According to one account, the news that the attack had been postponed once again eased the tension at army headquarters on Bendlerstrasse and gave rise “to an almost euphoric mood.” This report may not be reliable, however, particularly with regard to General Olbricht. He knew only too well what consequences might attend his unauthorized issuance of the Valkyrie orders in Fromm’s absence.15 Olbricht departed at once to cancel the untimely alert. He drove to the affected units in Potsdam and Glienicke, and, concealing his involvement, expressed his “particular appreciation” to General Otto Hitzfeld, the commander of the Döberitz infantry school, who was partially initiated into the conspiracy. He also made note of the fact that the new commander of the Krampnitz panzer school, Colonel Wolfgang Glaesemer, probably could not be won over to the cause, and rescinded the alert.
The next evening Stauffenberg met for the last time with his closest friends. Gathered together at the house on Tristanstrasse in the Wannsee district of Berlin where he lived with his brother Berthold were Ulrich Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, Peter Yorck von Wartenburg, Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Cäsar von Hofacker, Albrecht Mertz von Quirnheim, and Georg Hansen. Once again they discussed ways of proceeding: the “western solution,” outlined above, and the “Berlin solution,” according to which the central signals system would be seized for twenty-four hours and Hitler’s headquarters outmaneuvered by a number of irreversible withdrawals of German forces. Both these ideas were rejected, as was the idea discussed occasionally of ending the war by means of a direct agreement between the commanders in chief of the various national armies, speaking as “one soldier to another” and circumventing governments entirely.
All these solutions ran aground on the hard fact that no progress could be made in any of these directions-either with the Allies or with the German commanders-so long as Hitler was alive. The Allies had absolutely no intention of negotiating with him and the commanders little stomach for openly opposing him. The only option left, the conspirators on Tristanstrasse concluded, was indeed assassination. There is some indication that Stauffenberg was eager to hold this lengthy discussion, which stretched well into the night, in order to allay once and for all both his own qualms about doing “the dirty deed” and those of so many others. It was now clearly too late for the conspirators to turn the assassination of Hitler to advantage and negotiate better political terms with the Allies. All that remained was the possibility of reducing the number of war victims and sparing Germany some measure of humiliation by purging itself of the Nazis. In a subsequent conversation with Beck, Stauffenberg reviewed what had gone wrong on July 15 and pledged that “the next time he would act, come what may.
As always happened when things were heading toward a climax, more bad news arrived-of precisely the kind that had repeatedly sapped the conspirators’ resolve in the past. First, while returning from the front Field Marshal Rommel was severely injured when his car was strafed by an airplane. To be sure, he had never really figured in the plans for a coup, but when he had been asked the previous day how he would react if Hitler rejected his “ultimatum,” he had coolly replied that he would “throw open the western front,” thereby fueling the opposition’s lingering hope of unilaterally putting a stop to the fighting on that front.17 Furthermore, Rommel was extremely popular with the general public, and though he was certainly not an enemy of the regime, the insurgents hoped that he might join them if the circumstances were right. Rommel’s participation would have helped prevent the creation of another stab-in-the-back legend, a concern that had so preoccupied the conspirators.
In the midst of all the other bad news, however, the loss of Rommel was scarcely noticed. Much more disturbing to the conspirators was a tip from Arthur Nebe that Goerdeler had been named by Wilhelm Staehle and was about to be arrested. Stauffenberg responded to the information by asking Goerdeler “to disappear as quickly as possible and not endanger the entire conspiracy by running around Berlin making telephone calls.” Goerdeler, already bitter at having been pushed about for months and feeling increasingly squeezed to the periphery of the conspiracy, took this as another attempt to belittle him, especially since Stauffenberg did not mention that he had been summoned to report to Hitler’s headquarters on July 20, just two days hence. Nevertheless, Stauffenberg did ask Goerdeler to remain ready for a coup, and Goerdeler let it be known that his hiding place over the next few days would the estate of his friend Baron Kraft von Palombini in Rahnisdorf.18
Possibly even more disconcerting was a warning delivered to Stauffenberg on July 18 by Lieutenant Commander Alfred Kranzfelder: a rumor was circulating in Berlin, Kranzfelder reported, that “Führer headquarters would be blown sky-high that very week.” It seems that a young Hungarian nobleman had picked up this piece of information at the Potsdam home of the widow of General von Bredow, one of those murdered in the Rohm putsch. Later it turned out that the source was none other than one of the Bredow daughters, who was on friendly terms with Werner von Haeften, and it was reasonable to conclude that the information had thus far been confined to the Bredow household and had not actually spread to Berlin. But Schulenburg also informed the conspirators that day that “two men had been inquiring about him in his neighborhood” and that he did not think they were harmless visitors.19
These and other tips made Stauffenberg feel even more strongly that he had to act immediately. He felt driven as well-perhaps even more-by his chagrin at the delays and at the lack of resolve over the previous weeks. His exhaustion and his raw nerves, mentioned in various accounts, undoubtedly added to his sense of urgency. One observer spoke, with poetic overtones, of the “dark shadow” that seemed to have enveloped him since June. In any case, as Stauffenberg now said to Kranzfelder, “There’s no choice now; we’ve crossed the Rubicon.”20
The next day, July 19, was spent on preparations. By about noon Olbricht’s and Stauffenberg’s staffs were busy alerting Witzleben, Hoepner, Berlin city commandant Paul von Hase, Colonel Jäger, Major Ludwig von Leonrod, and the large number of other officers who had roles to play. In the early evening Stauffenberg called on Quartermaster General Wagner in Zossen, hoping perhaps to straighten out the difference of opinion that had arisen on July 15. At the end of their discussion Wagner arranged for a special airplane to be placed at Stauffenberg’s disposal for the return flight from Rastenburg. After Stauffenberg had taken his leave Wagner informed Stieff of the preparations.
Early on the morning of July 20 Wagner greeted Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Klamroth by asking, “What are we going to do if the assassination really is today?”21 Rarely had the conspirators’ lack of confidence been so clearly expressed as in this naive-sounding question; it was almost as if an actual assassination was the last thing they expected. Perhaps the sense, reinforced over the years, that whatever they touched would inevitably turn to dust lent all their plans a noncommittal air, which could not help but affect their determination to act. Just a few hours later this ingrained skepticism would have fatal consequences.
First, however, the notion that nothing ever happened as a result of their efforts was about to be shattered. Wagner’s query suggests he suddenly realized that Stauffenberg had brought to the resistance an unwavering determination to carry out the plot. One might wonder, as the historian Peter Hoffmann has, why Stieff, Wagner, Meichssner, Fellgiebel, and other officers who had access to Hitler palmed the assassination attempt off on Stauffenberg, whose physical dexterity was limited and whose absence from Berlin would seriously jeopardize the coup following the assassination. In all likelihood, they hadn’t fully understood that they were now irrevocably implicated, and that if Stauffenberg failed their own ruin was assured as well.