To some, Chauncey might have looked like a schoolboy in a dark suit and tie. He offered a polished, clean-shaven face with wide eyes, and ears that stuck out from behind nipped sideburns beneath a closely cropped hair-cut. But he was a sharp, fiercely tenacious attorney who would pursue his adversaries. He set aside qualms about flying into a dangerous Nazi setting and was completely focused on his historic corporate mission: save IBM Europe. For his efforts, Watson called him “the bravest man in IBM.”85
CHAUNCEY’S PHYSICALLY tiring trip to Germany via Bermuda, Lisbon, and Geneva did not dampen his enthusiasm. His first stop was Munich where he spent several days in discussions with Heidinger. At first, Chauncey tried to reason with his sometimes emotional adversary. He told the embittered Dehomag founder that Watson wanted him to stay on, not force the repurchase of his shares. Mostly, he hoped Heidinger would help Watson comprehend the competitive forces that might be arraying against IBM. But Heidinger was not interested in compromise. Chauncey purchased a small vase for the Heidingers as a personal gift from Watson. Heidinger refused it. Most striking to Chauncey was Heidinger’s contradictory arguments, and his elaborate, and occasionally bizarre, air of secrecy.86
The main Nazi objection, however, was made clear: IBM NY, now proven disloyal, would discover the secret planned uses of the Hollerith machines. Chauncey and his fellow Berlin-based attorneys did everything they could to constantly repeat the assurance that they would not ask questions or learn details. He told Heidinger he was willing “to go to any officials to show that IBM had not obtained any information of the confidential matters being done by Dehomag.”87 Again, IBM NY made a fine distinction between what its headquarters in New York would discover and the day-to-day knowledge its managers, engineers, and servicemen on site would be required to know to do their job.
A confusion of unwarranted alarms, false starts, and sudden rumors surrounded Chauncey as he tried, in his proper legalistic way, to make sense of it all. But after a few days of treadmill progress in Munich, Rottke telephoned from Berlin with something that appeared concrete. Rottke, too, was mysterious, but insisted it was imperative that Chauncey come to Berlin at once.88
When Chauncey arrived in Berlin, the sudden urgency of Rottke’s telephone call dissipated as quickly as it appeared. As was so often the case in wartime Berlin, whispers and hazy conjecture ruled the day. Chauncey had hoped for a meeting with an influential Nazi. But as yet, that was not happening. So Chauncey immediately sought out board director Otto Kiep and attorney Albert in Berlin, each of whom offered a different suggestion for IBM’s next move. Chauncey penciled voluminous notes and outlined various stratagems assessing the ifs and what-ifs of the predicament.89
As Chauncey waited to meet with the mysterious Nazi source, he lost no time scheduling a conference with Manager Karl Hummel. Hummel was generally perceived as more helpful in his views toward IBM because of his warm, personal relationship with Watson. This would be Chauncey’s opportunity to learn firsthand the structure of Dehomag’s business in war-ravaged Europe.
The conversation with Hummel was frank. Acting more like an attorney conducting a deposition, Chauncey first tried in his stiff way to understand the emotional Nazi mindset, why the medal’s return was so threatening, and whether Dehomag could weather the rage.
CHAUNCEY: When did you first observe difficulties… and what form did it take?
HUMMEL: Sales resistance—before [the] war—because of [the] American ownership. Prior to that some government departments would not do 244 business with us even if they needed the machines, because they claimed [the] confidential nature of [the] department’s activities prevented doing business with… [an] American-owned concern. War caused tremendous increase in those departments and they finally decided that they had to have the machines—but treated us very badly because of American ownership. About 35 percent of [our] business… is with government departments. [In the future,] even if [a] machine made in Germany is not as good at first as ours, the government will take the German machines and once that is done the private industries will follow. All of those industries are now under the government anyway, and only a suggestion is needed for them to change over.
CHAUNCEY: So… the form of any animosity was merely growling about having to do business with an… American-owned concern? Did any concerns actually refuse to do business with you because of American interest in Dehomag?
HUMMEL: There were no German machines…. The point… [will be] quite different when prospects have a choice between German machines and American machines… prospects kept saying that they would prefer to wait for the German machine.
CHAUNCEY: After the war commenced, did the difficulties increase?
HUMMEL: Sure!… [But] in my mind, [a] high percentage of difficulties were taken away because our people kept [the] friendship of the people! [A]number of companies took the machines but did not like it! “We don’t want American machines,” they said, but [the] Government ordered them.
CHAUNCEY: Notwithstanding that the animosity existed against Dehomag?
HUMMEL: In view of labor conditions, they could not do otherwise. This is when the Government realized the necessity of relying upon an American concern.
CHAUNCEY: What if anything did you report to IBM when this difficulty first arose and increased after the commencement of the war?
HUMMEL: When Schotte was here the difficulties had not increased so much and we did not think… it was so very much worse than it had always been… we always had been accustomed to the sales resistance because we were American owned!90
Chauncey turned to the issue of Hitler’s medal. Hummel tried to be delicate but reflected the ire of many Germans. The photos of Hitler and Watson, and IBM’s rejected letter offering a German Red Cross donation, were lying nearby.
CHAUNCEY: When did… the difficulty reach such a point that you thought… something [had] to be done?
HUMMEL: When Mr. Watson returned the medal. It came like a bomb. The man from the radio told us before anything [was] seen in the papers.
CHAUNCEY: Is it your feeling that this brought the thing to a climax, or was it really the reaction which you experienced with your customers and prospects?
HUMMEL: We excuse Mr. Watson because he looked at it from his own viewpoint—but it hurt us. In Italy it was as bad as in Germany…
CHAUNCEY: But let’s have concrete examples. Was it merely talk, or did customers refuse to deal with you?
HUMMEL: You must remember that the Nazis, when they feel insulted, will make certain that they will pay back that injury. It shows [how] they feel when they refused the gift [of a Red Cross donation]!
CHAUNCEY: So they refer to the return of the decoration when they refused the gift?
HUMMEL: They expressed clearly “we do not want anything from that man.” They said Watson and IBM’s gift could not be accepted.
CHAUNCEY: Why was it presented as a gift of Mr. Watson and not of IBM [corporately]?