Vollendorf divided the oil produced on the Taman Peninsula into three types: “Thick greenish, liquid greenish, and watery greenish.” In addition to the digging of oil out of the wells, Senior Manager Vollendorf described the extraction of “thick greenish” oil from petroliferous sand found at depths of 49 feet. In all, 51 barrels of oil were produced from the Taman fields that year.
Vollendorf’s report contained one more important fact: in the mid-1830s, the Kuban oilmen were using manual drilling in their prospecting work. According to his report: “When they want to dig a well at a new site, first they test the earth with an auger (they call it a sounding borer), sinking it.... When they want to reveal the presence of petroleum during testing, they pour more water into the drillhole and remove it more often, so the mud and oil no longer adhere to the auger.... They also learn of the presence of petroleum when the auger advances more easily, which indicates entry into a layer containing petroleum.”
Senior Manager Vollendorf’s trip to the Kuban yielded yet another noteworthy result: the appearance, in February 1836, of the first technical manual in the domestic oil business, Rules for Guidance When Digging Oil Wells [Pravila dlya rukovodstovaniya pri kopanii neftyanykh kolodtsev], with necessary drawings included in an appendix. The author systematized methods known at that time for constructing oil wells, proposed an optimal design, and specified necessary steps for well operation, including rudimentary safety measures for workers.
The need to increase oil production volumes in the region was also driven by the expansion of its areas of application. In his letter of August 1839 to the minister of finance, Count Yegor Kankrin, the commander-in-chief of the Civilian Unit in the Caucasus, noted that: “Black liquid oil is especially recommended as an excellent material for impregnating timber for construction of underwater parts, since it can replace natural drying of the wood and increase the strength of seagoing vessels. The latter fact, along with the introduction of ‘black’ oil for the lighting of beacons on the Caspian and Black Seas, deserves the government’s full attention. This is particularly true in shipbuilding, for which required timber can be prepared sooner, and as petroleum protects against rapid rotting, this will be of considerable benefit, especially for the Black Sea Fleet, which has its own petroleum, probably of the same quality as that on the Taman Peninsula. The substitution of ‘white’ oil for turpentine and thick ‘black’ oil in place of tar offers an important benefit in preserving wood.”
This proposal was accepted by the government, and imperial approval of the “Statute on the Black Sea Cossack Host,” with a special chapter “On the Production of Oil and Sale of Same,” followed on July 1, 1842. In accordance with the directive’s provisions, all oil produced in the Kuban region was to enter the army stores for sale at a price approved by the commander of the Caucasus Line. The oil fields were to be managed by an official of the mining department, who supervised the Cossack squadron [sotnya], the commander of which held the position of oil well inspector. The Cossacks, in addition to free provisions, would be paid 10 silver kopecks per 3.25 gallons of crude. The mining official and oil well inspector reported to the board of the Black Sea Cossack Host, which in turn presented a petroleum report once a year to the Department of Military Settlements of the Ministry of War.
On the whole, however, there was still no substantial growth in oil production. This is clearly confirmed by indicators presented in the “Register of the Arrival and Disbursement of Oil Produced at Army Petroleum Institutions over 10 Years and Withholdings for Army Use from 1835 to 1844,” prepared by the board of the Black Sea Cossack Host. During this period, only 970 barrels of “black” oil and 111 barrels of “white” oil were produced.
The unsatisfactory results from the Kuban oil fields were not overlooked by the government. Captain Anisimov of the Corps of Mining Engineers soon arrived to the Kuban and made a thorough study of the condition of the Taman fields with their “abundant signs of oil fields,” which was reflected in his “Memorandum on the Inspection of Oil Facilities” (April 1845). He considered it possible to increase oil production to 232 barrels per year if existing wells were promptly repaired, if exploration was begun by manually drilling wildcat wells using a tool known as an exploratory drill, and if 50 new wells were constructed.
However, acting ataman Major General Rashpil and the board of the Cossack Host were of a different opinion: in view of the “small income... and to ease the Cossacks’ internal service, all oil wells should be farmed out.” Therefore, in December 1846, the Military Directorate of the Black Sea Cossack Host signed a four-year contract with the small business owner Yegor Cherkasov, granting him a monopoly on development of oil fields on army lands, as well as the sale, export, and import of oil, all for an annual fee of 380 silver rubles.
In 1848, the Black Sea Cossack Host reinstated the position of mining engineer at the oil fields, appointing to the post squadron leader Gavriil Litevsky, who attempted to introduce certain new oil well operation techniques into production. However, in 1853, oil production in the Kuban virtually ceased due to the onset of the Crimean War, and was not resumed until after hostilities ended. Unfortunately, most wells became inoperable due to the prolonged period of inactivity.
Colonel Novosiltsev’s Oil Gusher
In early 1863, the Military Directorate of the Kuban Cossack Host entered into a tax-farming agreement for exploitation of Taman oil fields with the Kerch merchant Franz Kibler. The agreement was for a three year period at an annual fee of 135 rubles, to be paid to the army.
In July of the same year, Kibler assigned his tax-farming rights to Guards Colonel Ardalion Nikolayevich Novosiltsev (1816–1878). After familiarizing himself with the situation, Col. Novosiltsev contacted the Military Directorate and proposed extending the agreement through 1872, with monopoly rights to produce oil on the territory of the Taman peninsula and a simultaneous increase in the fee from 135 to 270 rubles per year. Col. Novosiltsev’s offer was accepted, and the agreement was extended through May 1, 1872.
Col. Novosiltsev then contacted the Military Directorate and proposed that it grant him a series of Kuban Cossack Host lands lying beyond the Kuban river within the Natukhay District, declaring that “with its method of developing oil and with the establishment of refineries and plants for the manufacture of candles, paints, soap, and similar necessary household goods, the poorest of residents will have the opportunity to use and purchase what they need for housekeeping, and later deliver a profitable source of income to the populated territory.”29
This proposal was likewise accepted, and under the second agreement Col. Novosiltsev gained monopoly rights to the land through May 1872 for an annual fee of 200 silver rubles. Additionally, he was required to annually provide 39 barrels of oil for the army’s needs and 310 barrels to Cossack families. After the agreement expired, all facilities and structures he had erected would become the property of the army. Finally, under a third agreement, Ardalion Novosiltsev obtained the right to develop oil-bearing areas occupied by the Abinsk and Psekup Cossack Regiments on the banks of the Chiby, Sups, and II Creeks through May 1872. In this manner, Col. Novosiltsev gained tax-farming rights to oil-bearing lands over a wide area, ranging from the shores of the Black and Azov Seas to the meridian of Yekaterinodar.