[80] Thomas Rainborow, speaking at Putney in 1647: p. 301 in The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, ed. C. H. Firth, vol. 1 ([London], 189 i ).
[81] This has an obvious affinity with Kant's doctrine of human freedom; but it is a socialised and empirical version of it, and therefore almost its opposite. Kant's free man needs no public recognition for his inner freedom. If he is treated as a means to some external purpose, that is a wrong action on the part of his exploiters, but his own 'noumenal' status is untouched, and he is fully free, and fully a man, however he may be treated. The need spoken of here is bound up wholly with the relation that I have with others; I am nothing if I am unrecognised. I cannot ignore the attitude of others with Byronic disdain, fully conscious of my own intrinsic worth and vocation, or escape into my inner life, for I am in my own eyes as others see me. I identify myself with the point of view of my milieu: I feel myself to be somebody or nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole; this is the most 'heteronomous' condition imaginable.
[82] loc. cit. (p. 1 8 3 above, note 2).
[83] Following Sterling: loc. cit. (p. 174 above, note 4), at p. 266.
[84] This argument should be distinguished from the traditional approach of some of the disciples of Burke or Hegel, who say that, since I am made what I am by society or history, to escape from them is impossible and to attempt it irrational. No doubt I cannot leap out of my skin, or breathe outside my proper element; it is a mere tautology to say that I am what I am, and cannot want to be liberated from my essential characteristics, some of which are social. But it does not follow that all my attributes are intrinsic and inalienable, and that I cannot
[85] In Great Britain such legal power is, of course, constitutionally vested in the
[86] loc. cit. (p. 174 above, note 4). ' loc. cit. (p. 225 below, note 2).
[87] loc. cit. (p. 92 above, note 1).
[88] Sir Richard Livingstone, Tolerance m Theory and in Practice, First Robert Waley Cohen Memorial Lecture [1954] (London, 1954), p. 8.
[89] This was written in 1959.
[90] This passage occurs in a review of two pamphlets on the Carlile prosecutions in Westminster Review 2 (July-October 1824) No 3 (July), 1-27, at 26. Since Alexander Bain - see John Stuart Milclass="underline" A Criticism (London, 1882), p. 33 - confidently ascribes this article to Mill, even though it does not appear in Mill's own list of his work, Berlin too, not unnaturally, took it as Mill's. The review is also reprinted in Prefaces to Liberty: Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill, ed. Bernard Wishy (Boston, 1959; repr. Lanham, Md, etc., 1983), where the quoted passage appears on p. 99. However, a letter from Joseph Parkes to John Bowring (then co-editor of the Review) of 1 March 1824 (HM 30805, The Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) suggests that the review may in fact be by William Johnson Fox (1768-1864), though Parkes refers to 'Persecution papers'. But even if the words are not Mill's, the sentiments are certainly Millian. Ed.
[91] '[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.' From the Preface to Bentham's A Fragment of Government (1776): p. 393 in A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment of Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London, 1977). Cf. 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation', from Bentham's commonplace book (1781-5): see vol. 10, p. 142, in op. cit. (p. 194 above, note 3). Bentham later dropped the reference to the greatest number. The career of this idea before Bentham, and in Bentham's hands, is complex, but distilled with great clarity by Robert Shackleton in 'The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The History of Bentham's Phrase', Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 90 (1972), 1461-82. Ed.
[92] L 4/281; cf. L 3/261, where Mill speaks of 'experiments of living'.
[93] 'Bentham': CW x 99-100.
[94] ibid. no. 2 ibid. i i i.
World': Writings on Codification, Law, and Education, ed. Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris (Oxford: 1998), pp. 46, 282 (note). Ed.
[96] As he does in 'Bentham': CW x 1 10.
[97] L 3/268.
' He did not seem to look on socialism, which under the influence of Harriet Taylor he advocated in Principles of Political Economy and later, as a danger to individual liberty in the way in which democracy, for example, might be so. This is not the place to examine the very peculiar relationship of Mill's socialist to his individualist convictions. Despite his socialist professions, none of the socialist leaders of his time - neither Louis Blanc nor Proudhon nor Lassalle nor Herzen
[99] L 2/231. 2 ibid.
[100] loc. cit. (p. 225 above, note 2).
[101] L 2/254. 'L 2/257. 'L 4/285.
[102] loc. cit. (p. 92 above, note i). 2 L 3/265, 271 ('maim')- 3 L 3/270.
[103] L 1/222. 2 L 1/226. 3L 3/271-2. 4 L 3/272.
[104] L 3/263.
' loc. cit. (p. 228 above, note 1 ).
[106] Which in any case he regarded as inevitable and also, perhaps, to a vision
wider than his own time-bound one, ultimately more just and more generous.
[108] loc. cit. (p. xxx above, note 1).