Even the Left Menshevik newspaper Rabochaya Gazeta, inclined to support the Bolshevik regime and implacably hostile to counter-revolution, was closed down because it did not slavishly reproduce the Bolshevik line at all times. In February 1918 at the Fourth Congress of Soviets, Lenin confronted socialist delegates who complained that their newspapers had been closed down. “Of course, unfortunately not all of them!” he responded from the top table. “Soon all of them will be closed”.20 Between October 1917 and July 1918 Sovnarcom closed down over 300 newspapers and periodicals.21
Between February and October 1917, the Bolshevik Party, as Trotsky admitted, had “de-Bolshevised” itself in order to respond to mass movements and popular feeling and to attract a wider membership. That phase was over. Already, on 3rd November, Lenin put a resolution to the Central Committee titled “Ultimatum from the majority of the Central Committee to the minority” that demanded that those who wished to pursue talks with other socialist parties desist or be expelled from the party. Lenin insisted on the removal of the dissenters not just from their CC positions but all other posts. Thus Kamenev was replaced as Chair of the Soviet Executive by the uber-loyal functionary Yacob Sverdlov, who was also head of the CC’s informal Secretariat.
On 4th November the Bolshevik moderate Yuri Larin put a resolution to the Soviet Executive that newspapers should remain free of censorship and repression unless they incited armed rebellion against Sovnarcom. The resolution was supported by many socialists including Bolshevik moderates and Left SRs. Larin told the CEC, “The measures taken against press freedom could be justified during the actual course of the struggle, but not now. The press should be free so long as it does not incite subversion and insurrection. Censorship of every kind must be completely eliminated”. Larin’s resolution demanded that Lenin’s press Decree be revoked and that “no acts of political repression may be carried out except by authorisation of a special tribunal chosen by the CEC”.
Malkin again attacked the Bolsheviks. He demanded the CEC “examine the question of the powers of the Council of People’s Commissars, which is issuing one decree after another without any sanction by the CEC”. When the Bolshevik CEC Secretary Avenesov replied that it was ridiculous for the Soviet to “stand up for antiquated notions about liberty of the press”, the Left SR Kamkov interjected,
Either we recognise freedom in words, or else we are behaving hypocritically […] No one has yet called for the overthrow of the existing regime, yet press freedom is being infringed without due cause. We are morally obliged to rescind these repressive measures, which bring shame on the Russian Revolution.
Lenin and Trotsky themselves led the opposition to Larin’s resolution. “You say that we demanded freedom of the press for Pravda”, Trotsky told delegates who criticised the Bolsheviks for a volte face on freedom of the press. “But then we were in a situation where we demanded the Minimum Programme. Now we demand the Maximum Programme. When the state power was in the hands of the bourgeoisie we stood for legal freedom of the press”. Lenin added, “We stated earlier that if we took power we would close down bourgeois newspapers. To allow them to exist is to cease to be socialists”.22 Larin’s resolution lost by 31 votes to 22. The Bolshevik resolution supporting restrictions on the press passed by 34 votes to 24.
After the resolution was passed the Left SR Prosyhan made a declaration on behalf of the Left SR party:
The resolution on the press passed by the majority of the CEC is a clear and unambiguous expression of support for a system of political terror and for unleashing civil war. The SR fraction, while remaining in the CEC […] has no desire to bear any responsibility for this system of terror, ruinous for the revolution, and therefore withdraws all representatives from the Military Revolutionary Committee, the staff, and all responsible posts.
With Proshyan’s words ringing in the air, People’s Commissar for Trade and Industry Nogin asked to be given the floor to read an urgent statement on behalf of a group of four of Sovnarcom’s People’s Commissars: himself, Commissar for Internal Affairs Rykov, Commissar for Agriculture Miliutin and Commissar for Supply Teodorovich.
He read out:
We take the stand that it is vital to form a socialist government from all parties represented in the Soviets. Only such a government can seal the heroic struggle of the working class and revolutionary army in the October-November days. We consider that a purely Bolshevik government has no choice but to maintain itself by political terror. This is the course on which Sovnarcom is embarked. We cannot follow this course, which will lead to the proletarian mass organizations becoming estranged from those who direct our political affairs, to the establishment of an irresponsible government, and to the annihilation of the revolution and the country.
The four People’s Commissars therefore resigned from Sovnarcom. Their statement was officially “adhered to” by Riazanov and other leading Bolsheviks. People’s Commissar for Labour Alexander Shliapnikov added that while he agreed with the statement he felt it was “impermissible to lay down my responsibilities”.23 Kamenev also resigned as Chair of the CEC.
It was a crucial moment. If Kamenev, Rykov and the Bolshevik “moderates” had won out, the October Insurrection might have delivered power to the Soviets instead of to the Bolshevik Party. As it was, Sovnarcom took power and never relinquished it. Central to that power was a Decree titled “Concerning the Procedure for the Ratification and Promulgation of Laws”, which gave Sovnarcom the right to act in a legislative capacity. The unilateral assumption of both executive and legislative power sidelined the CEC and the Soviets and reversed the entire rationale of the October Insurrection. When Lenin and Trotsky were summoned by the CEC and asked to explain, Lenin simply said he rejected “bourgeois formalism”. Trotsky, developing this theme, claimed that Sovnarcom could issue legislation because Sovnarcom and the masses were linked by “a vital and direct bond”, although he did not explain how the vital and direct bond actually functioned.24
Public division between the Soviet and Sovnarcom called the entire basis of the Bolshevik insurrection into question. Two things came to Lenin’s rescue. Firstly, the new regime was mobilising large numbers of volunteers to fight Krasnov’s forces. People had died for it. This gave it enormous credibility. Secondly, Lenin’s opponents played their cards badly. His critics within the Bolshevik Party resigned from key positions just when they could have used them to hold him to account. The Left SRs had just broken with the main SRs and as yet had no real organisation or structure. When they formed their own party they needed Bolshevik support to survive. Despite their protests about Sovnarcom they were tempted to join it in junior positions. This both defused their criticisms and enabled Lenin to claim that Sovnarcom was, after all, a socialist coalition government.
The Mensheviks were not tempted. Between February and October 1917 they appeared to lose their political bearings. Some of this was due to Martov’s absence until May 1917 and the dominance of the forceful but conservative Tseretelli. At their best they had stood for political liberty, civil rights and a controlled expansion of public ownership–although the Provisional Government’s endorsement of the Volosts’ seizure of landed estates and attempt to provide communal oversight of the redistributed land came from Chernov and the SRs. At their worst they slipped into support for imperialist war aims and a centralised capitalist economy, if with added trade union engagement.