At least one writer claims that the exchange of letters between the two monarchs had a significant impact. Kersaudy writes, “Actually, the intervention of such an eminent personality as King Haakon of Norway was more than enough for Neville Chamberlain to give up even the semblance of any warlike initiative.”14 It is more likely that Chamberlain and Halifax used the strong Norwegian response to the British note, along with a very negative response from Sweden, as reasons to put the brakes on Churchill’s plans.15 In the middle of January, the British government shelved Churchill’s plan for immediate action against the iron ore traffic.
There followed over the next month a series of note exchanges between the British and Norwegians. Lord Halifax suggested to the Norwegian Ambassador that Norway take steps to close its waters, and an aide memoir of January 22 made the same suggestion. The Norwegian answer in early February stated that the Norwegian government would examine measures to protect its territorial waters, including mining. It was not until March 20 that the Norwegian Defense Ministry was asked to examine the possibility of mining specific points along the coast. Rear Admiral Henry E. Diesen, Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Navy, recommended on April 2 that if the government deemed it necessary, mine barriers should be laid south of Stadt. The Allies did not wait for the Norwegians to make a final decision.
The British and French military staffs presented their plans to the Allied Supreme War Council in Paris on February 5, 1940. The War Council, based on these plans, approved a British motion to prepare and dispatch a military expeditionary force of several brigades of British, French, and Polish troops to the Finnish front. The expedition would be under British command. The primary objective of this force, which was to proceed to the Finnish front through Norway and Sweden, is actually found in another plan, code-named Avonmouth. The iron ore mines were included in the objectives of the expeditionary force.
The plan required Allied forces to land in Narvik and advance along the railroad to Kiruna and Gällivare, and on to Luleå on the Baltic. It was planned that the brigades would be positioned along this line before the middle of April, when Luleå would again be free from ice and open to German ore traffic. The unreasonableness of the assumption that Allied forces would be able to accomplish this in the roadless arctic wilderness was confirmed when elite British troops proved unable to undertake any off-road operations, and French Alpine troops were deemed unsuited for operations in the mountains around Narvik by their commander as late as May. Only part of the expeditionary force would proceed to Finland, and there is no doubt that the main objective was to halt the export of iron ore to Germany under the guise of helping the Finns.
The Allied plan anticipated a strong German reaction to the occupation of parts of northern Norway and Sweden. However, the planners did not expect Ger many to be in a position to act effectively until late spring when the Baltic was ice-free. Nevertheless, to meet possible German countermoves, the Allied plans called for the occupation of the cities of Trondheim, Namsos, Bergen, and Stavanger by five British territorial brigades. This part of the operation was codenamed Stratford. The occupation of these cities would provide bases from which to defend Norway, and open an alternate route to Finland via Trondheim. That city, along with Namsos, would serve as the main Allied base. Bergen would be an important secondary base and serve as the eastern terminal of a planned North Sea mine barrier. The planned operation against Stavanger can best be characterized as a raid. The city was to be held only long enough to destroy the Sola Airfield in order to deny its use by the Luftwaffe.
The plan for actions in Norway and Sweden called for reinforcements to be sent via Trondheim to take part in possible operations against Germans in southern Sweden, code-named Plymouth. These forces would consist of about 100,000 British and 50,000 French troops. Two British divisions due to embark for France were held back in Britain to be available for the Scandinavian operations. The port facilities in Trondheim were limited and it was estimated that it would take one month to get about 24,000 combat troops to link up with Swedish forces in positions to oppose a German advance. The rest of the force was needed to hold bases and keep lines of communications open. Over 40 destroyers were required as close-in escorts for the troop transports. The mission of the Home Fleet, strengthened by units of the French fleet, was to protect the transports against attacks by enemy surface units and the Luftwaffe. The air force contingent consisted of only six and one-half squadrons, three of which were fighters. In addition, four squadrons of heavy land-based bombers were placed at the disposal of the operation. While these were large commitments at this stage of the war, their inadequacy is confirmed by Britain’s own intelligence estimate, mentioned earlier, of what the Germans needed to carry out a similar operation. Derry maintains that these commitments were not large if the military chiefs were right in their opinion that it was their first and best chance to grab the initiative and shorten the war.
Even if the military chiefs were right in their assessment of the effects on the German war effort, the resources were inadequate against the logical reactions of the two Scandinavian countries, and particularly against the probable reactions by Germany and the Soviet Union. The issue of what to do if Norway and Sweden resisted, a probability Churchill claims to have recognized, was never faced by the Supreme War Council.
Preliminary requests to Norway and Sweden on March 2, 1940 about free passage of Allied troops to Finland were rejected quickly and firmly. In spite of this refusal and strong indications that Sweden and Norway would resist, the planners made no increase in the planned force levels. The likelihood of Norwegian resistance was eventually accepted, but the operation proceeded despite this probability. The military planners questioned what to do if the Norwegians and Swedes resisted, but the issue was studiously avoided by decision-makers. A note in Ironside’s diary is illustrative.
As the attitude of the Norwegians was in doubt, the commanders were instructed to land provided there was no serious fighting. The British had no intention of fighting their way through Norway and into Sweden. On the other hand, the commanders were not to be deterred by a show of resistance.16
Another astonishing excerpt from the instructions to the commanders was:
It is not the intention of this government that the force should fight its way through either Sweden or Norway. Nonetheless, should you find your way barred by Swedish forces, you should demand passage from the Swedish commander with the utmost energy.17
These were early examples of the many muddled statements and directives that were to emanate from the British command authorities during the Norwegian campaign. Chief Air Marshal Newall was on the mark when he said at the time, “I think the whole thing is hare brained.”18
On February 16, 1940 an episode occurred that proved tailor-made for Churchill’s plans. At the same time, the outcome was such that future violations of Norwegian neutrality by the Allies would be viewed with greater understanding both domestically and in neutral countries. The episode involved violations of Norwegian neutrality by both the German and British navies, and the Norwegians can certainly be blamed for not enforcing their own rules and for handling the incident in a clumsy manner.