[12] New York Review of Books, 18 October 2001, 12. The editors made a few
[13] 'Real beings are sacrificed to an abstraction; individual people are offered up in a holocaust to people as a collectivity.' De I'esprit de conquhe et de I'usurpation dans leur rapports avec la civilisation europeenne, part 1, chapter 13, 'De l'uniformite': p. 169 in Benjamin Constant, Ecrits politiques, ed. Marcel Gauchet ([Paris], 1997).
[14] What kind of incompatibility this is - logical, conceptual, psychological or of some other kind - is a question to which I do not volunteer an answer. The relations of factual beliefs to moral attitudes (or beliefs) - both the logic and psychology of this - seem to me to need further philosophical investigation. The thesis that no relevant logical relationship exists, e.g. the division between fact and value often attributed to Hume, seems to me to be unplausible, and to point to a problem, not to its solution.
[15] See A. K. Sen, 'Determinism and Historical Predictions', Enquiry (Delhi) 2 (1959), 99-1 15- Also Gordon Leff in The Tyranny of Concepts: A Critique of Marxism (London, 1961), pp. 146-9.
[16] 'Elender Behelf', in the Critique of Practical Reason: Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1900- ), vol. 5, p. 96, line 15.
[17] 'History, the Individual, and Inevitability', Philosophical Review 68 (1959),
93-Ю2.
[18] Hampshire replies: 'The injunction not to treat men as merely objects defines the moral point of view precisely because, being studied from the scientific point of view, men can be so treated. Isaiah Berlin disagrees with me (and with Kant) in regarding the question "Are men only natural objects?" as an empirical issue, while I hold that since no one can treat himself as merely a natural object no one ought to treat another as merely a natural object.'
[19] ibid., p. 71 (76); cf. p. 163 below. 2 ibid., p. 38-49 (44-55).
[20] 'The things themselves speaking.' The phrase appears to originate in Justinian's Digest at i. 2. 2. 1 1. 2.
[20] A view attributed to me by Christopher Dawson in his review of Historical Inevitability, Harvard Law Review 70 (1956-7), 584-8, at 587.
My evident failure to state my view sufficiently clearly is brought home to me by the fact that the opposite of this position - a crude and absurd anti- rationalism - is attributed to me by Gordon Leff, loc. cit. (p. 7 above, note i), by J. A. Passmore, loc. cit. (p. 12 above, note i), by Christopher Dawson, op. cit. (see previous note), and by half a dozen Marxist writers: some of these in evident good faith.
[22] Though not in all situations: see my article 'From Hope and Fear Set Free' [reprinted below].
г I state this explicitly on pp. 120, 122, 124-6, 134-5.
^ See H. P. Rickman, 'The Horizons of History', Hibbert Journal 56 (October 1957 to July 1958), January 1958, 167-76, at 169-70.
[23] The generous and acute anonymous reviewer [Richard Wollheim] of my lecture in the Times Literary Supplement ('A Hundred Years After', 20 February 1959, 89-90) was the first writer to point out this error; he also made other penetrating and suggestive criticisms by which I have greatly profited.
[24] Oxford, 1958: Clarendon Press. See p. xxxii above.
[25] Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2. 61. 'Nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, numquam te esse confitebor malum.'
[26] There is an illuminating discussion of this topic by Robert Waelder in 'Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Psychological Comments on a Problem of Power': this essay appears in George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger (eds), Psychoanalysis and Culture: Essays in Honour of Geza Rosheim (New York, !9P; repr. 1967), pp. 185-95. He speaks of the remoulding of the superego into 'internalising' external pressures, and draws an illuminating distinction between authoritarianism, which entails obedience to authority without acceptance of its orders and claims, and totalitarianism, which entails in addition inner conformity to the system imposed by the dictator; hence totalitarian insistence on education and indoctrination as opposed to mere outward obedience, a sinister process with
[27] A. W. Gomme and others have provided a good deal of evidence for the hypothesis that they did.
[28] In his inaugural lecture to the University of Sheffield in 1966, Freedom as Politics (Sheffield, 1966), reprinted in his Political Theory and Practice (London, [1972]).
[29] It has been suggested that liberty is always a triadic relation; one can only seek to be free from x to do or be y; hence 'all liberty' is at once negative and positive or, better still, neither. See G. C. MacCallum, jr, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', Philosophical Review 76 (1967), 312-34, repr. in Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Quentin Skinner (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Fourth Series (Oxford, 1972). This seems to me an error. A man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke. So do classes and nations.
[30] See Coleridge Biographia Literaria (1817), chapter 12, theses 6-7, and chapter 1 3, antepenultimate paragraph.
[31] Not that such open violence has been lacking in our own country, practised at times under the noble banner of the suppression of arbitrary rule and the enemies of liberty and the emancipation of hitherto enslaved populations and classes. I agree with a great deal of what has been said on this subject by A. S. Kaufman ('Professor Berlin on "Negative Freedom"', Mind 71 (1962), 241-3). Some of his points may be found in an earlier attack by Marshall Cohen ('Berlin and the Liberal Tradition', Philosophical Quarterly 10 (i960), 216-27). Some of Kaufman's objections have, I hope, been answered already. There is one point, however, on which I must take further issue with him. He appears to regard constraint or obstruction not brought about by human means as being forms of deprivation of social or political freedom. I do not think that this is compatible with what is normally meant by political freedom - the only sense of freedom with which I am concerned. Kaufman speaks (op. cit., p. 241) of 'obstructions to the human will, which have nothing to do with a community's pattern of power relations' as obstacles to (political or social) liberty. Unless, however, such obstructions do, in the end, spring from power relations, they do not seem to be relevant to the existence of social or political liberty. I cannot see how one can speak of 'basic human rights' (to use Kaufman's phrase) as violated by what he calls 'non-human . . . interference'. If I stumble and fall, and so find my freedom of movement frustrated, I cannot, surely, be said to have suffered any loss of basic human rights. Failure to discriminate between human and non-human obstacles to freedom seems to me to mark the beginning of the great confusion of types of