Shi Zhongquan concludes by saying that the definite theoretical relationship between On Contradiction and On Practice and the Soviet texts on philosophy has been either not acknowledged or underemphasized in the past, and there has been a tendency to exaggerate (bagao) the achievements and significance of Mao’s philosophical essays, something not in keeping with the current emphasis on “seeking truth from facts”. Nevertheless, the opposite tendency, that of completely denying or underemphasizing the important position of On Contradiction and On Practice in the history of the development of Marxism, is also an unscientific attitude.
The position advanced by Shi Zhongquan is clearly of significance for the line of argument I have been pursuing throughout this introduction. On the one hand, it emphasizes the debt to the philosophy of the orthodox Marxist tradition by Mao, while on the other hand stressing the areas in which Mao can be perceived to have either made a contribution of some originality or to have applied the abstract principles of Marxism in a novel way which could function as a model in the subsequent development of the theories, strategies, and tactics which were to become part-and-parcel of the ideology of Chinese Marxism. The conclusion arrived at by Shi appears to me to be a balanced and persuasive one, avoiding as it does the extremes of Wittfogel and Cohen on the one side and the political culture school[1-132] on the other, with its view of overwhelming dominance of traditional Chinese philosophy and culture on the formation of contemporary Chinese thought. The adoption of this middle path allows a recognition of influence and originality, source and subsequent development in the philosophical thought of Mao Zedong.
Another important issue emerges as a result of Shi Zhongquan’s discussion of the extent of Mao’s reliance on Soviet philosophical sources in the writing of On Contradiction and On Practice, and that is the issue of the sinification of Marxism. Stuart Schram has argued that Mao denied altogether the existence of “a universally valid form of Marxism”, and that his “preoccupation with the glory of China” led to a sinified Marxism which was “hermetic”.[1-133] In opposition to this view, I have suggested that the sinification of Marxism was an attempt by Mao to establish a formula by which a universal theory such as Marxism could be utilised in a particular national context and culture without abandoning the universality of that theory.[1-134]The fact that On Contradiction and On Practice drew so heavily for inspiration on a number of Soviet texts on philosophy enhances the suggestion that one important component of a sinified Marxism – the philosophical component – was not “hermetic” and bore a clear genealogical relationship to a form of Marxism claiming to be, and widely accepted as, universal in its content and applicability. There can be no doubt that the content of On Contradiction and On Practice is in most important respects acceptably orthodox as judged by the standards of orthodoxy established by Soviet Marxism in the 1930s.[1-135]Consequently, it is just not logical to recognise, as Schram has done, Mao’s reliance on Soviet sources in the compilation of his writings on dialectical materialism, while insisting that the sinified Marxism that Mao was largely responsible for creating was “hermetic”. There was nothing “hermetic” about it; Mao’s employment of concepts drawn from Soviet sources in all of his three philosophical essays ensured that his thought and Chinese Marxism generally contain significant elements which are not specifically Chinese in origin.
Moreover, a recognition of this dependent relationship on mainstream Marxism in Mao’s philosophical writings is necessary if one is to have any hope of comprehending the world of philosophy in post-Liberation and especially contemporary China. Textbooks and primers on dialectical and historical materialism in contemporary China read like regurgitations of the Soviet philosophical texts employed by Mao in the 1930s;[1-136] and the connection clearly is Mao’s endorsement of this reading of dialectical materialism in his writings on philosophy of 1937. Chinese Marxism does possess elements which are particular to the Chinese case; but it likewise incorporates concepts, categories, laws, and modes of thought and expression whose source obviously extends beyond the Chinese Marxist tradition itself.
The issue of Mao’s plagiarism and reliance on Soviet philosophical sources thus raises questions beyond the confines of Mao studies, questions which extend to the problem of understanding the contemporary Chinese world view, of which philosophy is an important and integral part.
The origins of Mao Zedong’s philosophical thought: perspectives from China
We have seen above that Mao scholars in China are subjecting Mao’s philosophical thought – its sources, development, content – to more rigorous academic scrutiny and analysis than was possible before his death. Nevertheless, while the stature and influence of Mao have been very seriously eroded in the political arena and in everyday Chinese life, amongst professional philosophers and Mao scholars in China there is still a very high regard for his abilities as a philosopher and as the major architect of the intellectual edifice now recognisable as Chinese Marxism. This regard is, of course, tempered by the current Party line, but the current stress on “seeking truth from facts” and the more open intellectual atmosphere of the last decade have facilitated the emergence of a field of Mao studies in which, like its Western counterpart, there is disagreement, debate, and controversy. It is, therefore, no longer possible to talk of a single perspective on Mao’s philosophical thought emanating from China; rather, a number of perspectives have emerged. And while the issue of Mao and his thought is likely to remain a politically sensitive one for many years to come, its study in the halls of Chinese universities and research institutes appears to be assuming an increasingly academic countenance. In this section I will look briefly at a number of themes and differences of opinion which have characterised the study of Mao’s philosophical thought in China in recent years. These are particularly relevant to the concerns of this Introduction, for they take as their point of departure the issue of the origins of the philosophical thought of Mao Zedong. In the literature on this subject, three perspectives are discernible, although one is at present dominant.
1-132
See Richard H. Solomon,
1-134
Nick Knight, “The form of Mao Zedong’s ‘Sinification of Marxism’”,
1-135
For a detailed analysis of the Soviet Marxist philosophy of the 1930s by a Soviet philosopher, see W.N. Kohosokov,
1-136
See, for example, Xiao Qian et al. (eds.),