15. According to Gisevius, it was Helldorf who reported the “euphoric mood,” commenting that “a stone seemed to have been lifted from Olbricht’s heart” (Bis urn bittern Ende [Zurich, 1954], 589). Page (Olbricht) expresses well-founded doubts about the “euphoria” as well.
16. See Zeller, Freiheit, 373, although there is no indication of source.
17. Count Romedio Galeazzo von Thun-Hohenstein, Der Verschwörer: General Oster und die Militäropposition (Berlin, 1982), 256.
18. Spiegelbild, 217. It may be that at the time he spoke to Goerdeler Stauffenberg still did not know for sure that he would be making a presentation at Führer headquarters on July 20.
19. Ursula von Kardoff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen, 1942-1945 (Munich, 1992), 209 (entry of July 18, 1944).
20. Spiegelbild, 117.
21. Spiegelbild, 146.
22. Cäsar von Hofacker assessed the chances of the coup attempt as “only ten percent”; see Walter Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic: Ein Deutscher im besetzten Frankreich (Freiburg, 1987), 131. For Schulenburg and Berthold von Stauffenberg, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 479; for Beck, see 462. For Stauffenberg, see Müller, Stauffenberg, 460.
23. Ritter, Goerdeler, 408.
9. July 20, 1944
1. The most thorough studies of the assassination attempt are Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, 3rd. ed. (Munich, 1979), 496ff. and 813ff, and Christian Müller, Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg: Eine Biographie (Dusseldorf, 1970), 477ff, 484-85, and 613ff. See also Archiv Peter, ed., Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte über das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), 85-86. The widespread belief that the assassination attempt failed because the briefing was suddenly shifted to a “barracks” is unfounded. In actual fact, the “noon briefings” had been held for quite some time in what was known as the “Speer barracks’ while the “evening briefing” was always held in the bunker. It is true that if the explosion had occurred in the bunker, with its cement walls, everyone present would have been killed because of the much greater concentrating effect.
2. Peter Hoffmann, Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Brüder (Stuttgart, 1992), 425-26.
3. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1981), 389.
4. See Müller, Stauffenberg, 487, for an enlightening description of the situation in which Fellgiebel found himself.
5. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 504.
6. Bernd Wehner, on Hava K. Beller’s television program “The Restless Conscience,” London, 1992.
7. Views differ considerably as to when and through whom Olbricht learned about the failure of the assassination attempt. Peter Hoffmann thinks that Thiele informed Olbricht shortly after the news from Fellgiebel arrived (Stauffenberg, 427, and Widerstand, 464-65). Helena P. Page, on the other hand, believes that Olbricht was not informed by Thiele until 3:15 p.m. (General Friedrich Olbricht: Ein Mann des 20 Juli [Bonn and Berlin, 1992], 276ff). According to her, Olbricht, accompanied by General Hoepner, went home at 1:00 p.m. as usual for lunch in order not to arouse suspicion. He returned to Bendlerstrasse shortly after 2:00 but still did not know what had happened in Rastenburg. There are some indications that General Wagner, who informed the conspirators in Paris around 2:00 p.m., also contacted Bendlerstrasse (see Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit: Der zwanzigste Juli [Munich, 1963], 435-36).
8. Müller, Stauffenberg, 490. Whether the decision to issue the Valkyrie orders was made before or after Haeften’s telephone call is still a matter of controversy; see Müller, 606.
9. According to Schulenburg; see Spiegelbild, 97.
10. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 516.
11. Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichishof Nurnberg, 14. November 1945-1. Oktober 1946 (Nuremberg, 1949), vol. 33, 404.
12. Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (Zurich, 1954), 631.
13. Speer, Inside, 383.
14. Kunrat von Hammerstein, Spähtrupp (Stuttgart, 1963), 280, and Hoffmann, Widerstand, 592.
15. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 608 and 507.
16. Müller, Stauffenberg, 498. Muller accurately characterizes Hoepner’s behavior as “frightful,” given the crucial role he was supposed to play in the coup. For the apathetic way in which Hoepner gave out information over the telephone at a very early point, see Schulenburg’s statements in Spiegelbild, 97.
17. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 601; Gisevius, Ende, 634-35.
18. Spiegelbild, 22 and 336.
19. For accounts of the events in general, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 619ff., and Müller, Stauffenberg, 505-06.
20. Gisevius, Ende, 649. My presentation ol events from Fromm’s reemergence to the proclamation of the court-martial decision largely follows the account Erich Hoepner provided to the People’s Court; see Prozess, vol. 33 (PS-3881), 417ff. and 505ff.
21. There has been controversy from the outset as to what Stauffenberg shouted into the salvo. Some witnesses understood him to say, “Long live sacred Germany,” while others heard only “Holy Germany” and still others “Long live Germany.” An informative overview, with the relevant sources, can be found in Hoffmann, Widerstand, 862-63.
22. Spiegelbild, 76.
23. Hans Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit: Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1977), 191.
24. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 586-87.
25. Walter Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic: Ein Deutscher im besetzten Frankreich (Freiburg, 1987), 127ff.
26. Count Dankwart von Arnim, Als Brandenburg noch die Mark hiess: Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1991), 208. The address Hitler delivered on the night of July 20-21, 1944, is reprinted in Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945, vol. 2 (Würzburg, 1963), 2127.
27. Zeller, Freiheit, 415ff.
28. Günther Blumentritt, in B. H. Lidell Hart, Jetzt dürfen sie reden: Hitlers Generale berichten (Stuttgart and Hamburg, 1950), 527.