“An outrageous and provocative speech,” thundered Goebbels. “He even had the impudence to assert that our euthanasia efforts will go so far that wounded soldiers, if they are no longer needed for practical work, will be murdered by us.” To Nazi officials, Galen’s speech, in which he implicitly tied the war to murder and none too subtly suggested that the bombing raids were God’s punishment on an unjust government, connected too many dots, for there was, indeed, a connection between war and euthanasia. The pseudoscientific eugenics movement that materialized in the late nineteenth century out of social Darwinism postulated a belief that human inequality was based on genetics and that, by limiting or encouraging the procreation of certain people, the general level of humankind could be improved. Although the eugenics movement had emerged most strongly in Great Britain and the United States, in Germany after World War I it took on a more sinister tone. Eugenics advocates, in a climate poisoned by the recent large loss of life and the economic burdens of a lost war, went beyond customary calls for sterilization of the “unfit” and suggested the right of the state to kill those judged “unworthy of life.” Since the “fit” had given disproportionately of their lives in the war, the state needed to intervene to avoid a demographic disaster. In an idea promoted by the Nazis and embraced by many proponents of “racial hygiene,” the Volk had to be cleansed of the unfit in order again to be healthy. By eliminating the “socially burdensome,” moreover, the state could use its limited resources in a more “socially productive” fashion.5
Hitler had been an early and enthusiastic advocate of eugenics, and, once in power, the Nazis moved swiftly to implement eugenics measures such as compulsory sterilizations and abortions. These actions resulted in the predictable opposition of the Catholic Church, but Hitler could count on not inconsiderable support from the German medical community. In 1935, he revealed his intention to implement a program of involuntary euthanasia in case of war. In the event, the Nazis had already in the summer of 1939 begun to kill handicapped infants. This “children’s euthanasia” was soon followed by a full-blown program of “adult euthanasia” under the direction of two young, ambitious, and ideologically fanatic officials in the Führer Chancellery, Philipp Bouhler and Viktor Brack. That same summer, Hitler again advocated euthanasia in the context of war, reiterating his belief that mental patients should be killed as hospitals and medical personnel could be better employed caring for wounded soldiers.6
The link between war and euthanasia was hardened with the German invasion of Poland. Within weeks of the attack, special units began killing mental patients, both Polish and German, in Polish institutions, some by shooting, and some, significantly, through the use of a sealed gas van. In October, Hitler signed an authorization typed on his own letterhead stationery—backdated to 1 September, the day the war began—that stated: “Reichsleiter [Reich Leader] Bouhler and Dr. Med. Brandt are commissioned with the responsibility of extending the authority of specified doctors so that, after critical assessment of their condition, those judged incurably ill can be granted mercy-death.” With that death sentence, the only time he was to affix his signature on such an order, Hitler had sealed the connection between war and euthanasia. The program for adult euthanasia, called T-4 after its headquarters in Berlin (Tiergartenstrasse 4), quickly recruited a pool of doctors to process the necessary forms and began work on six special killing centers. Those to be killed, primarily the German adult handicapped, were transported to the killing centers by special buses, then sent to gas chambers where they were murdered by carbon monoxide gas. By the spring of 1941, in cooperation with the SS, the program was extended into the concentration camps. By the time of Bishop Galen’s speech, over 70,000 and perhaps as many as 100,000 people had already been murdered in the euthanasia killing centers. Public protests unleashed by the bishop’s speech, and the fact that the Nazis felt constrained in moving against Galen in wartime, led Hitler to order an end to the adult euthanasia program on 24 August. Both the children’s and the concentration camp programs were continued, however, with more victims dying after the stop order was issued than before. The stop order also meant that a large staff of professional killers experienced in the methods and techniques of murder by gassing were suddenly available for other assignments.7
If the euthanasia program was not the direct precursor of the Holocaust, certainly there existed key conceptual, technological, and organizational connections between the two. Moreover, both were vital aspects of the Nazis’ larger project of creating a racial utopia. This demographic vision, subsumed in the larger concept of Lebensraum, encompassed the cleansing of the German Volk, the ethnic restructuring of Central and Eastern Europe, and the destruction of the ultimate enemy, the Jews. Just as importantly, the implementation of this abhorrent scheme could not have been undertaken without war. Hitler’s prophecy, the euthanasia program, the resettlement measures in Poland, the early notions of expelling the Jews from Europe, plans for a vast Jewish reservation in the east—all depended for realization on the stunning successes of the Wehrmacht. At each stage, however, expectations of the imminent realization of this racial utopia gave way to frustration as various obstacles thwarted Nazi planners. Time and again, however, military triumphs opened new avenues for ever more radical ventures. The mid-July burst of euphoria had resulted in the expansion of killing operations to include all Soviet Jews. Similarly, despite the official halt to the euthanasia program, a new round of combat successes in September and October would remove the last barriers to the full-blown implementation of the Final Solution. By the autumn of 1941, the various strands of the Nazi war of annihilation were to merge into one enormously deadly enterprise.
If domestic protest had stymied Hitler’s euthanasia plans, that same month opposition from the military had paralyzed army operations. Ironically, when the Wehrmacht resumed large-scale offensive action after the August pause, the bitter debate between Hitler and his generals seemed to work to German advantage since it had convinced Stalin of the Germans’ intention to replenish their forces and strike directly at Moscow. Hitler, however, had other plans. Throughout July, even as the fighting raged on the central axis at Smolensk, German forces had continued a steady if unspectacular advance in the south in hopes of seizing the important agricultural and industrial areas of Ukraine before winter. Operations here had been difficult from the outset. Not only did Rundstedt face the largest concentration of the Red Army, but geography favored the defenders as well. Soviet troops could anchor their line on the Carpathian Mountains in the south, while the Pripet Marshes in the north posed an impenetrable obstacle. At the same time, the Ukrainian front was larger in depth and breadth than the other two. Kiev lay some 350 miles from the border, compared to the 200 miles Bock’s forces had to cover to Minsk, while, south of the Ukrainian capital, German forces would have to advance into the wide expanse of the great bend of the Dnieper River. Even if the Soviets collapsed as expected, just occupying this huge swath of territory would have taxed the Germans. Supply was a constant problem, with the usual absence of good roads compounded by incessant rain in early July. Pulling off encirclement battles as in Belorussia would be difficult, especially since the Red Army had a decided advantage in tanks and aircraft. Added to the mix was better Soviet leadership, so the progress of Army Group South lagged significantly behind that of its neighbor to the north.8