After eight days of fever, the mists began to clear, and he remembered that he had been sent to prevent the Medina garrison from marching back to Syria. It was now almost two weeks since he had left Wejh, but there had been no move from Fakhri Pasha. In fact, although Lawrence did not know it, Fakhri had adamantly refused to abandon Medina, which was not to be evacuated until after the war. Lawrence wanted to resume his plan to hit the railway, not to cut it completely, but to dissuade the Turks from leaving Medina at all. On 20 March, he dragged himself out of bed long enough to talk to ‘Abdallah, whom he found indolent and complacent – his instinctive dislike of the Sharif came to the fore. He reported to Wilson later that the conditions in the camp were ‘unsatisfactory’. ‘Abdallah’s force of 3,000 ‘Utayba seemed to him inferior as fighting men to the Harb and Juhayna, and he found their Sheikhs ignorant and lacking in enthusiasm for the war. Just as he had used his rhetoric to boost ‘his’ Feisal, so he left no stone unturned in discrediting ‘Abdallah. He represented him as an obese playboy, ‘lazy and luxurious’, who ate well, read the newspapers, talked about the royal families of Europe, played cruel jokes on his ‘court jester’, and remained largely confined to his tent. He exercised no supervision over his men, rarely visited tribal Sheikhs, and allowed only intimates into his presence. ‘Abdallah was little interested in Syria – Lawrence’s obsession – but was making plans to annex the Assir, and subordinate the Yemen. Lawrence thought enough of his political acumen, at least, to take the possibility seriously, yet in general his observations are so scathing as to suggest that he felt a sense of rivalry with ‘Abdallah, who would not bend to his will. Indeed, his need to convince Wilson that ‘there was nothing between them’ was clearly an excusatio non petita –the unrequested denial which proves the fact. ‘Abdallah himself was not happy about Lawrence’s arrival. He had not wanted any foreign officers in Wadi ‘Ais, for the disconcerting effect a Christian presence might have on the tribes. In his memoirs he wrote that one of his Sheikhs asked him, ‘Who is this red newcomer, and what does he want?’ while another, a fanatic Wahhabi, castigated him for befriending Christians. He wrote that Lawrence had ‘an adverse influence on the fanatical tribes’ and that the general dislike of his presence among the Bedu was clear. The Sharif was concerned with taking Medina, and believed that a pincer movement by the three Arab armies – ‘Ali’s force in Rabegh, Feisal’s in Wejh, and his own in Wadi Ais – would capture the city. He disagreed with the idea of dissipating Arab strength by attacking too many points on the line. His view had something to be said for it: ifthe Arabs could have captured Medina, it would have been a tremendous moral victory, and would have freed all three Arab armies to move into Syria. Lawrence was now convinced, however, that the Arabs could not capture Medina, and a defeat there, with its multiple casualties, would have ruined the Hashemite cause. ‘Abdallah treated Lawrence kindly, but ultimately his attitude was that Hashemite strategy was no business of an Englishman, and that he should not interfere. 13
Lawrence was, however, more successful with ‘Abdallah’s second in command, Sharif Shakir, a slim, boyish-looking fellow of twenty-seven who had been a childhood companion of the Hashemite princes. With Shakir, Lawrence’s aesthetic sense was brought into play, for while he thought ‘Abdallah undignified, Shakir seemed to him ‘the born aristocrat’, who nevertheless identified with the Bedu, calling himself an ‘Utaybi, wearing his hair in plaits in Bedu style, deliberately cultivating head-lice, and even wearing the brim –a girdle of thorns supposed to confine the belly. Here was another ‘noble Arab’ to add to the list which included Feisal and ‘Ali ibn Hussain al-Harithi, but which definitely excluded the ‘vulgar’ – but intellectually gifted and fiercely independent – ‘Abdallah. Lawrence said that the ‘Utayba ‘worshipped’ Shakir, and would take orders from him rather than his chief, but he clearly appreciated Shakir most for the simple reason that he was amenable to the ‘congenial guidance’ which Lawrence could give him – guidance to which the headstrong ‘Abdallah was immune. Lawrence’s position with the Arabs – great and small – had always been paternalist: he knew what was best. Specifically, Lawrence liked Shakir because he agreed to his plan of striking at the railway immediately. Lawrence also appreciated the help of Dakhilallah al-Qadi, the hereditary lawgiver of the Juhayna, a man of forty-five – short, tough, weatherbeaten, with the ‘manner and appearance of a toad’. Dakhilallah had been with the Turks in Wadi Yanbu’, and indeed, it was he who had guided them down to the town on the night of 11 December 1916, when they had been scared off by the ethereal patterns of the naval searchlights. It was he who, by way of compensation for that act, had blown the bridge near Aba an- Na’am station about three weeks previously – the only action, Lawrence reminded his superiors, that ‘Abdallah’s forces had executed since moving to Wadi ‘Ais. Dakhilallah had his own reason for being attentive to Lawrence: he wished to make peace with Feisal after having helped the Turks. This was useful, for without Dakhilallah’s influence Lawrence would have been unable to organize anything at all.
