Already, Lawrence noticed, the Juhayna were drifting back to their homes in the Wadi Yanbu’, feeling themselves foreigners in Billi country. Ironically, it was only the ‘Agayl, who were neither a tribe nor even nomads, who were willing to travel far beyond their own frontiers, and the ‘Agayl had troubles of their own. On 12 February they mutinied against their leader ‘Abdallah ibn Dakhil, ransacked his tent, and thrashed his guards, then rushed the camp of the ‘Utayba, with whom they had a blood-feud. They were dissuaded only by Feisal himself, who strode among them barefoot, laying about with the flat of his sword, but by the time peace had been restored two men had been killed and thirty wounded. As for Lawrence, his temporary assignment with Feisal was now officially completed, for Newcombe was in the field to replace him. However, Feisal and Lawrence had grown attached to each other, and neither wished to part from the other in medias res.Lawrence saw that his place was to be official adviser and unofficial spur of the Arab Revolt. On the day they had ridden into Wejh, a cable had reached Clayton from Jeddah containing Feisal’s personal request that Lawrence should stay with him, since he had been ‘of very great assistance’. 3Clayton had no choice but to accept. On 1 March he wrote to Major Hugh Pearson – who had temporarily replaced Wilson in Jeddah – that ‘Lawrence with Feisal is of inestimable value and an Englishman to take a corresponding place with ‘Ali could immensely increase the probability of cooperation among the armies’. 4It was inevitable, given Lawrence’s faculty for empathy, that he should identify with the Arabs and the Arab Revolt, and he now felt his hand on the reins of power. His earlier reservations about being in the field were forgotten, and he became engrossed in his work to the exclusion of almost everything else. Now, dressing habitually in Arab robes, speaking Arabic constantly, he had stepped into his Arab persona and had half forgotten that he was a captain in the British army, regarding himself of being ‘of Sharif Feisal’s household’. He had ‘chosen’ Feisal as the revolt’s figurehead, and he alone would guide him to victory. He knew that Feisal was easily influenced, and since this was so, he intended to be the Sharif’s adviser for as long as he could: ‘The position I have is a queer one,’ he wrote home, ‘I do not suppose any Englishman before ever had such a place.’ 5Feisal had come to rely on Lawrence because he recognized that the Englishman had a quality indispensable to a true leader – he inspired confidence. Lawrence could not only generate great charm, but was one of those individuals who always seemed to be able to supply the right answer, who always appeared to know the right course, and was always capable of reassuring others that things would turn out for the best. As Sir Herbert Baker later said, ‘he appeared to radiate a magnetic influence’. 6Although Lawrence’s self-assured demeanour actually disguised an inner lack of confidence, and a turmoil of doubt, like his mother Sarah he showed a different face to the world. His influence was subtle, however. He did not try to dictate strategy to Feisal, neither did he harangue Arab councils with his opinions. He did not command, but suggested a course: ‘… he would make brilliant suggestions,’ Leonard Woolley commented, ‘but would seldom argue in support of them: they were based on sound enough arguments, but he would expect you to see these for yourself, and if you did not agree he would relapse into silence and smile.’ 7In his Twenty-Seven Articles,intended as advice for other officers dealing with the Hashemites, Lawrence revealed his modus operandiwith Feisaclass="underline" he would try to ensure that the Sharif first put his plans before him privately, and would always accept them and praise them, and then modify them imperceptibly by drawing suggestions from Feisal himself, until they accorded with Lawrence’s own opinion. Once they were in agreement, he would hold him to it firmly and push him, so subtly that the Sharif was hardly aware of it, towards its execution. In front of others, though, he would always appear to defer to the Sharif, and would strengthen Feisal’s prestige at the expense of his own. While in the Sharif’s camp, he would not visit him formally, but would remain in his company constantly, eating with him and being present at all audiences, continually dropping ideas into the casual talk. When tribal Sheikhs came to declare for the Hashemites, though, Lawrence would vanish, realizing that a first impression of foreigners in Feisal’s confidence would do harm to the cause. Lawrence brought his immense powers of concentration to bear on the Sharif’s affairs and immersed himself totally in Arab culture: he watched and listened and chewed over every detail, delved into motives and machinations beneath the surface, analysed the characters he had to deal with. He was always on his guard, tried never to speak unnecessarily, constantly watched himself and his actions. Pierce Joyce, who saw him at dozens of conferences with the Arabs, recalled that he rarely spoke: ‘He merely studied the men around him, ‘Joyce said; ‘he knew beforehand that his plan would be accepted, while the task of kindling enthusiasm among the tribesmen was best left to the Arab leaders.’ ‘It was not as is often supposed by his individual leadership of hordes of Bedu that he achieved success … but by the wise selection of leaders and providing the essential grist to the mill in the shape of golden rewards for work well done.’ 8
Lawrence was aware that the march on Wejh had been a great moral triumph for the Hashemite cause, but to professional British officers, who were less aware of the nature of a propaganda war, the Arabs had been found wanting – their major successes had been made possible only by the Royal Navy. Lawrence realized that a more independent victory was needed to vindicate the movement in the eyes of his British commanders, and to vindicate himself personally, for he was well aware of what officers such as Bray and Vickery thought of Feisal’s failure to make the rendezvous at Wejh, and of his part in that failure. A startling coup by the Arabs was needed to make the British stand up. That chance seemed to be offering itself when, on 10 March, the patrol ship Nural-Bahrput into Wejh with the electrifying news that Fakhri Pasha had been ordered to evacuate Medina with all his force.
A Turkish retreat from Medina at that moment would have been a great victory for the Arabs, but for the British a disaster. In December 1916 Murray’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force had crossed Sinai, and Murray was now preparing for a massive push against the Turkish defences in Palestine, which ran from Gaza on the coast to Beersheba inland. To have the entire Medina garrison – 12,000 Ottoman troops with full artillery – arrive suddenly on his right flank would have been most unwelcome. In a letter to Lawrence, Clayton stressed that Fakhri Pasha’s force must be attacked and destroyed before it could reach Palestine. Under no circumstances should it be allowed to get through. Newcombe and Garland were still up-country on demolition-raids, and since Lawrence was the senior British officer in Wejh, he had no choice but to take charge of the situation. His first task required all his diplomacy, and called on the relationship of trust he had built up with Feisal. He had to explain to the Sharif that Arab priorities must be sacrificed in this case for British ones. Feisal, to whom Lawrence had recently revealed the terms of the Sykes–Picot agreement, had been anxious to push north into Syria to consolidate the Arab position there before the French could claim it. It was a great tribute to Lawrence’s persuasive power that he brought Feisal round within the space of a few hours to accept the priority of British requirements. Once done, he and Feisal sat down to decide on the distribution of their forces. Messengers were rushed off to ‘Ali and Abdallah to alert them to the new situation. ‘Ali was to move north-east with the Juhayna and Bani Salem, ‘Abdallah was to be sent dynamite and instructed to hit the railway at any point and at any cost. Maulud al-Mukhlis and Rasim Sardast were to go to Faqir with the Mule Mounted Infantry and a mountain-gun, Sharif ‘Ali ibn Hussain of the Harith – the ‘young lord’ Lawrence had encountered on his first ride to Hamra the previous October – was to go to Jayala to harass the line. Sections of the Billi and Wuld Mohammad were to take machine-guns and menace the station at al -‘Ula. The plan, made on the spur of the moment, was to contain the Turks south of that line. If they managed to pass al-‘Ula then they would be in the protection of the large Ottoman garrison at Tebuk. A key point in their retreat would be the station at Hediyya, the only permanent water supply for 200 miles, and Lawrence earmarked this as his own target. Even before arriving in Wejh he had talked about the possibility of visiting ‘Abdallah in Wadi Ais. Now, he decided, he would travel to ‘Abdallah’s camp, explain the new strategy, have a look at the railway, mine a train, and if possible capture a station. He set off for Wadi Ais with an escort the same night.