Based on certain indications, Lee thought he would have the opportunity to meet personally with Stalin, who was by that time the Central Committee Secretary General, but the meeting never took place.
The American journalist recorded his impressions of his visit to the Soviet Union in two books titled USSR: A World Enigma and Present-Day Russia. The first book was released in the US in 1927 not long after his ten-day visit to Moscow, while the second appeared the following year with significant additions.
In his books, Lee did not predict the rapid downfall of the politicians he met, but did detect some contradictory beliefs and a lack of unity in the Soviet leadership. He distinguished the radical Bolshevik internationalists—the advocates of the dictatorship of the proletariat—from the nationalist-minded Bolsheviks, whom he considered to be pragmatists. Lee tried to evaluate the personalities of two radical Party leaders, Leon Trotsky and Nikolay Bukharin, based on their statements in the press, which he quoted in his book. He considered Bukharin the most dangerous radical for the world community, citing his inflammatory Communist International speeches. Lee was well aware that such slogans as “Down with imperialism!,” “Proletarians of all countries, unite!,” and “Factories to the workers!” did not pose a real threat to the US or the Western world. There was nothing behind these slogans except a desire to influence mass consciousness in the direction the Bolsheviks wanted. Lee maintained that the strongest antidote against this was a high standard of living.
Lee unexpectedly discovered a key thought in Leon Trotsky’s writing, of which he took note: if clear signs of the economic downfall of capitalism were not seen in the West in the next few decades, the USSR would not be able to surpass it in terms of labor productivity and product quality. It was pointless to chase an express with a freight train, and the Bolsheviks would have to admit that their Marxist theory-based socialistic experiment had proven to be a fatal mistake. Lee had no doubts that capitalism would win out despite the shortcomings of Western civilization, and the Soviet system would have to adapt to capitalist society by initially borrowing its accomplishments and then ultimately joining it.
As for establishing diplomatic relations with the US, Lee said the USSR needed to meet several preliminary conditions. It had to earn the respect of the global community by fulfilling all of its international obligations, even to the capitalists, and exile all organizations calling for revolution in other countries. In this regard, he emphasized the deconstructive role of the Communist International. “The Russian people as a people are all right. The great enemy of mankind is the Communist International. The supreme problem is how to drive a wedge between the Communist International and the Russian people so that the Russian people them selves will come to feel that they want none of the International or its works.” In addition, as an advocate of liberal values, he called for introducing “real freedom of thought, action and belief in the USSR and creating a judicial system based on the principles of true justice and law.
Even though for obvious reasons he concealed the actual role he was playing in fulfilling Rockefeller’s instructions during his trip to Moscow, Lee represented his ideas as his own personal thoughts and even arranged for his book to be printed privately. In the US, he was nevertheless accused of conducting the policy of the Red Commissars in the country and of having being “bought” by the Soviets.
Soviet authorities were not particularly thrilled with the book, either. While Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade Lev Khinchuk called the book “timely and important as an expression of the position of the business community,” he also found the ideas put forward in the book unacceptable for Soviet society. The popular Soviet newspaper Za industrializatsiyu [“For Industrialization”] wrote that “Ivy Lee expects the communist spirit to ‘disintegrate’ from the development of trade.”
Nevertheless, it can be said with a certain degree of confidence that Lee’s visit produced positive results, as he might have presented another decisive argument for the Soviet leadership to finally chart its course towards the possible expansion of multilateral cooperation with the United States.
On September 1, 1927, the Politburo founded the Permanent Commission for Technical and Scientific Relations with America. The commission included Aleksandr Serebrovsky, the head of Azneft who had visited the US three years earlier and met personally with Rockefeller.
That same year, the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce opened a permanent representative office in Moscow. The chamber’s subsequent activities were crucial in coordinating the efforts of the most forward-looking and clear-headed members of the US business community towards normalizing political and economic relations with the USSR, as well as expanding trade and economic ties between US banks and companies and Soviet economic organizations. The fact that members of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce were the ones concluding the largest financial and trade contracts with the USSR economic agencies in 1927 and 1928 illustrates the importance of the chamber’s role.
Even after the US State Department and Department of Commerce lifted some restrictions on lending for Soviet purchases in the second half of 1927 and trade volume increased, the nonrecognition policy nevertheless continued to have a negative effect on the development of economic relations between the two countries.
By 1927–1928, further growth in US-Soviet economic ties and pressure exerted by business groups on the US administration to create an environment in which such ties could expand finally prompted the US government to lift a number of restrictions on trade and economic relations with the USSR.
One of the biggest changes in this new policy was renewed lending for US exports to the USSR. In October 1928, Amtorg signed a contract with General Electric for a five-year loan worth up to $26 million, to be used to buy electrical equipment in the US and export it to the USSR. The agreement with General Electric led to more active talks with other large companies such as Ford Motor Company and General Motors. On May 31, 1929, talks with Ford culminated in the signing of a large contract for shipment of automobiles and spare parts to the USSR in addition to providing technical assistance in building the Gorky Auto Works.
US exports to the Soviet Union were on the rise in 1927 and 1928, and the USSR became the biggest importer of several types of US engineering products. In 1928 the USSR imported 10.1% of all tractors exported by the US, 4.6% of all metal-working machinery, 7.1% of all mining equipment, 6.9% of all petroleum equipment, 8.9% of all excavators, and 1.6% of all electrical equipment. In 1929, these percentages all increased, roughly doubling for tractors, metal-working machinery, and electrical equipment.
In 1928 and 1929, Graver Corporation provided Winkler-Koch cracking units to the Batumi refinery on the basis of a long-term loan. Graver Corporation later also supplied cracking units to refineries in Tuapse (1930) and Yaroslavl (1932). Other US companies that supplied equipment to the Soviet refining industry from 1928 to 1930 included Foster-Wheeler Corporation (New York) and Badger and Sons (Boston).
Relations between the two countries were bolstered by concession agreements and special contracts on technical assistance signed by Soviet organizations and US companies. As of October 1, 1928, there were nine US concessions active in the USSR and six contracts under which US companies were providing technical assistance, including in the oil industry. By the late 1920s, Soviet-American economic relations were at a level either equal to or higher than the USSR’s relations with Great Britain or Germany with respect to key areas of economic cooperation.