Soon Oster and Gisevius received further evidence that the resistance was unraveling. For encouragement, they went to see Witzleben, who had heretofore been steadfast in his determination, at his headquarters in Bad Kreuznach. But even he expressed strong doubts that Hitler could still be stopped from launching the offensive. Witzleben believed that the only remaining possibility would be for the three army group commanders in the West-Leeb, Rundstedt, and Bock-to refuse to transmit the order to attack when the time came. On the way back from Bad Kreuznach, Oster stopped in Frankfurt am Main to see Leeb and explore the potential for such a step. However, when Oster not only mentioned the names of many of the conspirators but also drew from his pocket two proclamations, both written by Beck, to be read during the military takeover, Leeb’s first general staff officer, Colonel Vincenz Müller, responded with outrage. Muller castigated Oster for his recklessness and eventually persuaded him to “burn the two documents in my big ashtray.” Witzleben, too, was indignant when he heard about Oster’s indiscretion and announced that he would not see Oster anymore.40
Shortly before their departure on the evening of November 8, Oster and Gisevius heard news that Hitler had narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich by unexpectedly cutting short a speech that was scheduled to last several hours. Gisevius immediately conceived the idea of blaming the assassination attempt on Himmler and using it to justify a coup, in much the same way as the fictitious attempt on the Führer’s life discussed by several of the plotters in September, 1938. But the main consequence of the assassination attempt was the immediate tightening of security measures, which heightened the already considerable difficulties that Lahousen was experiencing in procuring explosives for Erich Kordt. Nevertheless, Kordt was assured once more on November 10 that everything would be ready the next day. There was a catch, however. Under the new restrictions, Lahousen was only able to acquire an extremely complicated detonator that required special training to operate. Kordt declared that he was still prepared to proceed, but now Oster got cold feet and backed out. Thus was Hitler spared thanks to the first of many “providential” events that would henceforth occur regularly, preserving him for the “Herculean tasks” that he believed himself destined to carry out.
In the meantime, Hitler postponed the launching of the offensive from November 12 until the fifteenth, then the nineteenth, and finally the twenty-second. The sense of relief produced by these postponements further weakened the conspiracy. Returning from a visit to the western border, Stülpnagel remarked to Halder, “You’re right. It won’t work. The commanders and troops would not obey your call.” Halder himself commented spontaneously to General Thomas that a coup d’ état would fly in the face of all tradition and that “it is quite intolerable that the Germans should come to be the slaves of the English.” The helplessness of the opposition at this point is revealed by Halder’s suggestion to Secretary of State Weizsäcker that a soothsayer be bribed to influence Hitler and by his offer to provide a million marks for this purpose. Meanwhile, the commanders in chief of the army groups held a meeting at which they agreed unanimously about the perils of a western offensive but rejected Leeb’s suggestion that they resign en masse. At that, Leeb resolved to banish all thoughts of resistance from his mind.41
In Berlin, Schacht continued for a time to search out new conspirators who had not yet become cynical and weary, but he, too, eventually grew resigned. Beck continued to write “papers for his daughter,” as one observer scoffed. Gisevius was sent as vice-consul and military intelligence officer to the German consulate in Zurich, Goerdeler returned to his bizarre schemes, and Canaris finally succumbed to his revulsion for the world.42 He forbade Oster to engage in any further conspiratorial activities and demanded that he recall “Herr X,” Munich lawyer Josef Müller, whom Oster had dispatched to Rome in an attempt to discover through the British ambassador to the Holy See how London would react to a coup and what peace conditions it might offer should Germany rid itself of Hitler. An embittered Groscurth wrote to his wife on November 16, “We carry on, but nothing ever happens… except fiascos.” The same day he met with his immediate superior, General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who had attended a briefing in Brauchitsch’s office concerning fresh atrocities in Poland. Tippelskirch commented with a sigh, “We’ll just have to get through the valley of the shadow of death.”43
Hitler’s apparent sixth sense, which he often followed, now induced him to summon the officers once again and rally support for his plans. He knew enough about psychology to employ not only his own oratorical powers but also a measure of spectacle; on November 23, the extended leadership of all three services, the commanders and general staff officers, were invited to a glittering gathering in the Marble Hall of the Chancellery. For the first time since the victory over Poland, the army leadership came together, and the whirl of uniforms, gold braid, epaulets, and red trouser stripes seemed to cast an enchanting spell over the assemblage, so that much of their fear and concern had already evaporated when Göring and Goebbels made rousing appeals to the group. Then Hitler himself appeared, looking rather somber, and spoke at length with portentous solemnity about the thinking that underlay his convictions.
He opened with a historical and strategic overview, assuring the assembled throng that the Great War had never ended-the second act was only just beginning-and that he had not rebuilt the Wehrmacht in order not to use it. “The determination to strike has always lain within me,” he said. Anyone who opposed him would therefore be crushed, “regardless of who he is.” He said he had been deeply offended by what he saw as a lack of faith: “I cannot endure anyone’s telling me the troops are not all right.” After reviewing once again the necessity for the impending offensive, he declared himself “indispensable,” for he alone could make the difficult but crucial decisions. Hanging in the balance was not just a National-Socialist Germany but the entire question of “who will dominate Europe and therefore the world.” The speech bristled with threats directed at “doubters,” “deserters,” and those who would foment “revolution.” The struggle, he warned, would be waged without quarter against anyone who failed to embrace the will to victory. He himself was prepared “to die, if necessary, but only as the last one”: “I will not survive the defeat of my people.” These remarks were enthusiastically received in the ranks of the navy and air force, who had often been praised by Hitler. Within the army, even many of the generals who had recently expressed strong opposition to an invasion conceded that they were “greatly impressed” by Hitler, despite his unmistakable criticism of the high command. Oster commented incisively that accusations of cowardice had once again made cowards of the brave.44