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A dozen members of the Communist Party’s Central Committee elected in 1985 decided “to retire to China.” Another one, Aung Win, defected to the Burmese government, and he reported that there were “only about 200 party members remaining, scattered around the country.” Charles Smith reported that “Information on the remnant BCP organization below the top leadership is fragmentary, reflecting the general disintegration since 1988.”[641]

Conclusion

The Burmese arty split into two rival organizations soon after its establishment in 1939. One of these factions, the Red Flag party, soon disappeared. The rival White Flag group supported the Chinese when they split with the Soviet party, and in turn was for two decades strongly supported by the Chinese in its continuing guerrilla war against successive Burmese governments. However, after the death of Mao, support for the Burmese Maoists sharply declined. Although the fall in Chinese aid was for a while at least partly offset by income from the drug trade, by the 1980s Maoist guerrilla activity was largely confined to areas near the Chinese frontier. In 1989 there was a massive revolt against the Burmese Communist Party control of the guerrilla area, and the party itself largely disintegrated.

Burma would seem to be a prime example of the post-Mao Chinese leaders choosing Chinese national interests over the furthering of International Maoism.

Maoism in Ceylon/Sri Lanka

Maoism arrived early in Ceylon, almost simultaneously with the Chinese decision to foster establishment of parties in its own image in other countries. Ceylonese Maoism was also distinctive because it presented one of the clearest cases in which the Chinese leaders chose quite early to give priority to what they conceived to be the national interests of China over the interests of the party and its counterpart in another country.

The origins of the Communist Party of Ceylon were unique. It started as a faction in the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), which was established in December 1935 as a “Marxist” party without other qualifying adjectives,[642] but evolved into the world’s single most important Trotskyist party. As the LSSP evolved toward Trotskyism, its pro-Stalinist minority became increasingly unhappy, and finally in November 1940 withdrew from the LSSP to form what became the Communist Party of Ceylon (CPC).[643]

For two decades, the Communist Party of Ceylon faithfully adhered to the line laid down by Moscow. However, by the early 1960s, disagreements over both domestic policy and international orientation splintered the party. On the one hand, there was discord over the party’s alliance with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), led by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Internationally, there was a strong minority that supported the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.[644]

The upshot of these controversies was a split in the CPC in December 1963, after the expulsion of the principal pro-Maoist leader, Nagalingam Sanmugathasan. In 1964 each faction held what it called the “Seventh Congress of the Ceylon Communist Party,” and each faction continued to use the party’s name.[645]

This split was the culmination of months of conflict within the CPC. In September 1962, the Central Committee of the party adopted a resolution siding with the Soviet party in its quarrel with the Chinese. Sanmugathasan, who was Secretary of the party-controlled Ceylon Trade Union Federation, and several others objected to this resolution, arguing that since the regularly scheduled December 1962 party convention had not been held, the Central Committee did not in fact represent the views of the party. Sanmugathasan’s supporters, including Premalal Kumarasiri, editor of the party’s periodical, were removed from their control of the labor federation, and the expelled editors of the party papers were named to edit those of the labor group. Also, the pro-Chinese majority of the leadership of the party’s youth group, the Progressive Labor League, expelled the pro-Moscow faction from that body.[646] After the split occurred, the pro-Moscow group organized its own labor federation.[647]

In keeping with its opposition to alliance with the SLFP, the pro-Chinese party ran its own candidates in the 1965 parliamentary election, in which the pro-Moscow party joined in an alliance with Mrs. Bandaranaike’s party and the LSSP. The proMaoist group received 109,684 votes, 2.7 percent of the total, and elected four members of Parliament, 2.6 percent of the total membership.[648]

The pro-Maoist party gained recognition from Peking. A U.S. State Department source reported that “The pro- Peking party’s leading Maoist made one of his periodical visits to Communist China during the summer of 1967, and since his return to Ceylon, has been actively calling for revolution, especially among Tamil elements.”[649]

Sanmugathasan visited China again in 1970, and the same U.S. State Department source reported that “his statements at that time as well as on other occasions have been publicized by the Chinese as evidence of foreign support for their policies.”[650] In 1972, Sanmugathasan visited Albania, and did so again in 1975.[651]

In 1970, the pro-Chinese party announced that it would boycott that year’s parliamentary election.[652] However, the party in fact made a limited arrangement with the SLFP. In accordance with that agreement, the SLFP agreed to name a candidate against Pieter Keuneman, the pro-Moscow party’s principal leader, and not to name a candidate against a Maoist nominee, S. D. Bandaranayake. The Ceylon News commented, “Both these decisions were based on requests made unofficially to the SLFP by the Communist Party (Peking wing).”[653] No pro-Maoist party nominee was elected.[654]

A revolutionary uprising in April 1971 greatly disconcerted all the “Old Left” in Ceylon, including both Communist Party factions as well as the LSSP and other Trotskyite groups. This was an insurrection of young people with a secondary education who were faced with unemployment in a declining economy. According to James Jupp, the organization that led the revolt, the Janatha Virukthi Peramuna (JVP), originated as a secret faction inside the pro-Maoist party, although it also drew recruits from the proMoscow party and from people who had had no party affiliation.[655] The group was popularly referred to as a “Guevarist” party.[656]

For the pro-Moscow party, the LSSP, and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, this revolt was particularly embarrassing, because it was carried out against a United Front government in which all three were partners. But it was also a serious problem for the pro-Maoist party, because of the Chinese government’s attitude toward it.

Nagalingam S. Sanmugathasan was arrested during the revolt, according to Mukund G. Untawale, “probably as a preventive measure by the UF government,” and “the pro-Chinese party apparently experienced suppression by the government and neglect by Peking.” Untawale added that “China seems to have decided to woo Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government rather than support this small party with a predominantly Tamil membership.”[657]

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641

Charles B. Smith Jr., in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1991, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1991, pages 138—139.

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642

George Lerski, Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1968, page 5.

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643

Ibid., page 202.

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644

World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., 1968, page 103.

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645

Mukund G. Untawale, in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1973, page 434.

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646

Sydney Wanasinghe, “Split in Ceylon Communist Party,” International Socialist Review (organ of Socialist Workers Party, New York), Winter 1964, pages 2 and 31.

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647

World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, op. cit., page 103.

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648

Ibid., page 102.

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649

Ibid., page 103.

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650

World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., 1971 edition, 130.

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651

Untawale, op. cit., page 434; and Barbara Reid in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1977, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1977, page 382.

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652

World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, 1971, op. cit., page 130.

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653

Cited in Intercontinental Press (organ of Socialist Workers Party, New York), April 27, 1970, page 392.

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654

World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, 1971, op. cit., page 130.

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655

James Jupp, Sri Lanka—Third World Democracy, Fran Cass, London, 1978, page xix.

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656

“Chou Offers Guns to Help Wipe Out Rebels in Ceylon,” Intercontinental Press, July 5, 1971, page 624.

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657

Untawale, op. cit., page 434.