* * *
To prevent things getting further out of hand, the city’s gauleiter, Karl Kaufmann, declared a ‘State of Major Catastrophe’ early on Sunday morning, and a previously prepared disaster plan came into effect. Police battalions were called in from surrounding areas to prevent civil unrest, and signs across Hamburg stated that looting would be punishable with death. The worst-affected areas were cordoned off to stop people getting too close to the fires that were still alight and to prevent looters helping themselves to the piles of personal belongings that now lined the streets. While the appearance of the SS on the streets caused widespread resentment among Hamburg’s distraught civilians, there is no doubt that it did much to ensure the smooth running of the disaster plan. 24
Next came the clearance of the hospitals to make way for the casualties. At first, everyone with a non-serious condition was told to go home – although when the night-raids began again even the serious cases were evacuated in ambulance trains. In the meantime, most people were treated at one of the seventy-two air-raid-shelter clinics that dotted the city. Dr Wilhelm Küper worked at one of these first-aid posts, and was surprised that, in general, people looked after themselves remarkably welclass="underline" ‘The vast majority of the dressings were so professionally applied – evidently the fruit of many training courses – that one could leave them as they were, if their usage was not for some of the more serious wounds. 25
With the bursting of the water mains, and the requisition of all emergency supplies by the fire service, the supply of drinking water became an immediate problem. People who had been hidden in shelters for long periods needed water urgently, yet they were frightened to take it from the reservoirs in case they were arrested. 26Emergency pumps and hydrants were made available around Hamburg, the city’s many private wells were brought into use, and specially commissioned lorries brought clean water to various locations. 27
Emergency rations of food and cigarettes had been issued, and were handed out across the city. For those who had lost houses and apartments financial help was available, and a special ration of clothes and shoes to tide them over until more permanent replacements could be arranged. 28In the meantime, arrangements were made to evacuate those who had lost everything. By the evening of Tuesday, 27 July, 47,000 homeless people had been sent out to Schleswig-Holstein by train. 29
Despite the seemingly gloomy picture that the city presented, Hamburg’s disaster plan was working well. In some of the lightly affected areas a measure of normality had already been restored, and work on returning the gas and water mains to service was well under way. Had they been able to continue, the city authorities would probably have been able to put Hamburg back in order within a matter of weeks.
They were not allowed that luxury. Even as they were working, RAF Bomber Command was preparing to make another, even bigger strike on the city.
15. Concentrated Bombing
The guiding principle of bombing actions should be this: the objective must be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attack on the same target unnecessary.
Douhet 1
The British had sent maximum-effort attacks to Hamburg on Saturday night, and to Essen on Sunday night. To mount a third that Monday would have been too much to ask of the exhausted crews, so the follow-up raid on Hamburg was postponed for twenty-four hours. With Monday evening to themselves, the airmen were free to do whatever they pleased, but there was little enthusiasm for carousing. Most took the opportunity to rest, and went to bed early to catch up on sleep.
The people of Hamburg were not so lucky. After three raids in as many days they were understandably jumpy, and most people had abandoned their apartments for an uncomfortable night in one of the city’s many shelters. For those who had dared to stay at home the slightest warning would have them out of their beds, running for cover. The British knew from experience that sleep deprivation could be almost as damaging to the economy as bombardment, so that night the RAF sent six Mosquito aircraft over the city on a nuisance raid. The damage their few bombs caused was minuscule compared with what had gone before, but it was enough to keep the whole city awake. 2It had the added effect of distracting the rescue workers and fire-fighters from their efforts. Much of Altona was still on fire from the raid two nights ago, and the approaching Mosquito pilots could see the glow from twenty miles away. 3
The next day, Tuesday, 27 July, it was the Americans’ turn for a rest. Officially, they cited uncertainty over the weather as the reason for taking the day off, but the battered and harassed crews were in desperate need of a little respite. While they recuperated, Butch Harris was eager to resume his battle on Hamburg. Whatever the Americans might have said about the weather, as far as he was concerned the forecast for that night looked promising. A Mosquito reconnaissance plane was sent out over Hamburg later that morning to confirm conditions: its pilot reported back that, other than a light smoke haze from the fires that were still burning, the skies were perfectly clear. So, without further hesitation, Harris ordered his second maximum effort on Hamburg to go ahead.
The plan for tonight was similar to the one used on the night of 24 July. 4Once again the bombers would be using Window, and flying in a tight stream through the German defences. Zero Hour was again 1.00 a.m. and the aiming point was exactly the same as last time. The only real differences from the previous plan of attack were a slight change to the route and an alteration to the type of bombs they would be using.
Tonight, instead of flying to Hamburg from the north-west, the bomber stream would take a route right across the Schleswig peninsula, then come back to approach Hamburg from the northeast. The idea was to make it look as if they were attacking Kiel or Lübeck – indeed, some historians have stated, wrongly, that the bomber stream passed directly over Lübeck as part of the ruse. 5Whatever the case, it was an ineffective feint: everyone in Hamburg was expecting another attack, and the defences were still on high alert. However, it did mean that the run-in to the aiming point would be coming from a different direction, so any creepback in the bombing would land on a new part of the city. In the next few weeks the people of Hamburg would come to believe that the RAF had bombed the city with a methodical precision – ending their carpet of bombing at a particular street one night, and starting again with the next street along on the following night. Of course such accuracy was impossible, but there was an element of truth in the rumour. By coming at the city from different directions, the bombers could ensure that every suburb was hit during the series
of raids. Over the course of their four raids on the city the RAF attacked in turn from the north-west, the north-east, the north and the south. Effectively they were destroying the city a segment at a time.
The other main change to the plan was just as significant. Tonight the planes would be carrying far more incendiary bombs than they had on the previous attack – 240 tons more. 6Some historians have claimed that this change was made for purely operational reasons: the aircraft had further to fly, so the Halifaxes and Stirlings had reduced the weight of their loads by replacing their high-explosive bombs with lighter incendiaries. 7But that is not the whole story. Bomber Command planners were constantly revising the proportions of bomb loads, and it was becoming increasingly obvious that incendiaries did far more damage than explosives. Hamburg was not considered a particularly flammable city – most of the old wooden buildings in the city centre had already been burned down in the great fire of 1842 and replaced with more modern brick and stone buildings – but when the operation’s planners saw how well the city had burned on the previous attack it seemed worthwhile to increase the proportion of incendiaries. The Lancasters had already been ordered to carry ‘maximum economic incendiary loads’ when the Hamburg raids were first conceived. 8Tonight this order was extended to the Stirlings and Halifaxes.