About that time, Otto Kiep surprised Chauncey by mysteriously stating it was better for directors to decline any stock in Dehomag—even token stock. On December 13, Chauncey wrote to Watson without elaborating, “it is Mr. Kiep’s opinion that no shares should be issued to the directors, because of something he has learned.” Like the other messages, Chauncey channeled the message through the Embassy.129
Chauncey made clear to Watson in his various writings that Germany’s use of machines throughout conquered Europe would be profoundly lucrative, and IBM could not give up the profits. Albert described an enticing Axis-wide punch card monopoly that would rule in “Germany’s possible future economic space comprising not only the increased [Reich] territory [itself], but the sphere of… Central Europe to the Balkans, the African possessions, and the Near East.”130
But to remain a viable member of the Nazi juggernaut, Albert explained, Watson would have to adopt a decision not to just do business with and extract profit from Nazi Germany, but to ensure that Dehomag become an organic facet of the Third Reich itself. In a twenty-one-page recommendation to Watson, Albert circumlocutiously described the cooperation Veesenmayer expected. “The structure of the German economic system,” Albert wrote, “requires that every German undertaking is completely, loyally and without any reservation a member of that system, as formed by National Socialist leadership. What matters is… the spirit of German economic leadership—and not who is the owner of the shares…. the business policy of the German company… [must be] in complete harmony with the German national interests, and it is the business of the men at the head of the German undertaking to see to that. Of course, if the company’s interests are not so defended, either because the parties concerned grow weary under the weight of those difficulties,… [or] perhaps because at heart they themselves share the adversarial point of view… the company will suffer.”131
Watson was willing to cooperate—as he had done since the first days of the Third Reich. But why was it necessary to give up majority ownership? Majority ownership was something a man like Watson could not bear to relinquish. But everything seemed to rest on that very fulcrum: IBM becoming a minority owner of its own enterprise.
Only if IBM reduced its ownership to less than 50 percent would the contemplated competition be suppressed and Watson’s profits be protected. Yet the guarantees, all oral, seemed too vague for IBM to trust. Chauncey wrote Watson, “Dr. Veesenmayer… stated that he was not in a position to give me any written statement,” and added that “the transaction must be approved by the [German] government and that would be all the guarantee we needed.” Chauncey also reported his conversation with a director of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Kimlich, who concurred with Veesenmayer. “Dr. Kimlich stated that his organization [Deutsche Bank] would take care of any competition,… [a] statement he would not amplify, but only repeated.”132
Reducing ownership to a minority bothered Chauncey’s sense of profit as well. “IBM will have reduced its interest in the German company to less than 50 percent,” he complained to New York, “and its share of the future profits proportionately.”133 IBM wanted both—to remain a commercial part of the Nazi domination in Europe and keep all the profits.
Only Watson could decide. Chauncey confirmed to Watson and the other senior executives in New York that he had promised Veesenmayer that he would fly back to America and brief company officials. Then he would immediately fly back to Berlin and personally deliver to Veesenmayer IBM’s answer.134
Veesenmayer would now play a special role both with IBM and the Third Reich’s war against the Jews. As statistics and human sorting continued in the drama of Jewish destruction, the two would intertwine. Chauncey’s chaotic consultations with Veesenmayer and others about the future of IBM in Europe would keep the young attorney in Berlin and Geneva until late March 1941.135
Just days after Chauncey finally departed for New York, Veesenmayer would travel to Yugoslavia to oversee the Reich’s affairs with the Ustashi. By early April, Veesenmayer was arranging with Croat leaders and the Ustashi “an exact plan for the assumption of power.”136
But Veesenmayer ultimately emerged as much more than just Hitler’s envoy to communal destruction. He would soon become a technical scheduler of actual genocide.
One of the earliest episodes occurred in fall 1941. Germany’s Minister to Yugoslavia, Fritz Benzler, asked for an expert to handle difficulties with the Jewish situation. The Foreign Office sent Veesenmayer. On September 8, Veesenmayer and Benzler proposed that 8,000 Jews in Serbia be deported down the Danube on barges into Romania for further action. Berlin did not answer quickly enough, so forty-eight hours later Veesenmayer and his colleague sent a follow-up dispatch: “Quick and draconian settlement of the Serbian Jewish question is most urgent…. Request authorization from the Foreign Minister to place maximum pressure on the Serbian military commander. No opposition is to be expected from the Serb government.”137
Soon, the question was routed to Adolf Eichmann, the Reich’s expert for Jewish affairs. The reply: “Eichmann proposes shooting.” By September 28, the German general commander in the area wanted all 8,000 rounded up for “immediate elimination.” In early October 1941, German army commanders in conjunction with Serb mayors and police began picking up Jews from cities and towns in a lightning Aktion, or Action. Victims were driven and then marched to an open pit in a remote location, and there ordered to kneel over the trench. German soldiers at ten paces would fire rifles at their head and chest. Line by line, thousands of murdered Jews slumped into the earth.138
Days later, the Foreign Office rebuked Benzler and Veesenmayer for becoming too involved in the technical and military aspects. They were reminded to confine themselves to such matters as simply arranging transportation.139
Later, in July 1943, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop wanted President Tiso of Slovakia to accelerate the “cleanup” of the Jewish question there. The Slovakians were reluctant because the war was not going well for Germany and Slovakian leaders could no longer plead ignorance of the genocide. In December 1943, Veesenmayer was again sent to Bratislava. In one meeting with Eichmann’s expert Dieter Wisliceny, Veesenmayer angrily reviewed Eichmann’s detailed statistical reports of Slovakian Jews both by ancestry and religious belief. Veesenmayer was impatient for action. He vowed to talk “bluntly” with President Tiso. After their talks, Tiso agreed to transport the remaining 16,000 to 18,000 unconverted Jews to concentration camps—no exceptions permitted. Shortly thereafter, 10,000 baptized Jews were added to the rolls.140
In spring 1944, after a stint at der Fuhrer’s headquarters, Veesenmayer would be sent East again, this time as Minister to Hungary. His instructions were to form a new puppet government in Budapest and organize the Hungarian railroads.141
Veesenmayer was for the first time completely in charge of German operations in a puppet nation. In Budapest, he formed a close alliance with Eichmann and together they orchestrated the systematic destruction of Hungarian Jewry. According to Veesenmayer’s 1941 census statistics, 724,307 Jews lived in Hungary. Another 62,000 were considered Jewish by blood. But Hungarian leaders, although rabidly anti-Semitic, were reluctant to continue their on-again off-again persecution of the Jews. The Allies had already announced that there would be war crime tribunals for genocide. Warnings conveyed by neutral leaders and the Vatican were coming in continuously. Russian troops were steadily advancing from the East. The Hungarians were openly worried.142