If we think about it, we have a limited number of tools at our disposal to do battle against state propaganda without limiting freedom of speech in Russia. In reality, the state plays a dual role in the media market: as a regulator that sets the rules of the game, and as a player itself. What we want from the state as a regulator is obvious: ensuring a fair competitive environment and guaranteeing freedom of speech for everyone. But what do we want from the state as a player? This is a rather more difficult one to answer. As the founder of various elements of the media, the state automatically has a great opportunity to influence their policies. But the state is a particular type of owner. In theory, we are the owners, because the state is spending not its own money, but every citizen’s money. So what should happen?
Countries with a developed democratic system found the answer to this a long time ago. Information resources that have been created by the state or with the state’s help are entrusted to be managed by representatives of civil society. Trusts or social bodies are in charge of state television and other information sources affiliated to the state. These are directly made up of representatives of civil society. By law, the state cannot influence their membership, and in practice such a possibility is completely ruled out. The procedure for creating these bodies is carried out as transparently as possible, which ensures that their composition is independent of the authorities and respected by society. Any violations, conspiracy or pressure being applied is considered to be a criminal act. The activities of these institutions are regulated by special statutes (rules), which exclude the possibility of legally turning these resources into tools for manipulating public opinion in the interests of certain groups or individuals.
And the last point; last, that is, in order, but not in terms of its significance. Freedom of speech and openness were, and remain, the most important measurement of democracy: they are the cloth that binds society together. Protecting them from attack by any kind of watchdog, whoever that might be, is the most important task of the democratic movement. But freedom of speech can also be subtly used by those whose goal is the destruction of all freedom. It’s very tempting not to allow them this freedom.
The subtlety of freedom of speech lies in the fact that in this battle it’s easier than anywhere else to throw the baby out with the bathwater. It’s possible to organise such a fight against state propaganda or some other evil that people won’t consider it sufficient, and instead of appalling propaganda, you’ll see even more appalling counter-propaganda. However awful it may seem, we have to admit that any word has the right to be free. We have to be careful with any attempt to limit what can and what cannot be said, written, shown, or broadcast. If you want to ban any single word at all, it could soon turn out to your great surprise that you’ve forbidden the use of a whole dictionary.
My personal position on this is that if there’s any doubt at all, then rather like the principle that the law is on the side of the accused, we should come down in favour of freedom of speech. It’s better that someone should be allowed to say something disgusting than someone should be denied the opportunity to learn something important and essential. The priority that freedom should come before any restrictive measures is the main principle that should be adhered to so as not to stray from the course.
I remain convinced that, for example, the incredibly boring Mein Kampf, full as it is of hatred for mankind, and the fake Protocols of the Elders of Zion, just like the secret clauses to the agreement between Hitler and Stalin, should be available to anyone who’s interested in reading them, and should not become some sort of secret knowledge.
It can be very difficult to carry this out in practice, even psychologically. But we have to learn this and other than simply banning it, find alternative methods of suppressing the appearance of extremism in all its manifestations.
We have to learn to live in a world where we exist alongside things that we find unacceptable. The most important thing is that that world is genuinely stable and comfortable.
Chapter 19. The Constitutional Choice:
a Parliamentary Republic or a Presidential One?
Arguments about whether there should be a presidential or a parliamentary republic in Russia continually flare up and die down in the country’s political discussions. From a purely utilitarian point of view, this doesn’t seem out of place, and rather reminds one about dividing up the skin of a bear that isn’t dead yet. A lot of people say, “let’s first work out the democratic contents that we can dress up in an acceptable political format, then we’ll talk”. That’s all well and good, but there’s one small problem: the political content has grown up alongside the political format. In fact, it’s grown up with it so strongly that if we don’t get rid of the political format around it then we won’t be able to fill it with any other content.
So the question of how Russia’s political format will look in the future is neither speculative nor premature. The answer to this is a kind of political litmus test, illustrating a serious intention to break the Russian tradition of autocracy and the preparedness to carry this through to the end, and not simply swop one type of autocracy for another, and even less, one tsar for another. This is not a question of the constitutional structure, but of political philosophy, and thus it is a deeply ideological question. Perhaps this is why it has to be settled before anything else can be.
Indeed, the constitutional and legal significance of the political format in Russia has been somewhat exaggerated. In all seriousness, you can’t simply argue that a parliamentary republic is more democratic than a presidential one or vice-versa. Across the world experience shows that within both presidential and parliamentary models an acceptable format can be created for free representation of the people with a built-in and effective separation of powers. At the same time, any political format can be cut down to fit any authoritarian or even totalitarian system. It’s worth reminding ourselves that, formally, the USSR was a parliamentary republic. It’s more important to integrate all executive power, including the president, into a system of the division and balance of power. So what’s the issue here?
The issue is Russia’s specific situation – the peculiarities of its political history, culture and traditions. People frequently talk automatically about Russia as a presidential republic. That is, to say the least, a massive exaggeration. Not only is Russia not presidential (despite it having a president), but in the exact meaning of the term it’s not even a republic. Over the last hundred years, no ruler of the Russian state has come to power through free and fair and definitely democratic elections. (Even Boris Yeltsin’s victory in June 1991 was achieved thanks to regional elections within the Soviet empire.)
The history of twentieth century Russia is rather like the history of Rome in the era of the “soldier emperors” – in most cases, the irremovable dictators either ruled the country until their death, or were overthrown by a coup. Sometimes these went together. In the same way, autocracy was and is to this day the only natural political format for Russia. To be more precise, it’s the format and the contents all at the same time. And, as the first “red tsar”, Lenin, wrote, this is an objective fact, handed down to us through the generations. How we react to this fact is the main question for the future of Russia and the main political watershed.
The question is this: are we prepared ruthlessly to break this long-established Russian tradition of autocracy, or, despite all of the democratic slogans, in the depths of our souls do we wish still to search for a good tsar who will grant Russia freedom – however paradoxical that may seem? If we choose a presidential model, then there is far more likelihood in the future that the autocratic instincts will rise to the surface of Russia’s political culture once again and give the authorities much greater scope to move away from democratic methods than would a parliamentary model.