There is no mind comprised of thought which is in essence distinct, there is only ideational matter – the brain. This ideational matter is matter of a particular quality [p. 213], matter which has developed to a high degree following the development of language in human social life. This matter possesses the particular characteristic of thought, something possessed by no other type of matter.
However, vulgar materialists consider thought to be matter secreted from within the brain; this viewpoint misrepresents our conception of this problem. It must be understood that the behaviour of thought, emotion, and will is weightless, neither does it possess the capacity to expand; and yet consciousness, together with weight, and the capacity to expand (shenzhangxing), and so on, are all matter with different characteristics. Consciousness is an intrinsic condition of matter in motion; it reflects the particular characteristics of the physiological processes which occur with matter which is in motion. These particular characteristics cannot be separated from the objective processes of nerve function, but they are not[2-235] identical with such processes. The confusion of these two and the repudiation of the particularity of consciousness – this is the viewpoint of vulgar materialists.
Similarly, the mechanistic theory of sham Marxism echoes the viewpoint of certain bourgeois right-wing[2-236] schools of thought within psychology; this in actuality has also completely overturned consciousness. They consider the processes of the physiology and comprehension of consciousness to be a particular characteristic of the nature of advanced material substance, and do not recognise that consciousness is a product of the social practice of humankind.[2-237] For the concrete historical identity of object and subject, they substitute the equality of object and subject, and the one-sided mechanistic objective world. These viewpoints which confuse consciousness with a physiological process are tantamount to the abolition of the fundamental question of philosophy of the relationship[2-238] between thought and existence, (p. 292) The idealism of the Mensheviks attempts to employ a compromise theory, one which reconciles materialism and idealism, as a substitute for Marxist epistemology. They oppose the principle of dialectics through the principles of[2-239] the “synthesis”[2-240] of objectivism and subjectivism and the “mutual assistance” of these two methods.[2-241] However, this principle of dialectics is both non-mechanistic objectivism and non-idealist subjectivism, and represents the concrete historical identity[2-242] of objective and subjective.
However, there is also the unusual theory of Plekhanov’s animist view on the problem of consciousness, which is fully expressed in his celebrated dictum “a stone also possesses consciousness”, [p. 214]. According to this viewpoint, consciousness does not occur in the process of development of matter, but exists in all matter from the very beginning; there is only a difference of degree between the consciousness of humans, low-level organisms, and a stone.[2-243]This anti-historical viewpoint is fundamentally opposed to the viewpoint of dialectical materialism which considers consciousness to be the ultimately occurring particular characteristic of matter.[2-244]
Only dialectical materialism’s theory of consciousness is the correct theory on problems of consciousness.
9. On Reflection
To be a thoroughgoing materialist, it is insufficient simply to acknowledge the material origins of consciousness; the knowability of matter by consciousness also must be acknowledged.
The question of whether or not matter can be known is a complex one; it is a question which all philosophers of the past have felt powerless[2-245] to deal with. Only dialectical materialism is able to provide the correct solution. On this question, the standpoint of dialectical materialism has been in opposition to agnosticism and is different to strident realism.
The agnosticism of Hume and Kant isolates the subject of knowledge from the object, and considers that it is not possible to transcend the limits which isolate the subject; between the “thing-in-itself” (p. 293) and its outward form exists an impassable chasm.
The strident realism of Machism equates the object with sense perceptions, and considers that the truth is already established in final form in sense perceptions. At the same time, Machism not only does not understand that sense perceptions are a result of the effects of the external world, it moreover does not understand the active role of the subject in the process of cognition, namely, [p. 215] the transformative work of the sense organs and thinking brain of the subject,[2-246] on the effects of the external world (such that two forms – impressions and concepts – are made manifest).
It is only the theory of reflection of dialectical materialism which has positively answered the problem of knowability to become the “soul” of Marxist epistemology. This theory has clearly demonstrated that our impressions and concepts not only arise from objective things, but also reflect them. It demonstrates that impressions and concepts are neither a product of the spontaneous development of the subject as the idealists suggest, nor the label given objective things as suggested by the agnostics; they are rather the reflection of objective things, a photographic image and sample copy of them.
Objective truth exists independently and does not depend on the subject.[2-247] Although it is reflected in our sense perceptions and concepts, it achieves final form gradually rather than instantaneously. The viewpoint of strident realism, which considers objective truth achieves final form in sense perceptions and that we gain it thus, is a mistaken one.
Although objective truth does not achieve final form at once in our sense perceptions and concepts, it is not unknowable. The reflection theory of dialectical materialism opposes the viewpoint of agnosticism, and considers that consciousness can reflect objective truth in the process of cognition. The process of cognition is a complex one; in this process, when the as yet unknown “thing-in-itself”[2-248] is reflected in our sense perceptions, impressions, and concepts, it becomes a “thing-for-us”. Sense perceptions and thought certainly do not, as Kant has stated, isolate us from the external world; rather, they are what links us with it. Sense perceptions and thought are reflections of the objective external world. Mental[2-249]things (impressions and concepts) can be no other than “material things, altered (p. 294) and transformed, within the brain of humankind”. (Marx) In the process of cognition, the material world is increasingly reflected in our knowledge more closely, more precisely, more multifariously, and more profoundly. It is the task of Marxist epistemology to carry on a struggle on two fronts against Machism and Kantianism, and to expose the errors of strident realism and agnosticism.
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