On October 30, 1945, Chauncey returned under escort to Paris to continue the methodical process of reclaiming the German subsidiary. He continued to petition various offices of the occupying authorities in Europe and the State Department in Washington. Even though a complete policy on resumption of corporate control had not yet been defined, as soon as any ad hoc element of the policy was espoused, IBM was ready to swiftly act on it. During late summer and fall 1945, the bureaucratic barriers gradually began to crumble.56
The Berlin and Sindelfingen operations were administered as two distinct entities. During the summer, the military had initially appointed Dehomag Manager H. Beckmann as custodian of the Berlin operation. But he was extremely inefficient and depressed over Germany’s fortunes. His son had been killed in the war. His wife had her teeth knocked out during an alter cation with Russian soldiers. Chauncey called Beckmann “a broken man.” What’s more, he was on bad terms with Fellinger. Beckmann ordered guards to stop Fellinger at the gate. Fellinger complained. So the military replaced Beckmann with another Dehomag manager, W. Cimbal, who was more to Fellinger’s liking. Whoever was appointed to run Dehomag was dependent upon Fellinger for transitional help. After all, Fellinger had been effectively running the subsidiaries since 1943. Nonetheless, occupation authorities, overlooking Fellinger’s Nazi Party connections, designated him a special advisor to Cimbal.57
Although IBM had not regained control of Dehomag, the company was now allowed to resume its normal operations as quickly as possible. Considerable monies were still frozen in bank accounts. An August 1945 review reported that salaries had not been paid since the fall of Berlin. So Cimbal rallied Lichterfelde’s resources, cut expenses and salaries, and re-established monthly leasing patterns. To earn extra cash, toys were produced from scrap metal. Soon Lichterfelde’s tabulators were rattling again. Punch cards were rolling off the presses. By September 1945, more than 320 prior German installations were in operation, including Holleriths at public utilities, insurance companies, and railroads. One plant filling card orders for the French and U.S. armies was already at 75 percent capacity; it had produced 58 million cards from September to November. A military order for 17 million was waiting to be produced. Cimbal was compelled to seek IBM NY permission to order $12,000 in additional machine tools to restart the manufacturing program.58
Before the end of the year, Chauncey would be able to report in a letter to Watson, “Cimbal has done a good job. The territory under him is operating on a cash basis profit. You know already of their manufacture of toys from scrap and novelties from American Army discarded tin cans. The rentals, however, remain the backbone of the revenue.”59
In August 1945, the military instructed Fellinger to prepare comprehensive reports on his command of IBM subsidiaries in Germany, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, as well as his knowledge in other territories. In addition to a resume of activities, Fellinger was required to forecast the prospects for each division. Fellinger addressed some reports directly to Watson. But most of the surveys were formally submitted to American military government for IBM’s review.60 These extensive country-by-country summaries, backed up by financial data, contained most of the information IBM NY needed to resume control.
Shortly after the submission, an unidentified branch of the military arrested Fellinger.61 That was end of his involvement with IBM.
On December 3, 1945, the American military government in Stuttgart passed a message for Chauncey through an army office in Paris. Firm policies were still unresolved on restoring American property. But Chauncey could again travel to Germany to resume discussions.62
The next day, December 4, Chauncey and another IBM officer, Mr. Warrin, flew from Paris to an airport near Frankfurt. The late connecting flight to Berlin was canceled due to poor weather. They tried again in the morning, but the weather was unimproved. While waiting in Frankfurt, they again called on Captain Hayter, who asked IBM to prepare whatever contract it deemed appropriate to allow the military to begin the widespread leasing of needed Dehomag machines and secure repair services for mobile U.S. machines in the area.63 Chauncey was happy to comply.
With the weather still difficult, Chauncey and Warrin resorted to an overnight train. Purchasing tickets at the last minute, they were required to travel all the way to Berlin in regular seats instead of first-class berths. Once in Berlin, they sought out Major Curry at the local Property Control Office. He authorized Chauncey to finally inspect the Lichterfelde facility. No escort would be necessary and any useful discussion could take place.64
When Chauncey and Warrin arrived at Lichterfelde, December 6, 1945, an American flag was flying atop the Dehomag factory roof. They were met by Cimbal and a delegation of Dehomag employees. From the outset, Chauncey announced, as before, no “friendly discussion” could take place, but only an exchange of business information required by IBM NY.65
The next day, Chauncey received a message to come to Cimbal’s home to speak to Major Curry. That evening, Chauncey and Warrin arrived at Cimbal’s home as requested, and met Curry. But when they walked in a bit further, they saw a beautifully set dinner table. It was nothing like the grandiose banquets IBM had staged during the war, but Mrs. Cimbal had spent some time trying to be hospitable with the little they had. Abruptly, Chauncey stopped and harshly demanded that no party-like atmosphere could ensue. Adhering to a strict non-fraternization ethic, he insisted only business in a business-like setting could be discussed.66
Just then, Lieutenant Colonel Flick entered the dining room. In a few days, Flick was due to return home. But for now he was still in authority. He berated both Chauncey and Warrin for their unfriendly attitude toward the Cimbals. At that, Chauncey retorted: had he known he was being invited to a party, he would have refused. The two IBM men turned around and abruptly left.67
After first checking with several ranking occupation officers, Chauncey softened his manner with Cimbal. In subsequent contacts, he was able to extract the key information about Dehomag’s Berlin operation, including its customer list, financial condition, a review of blocked bank accounts, and the prospects for profitable continuation. Eventually, he learned that the Sindelfingen plant alone had produced some $3.07 million in cards and equipment during the war years. One site alone, Plant II, averaged 39 million cards per month. At the cessation of hostilities, the Berlin factory controlled about 1,000 total installations, representing as many as 6,000 machines, worth $2.34 million. Some 1,314 punches, verifiers, sorters, and tabulators were dam aged at user sites, representing an approximate loss to IBM of $1.61 million.68
Dehomag machines were located throughout what had been known as the Greater Reich and adjacent occupied territories. In Poland: 444 punches and verifiers, 144 sorters, 124 tabulators, and 74 auxiliary machines. In Austria: 447 punches and verifiers, 117 sorters, 91 tabulators, and 53 auxiliary machines. In Czechoslovakia: 108 punches and verifiers, 37 sorters, 26 tabulators, and 17 auxiliary machines. All tolled, some 2,348 Holleriths were identified for recovery.69
Chauncey sought out IBM attorney Heinrich Albert. Albert was now functioning as custodian for Ford Motor Company’s operation in Berlin. Although many of the records relating to Dehomag were lost, Albert was able to sign enough affidavits and certificates to document that IBM NY was in fact the lawful owner of Dehomag and all its Holleriths.70