The brothers had a number of minor scrapes with the law, mainly over traffic citations. Matt rarely carried a driver’s license, and more often than not, he owned cars that had not been re-registered with the state of Washington into his name. As far as he was concerned, a valid bill of sale was all that he needed to prove that the car was his property under common law. He once told his friend Dave, “If you read the state vehicle code, it doesn’t say a word about privately owned automobiles. It only pertains to commercial vehicles, operating in commerce. People are tricked by the authorities into thinking that all these laws pertain to them, but they don’t. A ‘motor vehicle’ is used for commerce, using the privilege to drive on the highway. That means carrying commercial goods under a bill of lading, or paying passengers. If it is just you and your guests—not ‘passengers’ mind you— traveling, then you are exercising your right of locomotion on the right of way rather than using the privilege to drive. That’s an important distinction that most people don’t grasp, and that these statutory jurisdiction kangaroo courts rarely recognize.”
Both of the Keanes and their younger sister had been homeschooled. Once they had mastered the “three Rs,” their parents let them do independent study.
The youngest, Eileen, wanted to be a veterinarian. She worked part-time as an assistant at a local vet clinic. Chase was interested in music. He took guitar, violin, and piano classes. Matt was fascinated by the legal system, so he spent nearly two full years commuting with his father to downtown Spokane. Each day his father dropped him off with a sack lunch at the county law library, and picked him up each evening. This began when he was sixteen years old. Seeing that Matt was genuinely interested, one of the librarians immediately took Matt under her wing. She started him off with a copy of Legal Research by Stephen Elias, and Black’s Law Dictionary. Most of the lawyers that saw Matt using the library assumed that he was a law clerk or a paralegal researcher. Matt dug into his law research with gusto. He was gifted with a photographic memory. Within a few weeks he was reciting the names and key points of cases verbatim. He had been doing the same with Bible verses since he was a child.
Matt and Chase were accused of selling firearms without a Federal Firearms License (FFL) three different times: twice by other dealers, and once by a gun show promoter. It was true that neither of them had a license, but they didn’t see the need for one. Matt had researched the Federal gun laws in detail. In 2007, the promoter of an Oregon show came by the Keanes’ tables and asked Matt casually, “Are you selling a private collection, or do you have an FFL?”
The term “private collection” was the standard gun show euphemism for a table rented by someone who sold modern guns without a license. Matt replied frankly, “Sir, I am indeed a full-time gun seller, but I don’t have an FFL.”
The promoter replied huffily, “Well, if you’re ‘engaged in the business,’ then you are required by law to get an FFL.” When the promoter quoted the
“engaged in the business” phrase from the Federal law, it was enough to get Matt going. For the next five minutes, the promoter sat in stunned silence as the young man lectured him about the inapplicability of Federal gun laws to state Citizens. Matt began, “Now sir, I’m going to explain some terms and applicability of laws, as I understand them, and please hear me out.
“Now this is what I’ve learned: Both the National Firearms Act of 1934—the NFA—and the Gun Control Act of 1968—the GCA—are deliberately deceptive, making millions of Sovereign Citizens unwittingly and needlessly subject to a false jurisdiction. Both laws indicate that they are applicable ‘within the United States,’ for ‘interstate or foreign commerce’ unless otherwise excluded by law. Further, these laws define the ‘United States’ to include the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and possessions of the United States. This corresponds to the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ as defined in Article 1, Section 8, clauses 17 and 18 of the Constitution.
“If you refer to Public Law 99-308, Chapter 44, section 921(a) (2) which reads: ‘The term interstate or foreign commerce includes commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include commerce between places within that same State but through any place outside that State. The term State includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone.)’”
A small crowd of curious onlookers began to gradually gather around Matt’s tables when they heard him rattle off the legal citations in a loud voice.
“Based upon my research, it is my understanding that the term includes restricts rather than expands a definition. This was clearly established in a large body of State and Federal cases, such as Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S., 452 at 466, and in Treasury Decision Number 3980 Volume 29, of 1927. That one said that ‘includes’ means to ‘comprise as a member,’ ‘to confine,’ and ‘to comprise as the whole part.’ If ‘includes’ meant an incomplete list of examples, such as in the common vernacular use of the term, then Congress would have certainly used the phrase ‘including but not limited to…’ or something similar.
“In the strict Federal legal definition—the so-called ‘black letter law’—of the word, as opposed to common interpretation, if something is not ‘included,’ then it is excluded!
“Since the term includes is one of strict definition, when lawmakers wish to temporarily supersede that definition for the purposes of an individual section or paragraph, they often use the word means. To illustrate this, I quote Internal Revenue Code section 6103(b)(5)(a) in which Congress temporally expanded ( ‘for the purposes of this section’) the term State to encompass the fifty States:‘The term ‘State’ means any of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the [U.S.] Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa….’
“Now by ‘possessions’ I assume that NFA and GCA both refer to the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, as well as certain Federal enclaves within the fifty Sovereign States, such as Federal military forts, dockyards, et cetera. Clearly, the fifty Sovereign States are not ‘possessions’ of the Federal United States. The nature of the possessions of the Federal United States is described in Art. 1, Sect. 8, clauses 17 and 18 of the Constitution. So the bottom line is that Federal jurisdiction in no way extends to individual Citizens of the fifty Sovereign States and Commonwealths!