commission to Tehran and said it would be allowed to speak to all of the hostages. American TV networks latched on to the commission’s trip as the likely endgame to the months-long story, and its every move led their reports. Hostage families were interviewed from all over the country and all were visibly glowing with hope. In an interview, Vice President Walter Mondale said on the nineteenth that the crisis was nearing an end.
“We think progress is being made, but I don’t want to characterize the chances,” he said at first, but then hinted that a release was imminent. “When they [the hostages] return, people will see the whole story, and I think they will be appreciative.”
In Tehran, the student captors were still insisting that the hostages would not be freed until the shah was returned, but they seemed to be swimming against an overwhelming tide.
Then Khomeini, upon whose silent nod this whole scheme turned, finally spoke. He pulled the rug out from under Ghotbzadeh and his allies and upended the fragile agreement. In a radio speech he praised the students, and once again demanded the return of the shah. The occupation of the American embassy had “dealt a crushing blow to the world-devouring U.S.A.” He said the fate of the hostages would be decided not by Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council but by the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, which had as yet not even been elected. That meant the earliest the hostages could be released was at least a month away, probably more. It also meant that the deal negotiated in secret with Ghotbzadeh was worthless.
Jordan was at home on Saturday morning when he received a call from Camp David, where he knew the president was staying that weekend. Ordinarily, an operator placed the call and the president picked up the line after a short delay. This time Carter evidently had dialed himself.
“Ham, what the hell is going on?” he demanded.
Jordan had not heard the news from Tehran.
“Well, I just got a call from Cy Vance,” said the irate president, “who said that Khomeini had made a statement this morning that the hostages would be dealt with when the Iranian parliament assembles!”
“Oh, my God, no,” said Jordan. “That’s terrible. I don’t know what to say.” He promised Carter he would call Villalon and Bourget immediately.
“Please do,” the president said. “And let them know they are playing with fire. The commission is probably already on the way to Tehran now, believing that we have an agreement…and now this! It makes us all look foolish. It’s starting to look as if the only person involved is Khomeini!”
It got worse. The UN commission very publicly left for Tehran with the private deal already collapsing, and with well-informed reporters covering its every move anticipating its futility. The imam instructed the students to turn over incriminating documents seized at the embassy to the UN commission, but when the students attempted to deliver a box of the files to their hotel the commission members refused to accept it, fearing that it contained a bomb. Despite a unanimous ruling from the Revolutionary Council and the public backing of Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr, the students, emboldened by Khomeini’s speech and sensing that the commission was the linchpin of a plot to release the hostages, refused to allow its members to meet with the captive Americans.
Jordan summarized these events for the president in a memo, and Carter sent it back with the scribbled note, “Ham, they are crazy.”
The panel lingered in Tehran, hearing testimony and getting the graveyard and cripple tour, waiting for a chance to interview the accused American spies. The commission’s presence in Tehran intensified the struggle between the government and the students, with Ghotbzadeh denouncing the students as “Zionists and Communists,” and paying a visit to the embassy to confront them personally. At one point TV cameras caught the embattled foreign minister locked in heated argument with the unknown Hussein Sheikh-ol-eslam, the bearded, gap-toothed student leader, who was seen pulling the collar of an army field jacket up around his neck and jabbing a hectoring finger at the older man. Accused of collaborating with the American government, Ghotbzadeh began to receive death threats, as did Bourget and Villalon. The foreign minister offered to resign, but though Khomeini would not support him in the showdown, he refused to let Ghotbzadeh go. For the first time, the shape of the ongoing struggle between moderate secularists and religious conservatives in the new Iran spilled fully into the open, with the maverick role being played by the students on full display. The sight was confusing to most. All parties swore allegiance to Khomeini, but the imam projected not leadership but ambivalence. Finally, the commission gave up its efforts to see the hostages, suspended its inquiry, and flew home. The deal had fallen through.
In his nightly roundup of events in the hostage story on ABC, which would soon evolve into the program Nightline, Ted Koppel summed up the diplomatic disaster, still perceived primarily as Waldheim’s folly: “From the first the commission was a body born of despair, nurtured by frustration, and fueled by the absence of any alternative.”