Feisal’s tribal levies, with Lawrence, and Stewart Newcombe – whom they had picked up at Umm Lujj – arrived the following day to find the town already in Arab hands: ‘It was a fine sight to see his contingents scattered over the undulating plain to the south east,’ wrote Captain Bray. ‘… Feisal himself led the van, his presence denoted by his standard-bearer, carrying a huge red banner, the only splash of colour in his army.’ The Bedu trotted into the town on their horses and camels, singing, capering and executing mock charges. Bray noted that they appeared very light-hearted, ‘which was rather to be wondered at,’ he added, ‘since they had failed us – quite inexcusably, I think, in spite of the explanations which were later given by Lawrence and Feisal… no attempt whatsoever was made to keep faith, and it was a reflection, both on Feisal’s leadership and still more on his British advisers …’ 11It was, indeed, a sad end to Lawrence’s 1 ‘spectacular march’ of 200 miles, and privately he was mortified by the failure. Publicly, though, he blamed the delay on lack of water, the weakness of Feisal’s camels – many of which had died – and on the ineptitude of his Juhayna guides. He defended himself by attacking Vickery’s impatience, implying that the assault had been made prematurely, and that the number of casualties had been unacceptable for an irregular army. He pointed out, correctly, that to the Arabs casualties were not statistics but personal tragedies, called the attack a ‘blunder’ militarily, and decried the looting and smashing of the town, which was, after all, required as an Arab base. Lawrence had met Vickery at Umm Lujj during the march, and they had taken a mutual dislike to one another. Vickery had thought Lawrence a braggart for boasting that the Arabs would be in Damascus by the end of the year. For his part, Lawrence, always critical of professional soldiers, condemned this gunner often years’ experience in the Sudan as insensitive because he had drunk whisky in the presence of Feisal, a devout Muslim. He regarded Vickery as one of those colonial officers who, though perfectly fluent in Arabic, was accustomed to patronize the natives, and could not distinguish between ordinary tribesmen and ‘noble’ Arabs such as the Hashemites. Lawrence’s style was very different. He tried to get ‘under the skin’ of the Arabs and emulate their ways: to see the best in them, even when their behaviour seemed unacceptable to European culture. His irritation with Vickery, though, arose from his unconscious shadow – the submerged feeling that despite his mask, he and Vickery were in essence the same, differing only in approach. Drinking whisky before Feisal might have been insensitive, he reflected, but it was at least honest (and Feisal, being broadminded, had laughingly accepted it), while his own assumption of an Arab persona was a charade. His criticism of Vickery was largely unjust, however. First, it had been Admiral Wemyss rather than Vickery who had decided not to wait for Feisal’s force: second, the Arabs had been largely beyond Vickery’s control, and third, the looting and smashing of the town had been no less appalling to Vickery and Bray than it had been to himself. Lawrence took no personal responsibility for Feisal’s failure to make the rendezvous, and his excuses were lame. Elsewhere he boasted of the Bedu’s ability to march long distances on minimal food and water, and, as Bray pointed out, he could quite easily have sent a small advance-guard of the 8,000 men ahead to Wejh to join in the attack. On the other hand, the propagandist in Lawrence appreciated that the march had been a success by its very occurrence: Feisal’s ability to assemble such a formidable force of tribesmen, to move them 200 miles through the desert, and now to threaten the Hejaz railway, would, he knew, have a devastating effect on Turkish morale.
Another great blow to Turkish morale, though, had been delivered by Sharif ‘Abdallah, who, on 13 January, while on the march to Wadi Ais with 5,000 Bedu, had run into a Turkish column under the former assassin Ashraf Bey, near the oasis of Khaybar. ‘Abdallah, who even Feisal admitted could act with lightning decision when necessary, had sent in his horsemen so swiftly that the Turkish machine-gunners had only managed to get off sixty rounds before being swamped. He had captured the entire column, including Ashraf himself, together with Ј20,000 in gold, carpets, clothes, a machine-gun, howitzers, and boxes of pistols. ‘Abdallah had then crossed the railway in the Wadi Hamdh and had left a letter for Fakhri Pasha between the rails, informing him that the Arabs had Ashraf Bey, and making all manner of dire threats. ‘Abdallah had sent a messenger to Feisal with Ashraf Bey’s own jewelled dagger as a present, while he and Lawrence were encamped at Harrat Ghalib on the coast. There had been great feasting and rejoicing: the tribal bard, Lawrence wrote, had composed an ode to the victory ‘within sixteen minutes’. The Arabs had lingered an extra day at Abu Zeraybat in the Wadi Hamdh to celebrate, and it was this delay, rather than lack of water, which had cost them the rendezvous at Wejh.