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Later in the same interview, Amazonas said, “The present time calls for great mass struggle, ample mobilization of workers and people, the awakening of their political consciousness, the improvement of their organizations, the unification of the powerful and social forces, and the firm and determined opposition to a regime favoring foreign interests while resorting to repression and creating hunger. These are fronts in the struggle that prepare people to successfully confront the counterrevolutionary violence.”[202]

In the final years of the military regime, the Partido Comunista do Brasil emerged as strong as, or probably stronger than, its pro-Soviet rival, the Partido Comunista Brasileiro. In 1982, I noted that the PC do B “was apparently the strongest of the groups to the left of the PCB. O Estado de São Paulo reported on 20 November 1980 that military observers thought that the PC do B had a ‘truly strong structure, even well established among students, the press and the clergy, which translates into a substantial increase of its mobilization capability and the expansion of its sphere of influence.’”[203]

In the first free elections for members of Congress, the PC do B made arrangements with the Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), then the largest in opposition to the military regime, to run some PC do B members on the tickets of the PMDB. As a result, six Maoists were elected to the Chamber of Deputies. In 1985, after the PC do B was legalized, these six formed their own bloc in the Chamber.[204] At that time, military intelligence estimated that the PC do B had about 7,000 members.[205]

The military regime came to an end with the election, in early 1985, of Tancredo Neves, a long-time opponent of armed forces’ rule, as President, and his running mate, José Sarney, onetime head of the government party of the armed forces regime who had defected from it, as Vice President. However, Neves died before he was able to take office, as a consequence of which Sarney was inaugurated as the first civilian chief executive in twenty-one years.

The advent of the Sarney regime to power resulted in some dissension within the PC do B, between those who favored “conciliation” with the new civilian administration and those who favored “radical opposition” to it. This controversy resulted in some expulsions from the party in 1987.[206]

The PC do B had some influence in the labor movement. In the 1980s, organized labor was divided into two major groups. One was the Central ùnica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), organized by Luiz Inacio da Silva (Lula), who in the late 1970s had led a movement of the auto workers’ unions in the São Paulo area against the control the government had traditionally exercised over organized labor. The other was the Confederacção Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT), which included those union leaders who did not favor a sharp break with the traditional system, and in the beginning was also supported by both Communist parties.

The CGT soon split into several competing groups. The first element to leave consisted of those unions under the control of the Partido Comunista do Brasil. They established the Corrente Sindical Clasista (CSC), which held its first congress in February 1989 to seek affiliation with the CUT.[207]

The change of the trade union allegiance of the PC do B was certainly much influenced by the party’s attitude toward the 1989 presidential election. One of the major candidates in that contest was Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula), who had organized a party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), based in large part on the CUT. The PC do B backed Lula from the beginning of the election campaign, and played a key role in establishing the Frente Brasil Popular for this purpose. In the first round of the election, the Frente consisted of the PT, the PC do B and the Partido Socialista, and Lula emerged as one of the two leading candidates, setting the stage for the second round of voting between Lula and a conservative nominee, Lindolfo Color.[208] Although several parties that had had their own nominees in the first round supported Lula in the second, Color was elected.

International Association of Brazilian Maoists

From its inception in 1962, the Partido Comunista do Brasil proclaimed its sympathy for and association with the Chinese party in its conflict with that of the Soviet Union. In 1970, João Amazonas sketched the party’s international position. He wrote, “The party, after its reorganization, firmly supported Popular China when it was faced with aggression from the Hindu reactionaries and later gave warm support to the Proletarian Cultural Revolution from its inception. It placed itself decidedly on the side of the Popular Republic of Albania when the Soviet revisionists carried on against it an infamous campaign of lies and calumnies. It manifested its total solidarity with the Vietnamese people in struggle against the North American invaders. It declared its solidarity with the Czechoslovakian people, victim of perfidious aggression by the Soviet troops and those of the Warsaw Pact. In these eight years since its reorganization, the party has been able to strengthen its bonds of friendship with the CP of China, with the Party of Labor of Albania, and with all truly Marxist-Leninist parties.”[209]

However, with the changing foreign policy of the Chinese, and then with the emergence of a new leadership in the Chinese party following the death of Mao Tse-tung, the Partido Comunista do Brasil’s relations with the Chinese Communist Party became strained, and then were broken entirely. Finally, they joined the Albanians in their quarrel with the Chinese.

Rollie Poppino reported in 1973, “Since mid-1971… when U.S. President Nixon first announced his forthcoming 1972 trip to China, the PC do B has been less outspoken in its praise of the People’s Republic.” Poppino noted that as early as December 1971, A Classe Operária, the Partido Comunista do Brasil’s paper, “praised the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but did not mention Mao Tse-tung.”[210]

However, the relations between the Chinese and their Brazilian allies continued to be more or less friendly for several years. Poppino reported in 1974 that the activities of the PC do B were still occasionally reported in the Chinese press.[211] As late as February 1977, the Peking Review reported that the Central Committee of the Chinese party “sent a message of deep condolences to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil on the brutal assassination by the Brazilian reactionary authorities of Comrades Pedro Pomar, Angelo Arroyo and João Batista Drummond, leading members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil.[212]

According to João Amazonas, support of the Chinese Communist Party by the PC do B “was altered from the end of 1976.” He also noted that in December 1978, the PC do B carried out “self-criticism” for its earlier support of the Great Cultural Revolution.[213]

When the Albanian Party of Labor openly broke with the Chinese, the PC do B sent the Albanians a message supporting their action. It said, “We have long observed with revolutionary concern the contemptuous attitude of the Chinese leaders towards the forces that genuinely defend socialism and their arrogant and imposing revisionism, imperialism and world reaction. … They have now gone to the extreme of vileness and by economically attacking a socialist country like Albania, which is admired and respected for its adherence to principles, its military spirit and its revolutionary honesty, intend to weaken its economy and national defense. … They call themselves Marxists and internationalists, whereas in practice they act, in everything, like a big power, seeking unconditional submissions to their nationalist line and policy from those who receive their aid.”[214]

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202

Jornal do Brasil, December 16, 1979, page 5.

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203

Robert J. Alexander, in Yearbook on lnternational Communist Affairs, 1982, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1982, page 71.

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204

Interview with Paula, op. cit.

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205

Carole Merten, in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1985, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1985, page 54.

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206

Carole Merten, in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1988, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif, 1988, page 47.

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207

Debate Sindical (São Paulo), October-November 1989, page 11.

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208

Interview with Paula, op. cit.

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209

Amazonas, op. cit., page 72.

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210

Poppino, 1973, op. cit., page 297.

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211

Rollie Poppino, in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1974, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1974, page 291.

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212

Peking Review, February 4, 1977, page 4.

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213

Amazonas, op. cit., page 72.

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214

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, August 12, 1978.