As Lenin pointed out, Marx in his Capital made a model application[4-425] of this principle of the movement of opposites which runs through a process[4-426] from beginning to end. He pointed out that this is the method which must be employed in studying any process.[4-427]
In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this “cell” of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the Σ (summation) of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.[4-428]
Lenin added, “Such must be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general”.
Fine, we don’t need to study the ancient literary method (yifa) of the Tong Cheng school,[4-429] for Lenin has informed us of an even better method (yifa), and that is the Marxist scientific method of study.[4-430]
IV. The Particularity of Contradiction
[p. 252] Contradiction is present in all processes;[4-431] it permeates each and every process from beginning to end.[4-432] This is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction which we have discussed above. Now let us discuss the particularity and relativity of contradiction.[4-433] This problem should be studied on several levels.
First, the contradiction in each form of motion of matter has its particularity. Man’s knowledge of matter is knowledge of its forms of motion, because there is nothing in this world except matter in motion.[4-434] In considering each form of motion, we must observe the points which it has in common with other forms of motion. But what is especially important, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion of matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. Materialist dialectics indicates clearly: Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another.[4-435] There are many forms of motion in nature, mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, dissociation, combination, and so on. All these forms are interdependent, but in its essence each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena.
Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.
The sciences are differentiated precisely on the basis of the particular contradictions inherent in their respective objects of study. Thus the contradiction peculiar to a certain field of phenomena constitutes the object of study for a specific branch of science. For example, positive and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of production and relations of production, and class struggle, in social science;[4-436] offence and defence in military science; idealism and materialism, the metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook, in philosophy; and so on – all these are the objects of study of different branches of science precisely because each branch has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. Of course, unless we study[4-437] the universality of contradiction, we have no way of discovering the universal cause[4-438] for the movement or development of things; however, unless we study the particularity of contradiction, we have no way of determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things, no way of discovering the particular cause[4-439] for the movement or development of a thing, [p. 253] and no way of distinguishing one thing from another or of demarcating the fields of science.[4-440]
It is necessary not only to study the particular contradiction and the essence determined thereby of every great system of the forms of motion of matter, but also to study the particular contradiction and the essence of each process in the long course of development of each form of motion of matter. In every form of motion, each process of development[4-441]is qualitatively different; in the entire world (tianxia) there are no identical contradictions, and our study must emphasize[4-442] this point.
4-425
4-426
Official text reads: “…process of development of things…”; SW I, p. 318‒319; XJ I, p. 282.
4-428
In this and the following quote, I have reproduced the official translation, although the Chinese in the original text does differ in some minor respects from that shown in the original text.
4-429
4-430
Addition in official text; “Chinese Communists must learn this method; only then will they be able correctly to analyse history and the present state of the Chinese revolution and infer its future”. SW I, p. 319; XJ I, p. 283.
4-434
Addition in official text: “…and this motion must assume certain forms”. SW I, p. 319; XJ I, p. 283.
4-435
Addition in official text: “It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world”. SW I, p. 320; XJ I, p. 284.
4-440
There is an important addition here in the official text dealing with Mao’s epistemology. It reads:
“As regards the sequence in the movement of man’s knowledge there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after man knows the particular essence of many different things can he proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things. When man attains the knowledge of this common essence, he uses it as a guide and proceeds to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus is he able to supplement, enrich, and develop this knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering or petrifying. These are the two processes of cognition; one, from the particular to the general, and the other from the general to the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and more profound. Where our dogmatists err on this question is that, on the one hand, they do not understand that we have to study the particularity of contradiction and know the particular essence of individual things before we can adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things, and that, on the other hand, they do not understand that after knowing the common essence of things, we must go further and study the concrete things that have not yet been thoroughly studied or have only just emerged. Our dogmatists are lazy-bones. They refuse to undertake any painstaking study of concrete things, they regard general truths as emerging out of the void, they turn them into purely abstract unfathomable formulas, and thereby completely deny and reverse the normal sequence by which man comes to know truth. Nor do they understand the interconnection of the two processes in cognition – from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular. They understand nothing of the Marxist theory of knowledge.” SW I, pp. 320‒321; XJ I, pp. 284‒285.
4-441
Addition in official text: “…which is real (and not imaginary)…”; SW I,p. 321; XJ I,p. 285.