My friend, Dr. Enoch Haga, has expertly guided me through this project, from beginning to end. He read every draft and made very helpful suggestions as to subject matter, organization, style, composition, and illustrations. Whenever pessimism began to rear its ugly head, Dr. Haga was always there to provide encouragement and support.
Finally, it is obvious that without the great patience and understanding on the part of my family, as I became increasingly absorbed in this work over the past three years, it would never have seen the light of day. My debt to them is immense.
Despite the diligence of those who provided assistance, comments, and advice, I must stress that I take full responsibility for all conclusions and such errors as this book may inadvertently contain.
PROLOGUE
“A power that wants to land in Norway, whether in the south or in other places, must rule the sea, and the power that rules the sea has no need to land in Norway.”
Located east of the British Isles, Norway is situated on one side of the route used by German ships heading to or returning from the Atlantic. In the south, Norway forms the northern shore of the waters leading to and from the Baltic approaches. With the advent of air power, the possibilities that control of the Norwegian coastline offered to the belligerents, particularly Germany, were obvious. The Baltic, its approaches, and German harbors in the Baltic were within reach of both long range and shorter range British bombers operating from Norwegian airfields. An Allied presence in Norway would virtually bottle up the German Navy and cut off much of the merchandise that flowed through Scandinavia. This was a serious concern since the very effective Allied blockade during World War 1 was a fundamental reason for Germany’s defeat in that war. On the other hand, a German presence in Norway would secure the Baltic approaches. German bombers operating from Norwegian airfields could cover the whole of the North and Norwegian Seas, as well as portions of the FaeroeIceland gap, critical for naval access to the North Atlantic. The sea routes to Soviet harbors on the Arctic coast could also be interdicted by naval and air forces operating from bases in North Norway. This consideration, however, only became important later in the war.
In World War 1, to prevent German access to the North Atlantic, the Allies decided to create a mine barrier across the North Sea, from the Orkneys to a point three miles off the Norwegian coast, near the town of Haugesund. The United States was the major participant in this enormous project. The U.S. Navy laid almost 57,000 of the 70,000 mines. The barrier stretched over a distance of 230 miles and varied in width from 15 to 35 miles. The mines were laid in several layers at various depths. The British Navy complained that the barrier, on which enormous labor and money was spent, would be ineffective unless the corridor between the mine barrier and the Norwegian coast was closed, and all Allied governments put the strongest pressure on the Norwegians to close it themselves.
This immense barrier took a long time to complete, and by then there was little doubt about how the war would end. It had become clear to the Norwegians that Germany no longer possessed the means to invade Scandinavia. Still, it was not until October 1918 that Norway laid two minefields in territorial waters to close the gap.
During World War II, both Germany and the Allies imported raw materials from Scandinavia, but in Germany’s case, these imports were critical. The German war industry lacked two important raw materials, oil and iron. Most of the iron ore coming from mines in Sweden was shipped from the port of Luleå when the Baltic was ice-free. During the months when Luleå was blocked by ice, the ore was shipped to Narvik in Norway and from there in ships along the Norwegian coast to Germany. The importance of the iron ore and the role it played in the plans of the belligerents is discussed in the first two chapters.
When war broke out in Europe at the beginning of September 1939, none of the belligerents planned for or expected Scandinavia to become a theater of operations. Germany viewed a neutral Norway as in their best interests. When Norway issued a declaration of neutrality on September 1, 1939 the German response came on September 2. The Germans stated that they would respect Norwegian neutrality as long as that neutrality was maintained in an uncompromising manner. If not maintained in such a manner or if a third power violated Norwegian neutrality, Germany would be forced to protect its interests in ways and by means dictated by the situation at the time. While the statement signaled Germany’s views that it considered Norwegian neutrality to be in its best interests, it also gave a clear warning that Germany would not tolerate a tilt in Norwegian neutrality towards the Allies or an actual Allied presence in Norway. The British and French did not issue an immediate response to Norway’s declaration of neutrality but in answer to a query from the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvdan Koht, the British Government stated it would respect Norwegian neutrality in the present war. However, a German attack on Norway would be considered an attack on Great Britain and would be met with force. There may have been several objectives behind this British declaration. First, a way to close some of the loopholes in the British blockade was to prevail on the Norwegian government to interpret their responsibilities as a neutral party in a manner favorable to the British; and secondly, to lessen Norwegian fears of the German threat. In addition, it was critically important for the British to obtain the services of the large Norwegian merchant fleet.
The British achieved this last objective when the Norwegian Shippers Association chartered the largest and most modern ships in their fleet to the British on November 11, 1939. British achievement of this important goal was not the end of the matter. Policy makers had to keep in mind that hostilities with Norway would nullify the agreement. To balance the scales, Norway signed a trade agreement with Germany on February 23, 1940 stipulating that Norway would continue to provide exports to Germany at the 1938 level.
The British policy of appeasement in the 1930s was aimed at maintaining peace and the status quo in Europe. To this end, British leaders were willing to accommodate some of the German government’s grievances resulting from provisions forced on it at Versailles at the end of World War I. This British policy did not end entirely with the declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, continued to cling to the desperate hope that the German people would overthrow Adolf Hitler. In the light of Hitler’s continued aggressive tactics, it is clear that Chamberlain and Halifax misjudged and underestimated Hitler and his ambitions and overestimated the ability and willingness of the German people and their armed forces to take action against their own government. Nevertheless, this policy partially explains Allied reluctance and timidity towards offensive operations in 1939 and early 1940.
Another factor influencing reluctance to initiate operations in the west was the four-year bloodletting in the brutal trench warfare of World War I, still fresh in French and British memories. Many people, including Winston Churchill, believed that the nation’s resources were badly spent in this war of attrition and that a repeat of that calamity must be avoided in any future conflict. This feeling strengthened Churchill’s existing fascination with flank strategies.