Though his spirit was willing to start at once, his body was still weak. Fever, boils and swellings returned and confined him to bed for the next two days. On the 22nd he managed to send a message to Pierce Joyce, who had taken command in Wejh, saying that he hoped to organize a force of his own shortiy, and intended to get down to the railway the following day for a reconnaissance. He said that he would stay in Wadi ‘Ais for a time, to make sure something was done, and asked Joyce to beg Feisal not to stay in Wejh, as the mere knowledge that he was moving against the railway would both inspire the Arabs and frighten the Turks. Lawrence’s insistent tone in the message, in fact, is indicative of the ascendancy he had already gained over the Arab leader: he told Joyce to say that ‘he hoped most strongly to find [Feisal] at Jayadah or ‘Ain Shefa soon’. 14He had decided to leave on Sunday the 25th, but the following day he wrote in his pocket diary, ‘am still beastly ill really.’ 15He finally started the day after, intent on attacking the station at Aba an-Na’am, which lay, conveniently, almost opposite the mouth of the Wadi Ais, shielded from its view by an outcrop of ridges – the Dhula. Lawrence collected about thirty ‘Utayba, and a handful of Sharifs, which would be the scouting party of a much larger force commanded by Sharif Shakir, equipped with howitzers and machine-guns. They left the camp just after first light, their camels’ feet crunching on the hard flints of the wadi floor, and by a tremendous effort of will Lawrence put his fear behind him. After riding for two days the party reached the Dhula, where they made camp in the lee of the rocky outcrops, amid some great tamarisk trees. Leaving camp, Lawrence climbed a 600-foot ridge to spy on the station, and found himself shattered after his fever, panting and halting to get his breath frequently. At the top, though, he was rewarded with a clear view of the station, which lay about 6,000 yards away: three large buildings, and the twenty-arched bridge which Dakhilallah had blown previously – now repaired. The original plan had been to send a force of tribesmen to occupy the hill behind the station – Jabal Unsayl – and attack it from the rear. When Sharif Shakir arrived with the main body the following afternoon, though, Lawrence discovered that he had brought with him only 300 men – a third of the number promised. He judged this force inadequate for an infantry assault, and instead he and the Sharif decided to bombard the station with their artillery, while mining the railway on both sides. One party was dispatched to the north to dynamite the rails and cut the telegraph line at dawn, while Lawrence led another – a group of ‘Utayba – to mine the track between Aba an-Na’am and Istabl ‘Antar – the next station to the south. There was no talking, and the camels loped along in silence, until, at about 11.15, they arrived at a deserted stretch of line. This was the first time Lawrence had seen the railway close up, and he found the touch of the rails thrilling. He placed the mine – a twenty-pound Garland-Martini, designed by Herbert Garland himself – under the rails, and set up a pressure switch which would detonate when the metals were depressed by the weight of a train. Then he sited a machine-gun and its crew in a water-course about 500 yards away, behind some thick bushes. Leaving the gun crew, Lawrence and the rest of the ‘Utayba mounted up and rode a little farther south, to cut the telegraph wires. As none of the Arabs could climb a telegraph pole, Lawrence had to shin up himself, and, having severed the wires, lost his grip and plummeted sixteen feet to the ground, only to be saved by his guide, Mohammad al-Qadi. At last, though, everything was in place: the plan was for Shakir’s artillery to open up on the station at first light next morning. The Turks would immediately try to telegraph for reinforcements, but, finding the lines cut, would be forced to send off a train towards Medina, which would run straight into Lawrence’s mine and be derailed or destroyed. When the crew jumped out to salvage it, the machine-gun would cut them down.