It appears that at first Fabius opposed him on grounds of prudence and caution, really fearing the dangers of his project, but that the contest gradually became a personal one, and he was moved by feelings of jealousy to hinder the rise of Scipio; for he tried to induce Crassus, Scipio's colleague, not to give up the province of Africa to Scipio, but if the expedition were determined on, to go thither himself, and he prevented his being supplied with funds for the campaign. Scipio being thus compelled to raise funds himself, obtained them from the cities in Etruria which were devoted to his interests. Crassus likewise was not inclined to quarrel with him, and was also obliged to remain in Italy by his office of Pontifex Maximus.
XXVI. Fabius now tried another method to oppose Scipio. He dissuaded the youth of the city from taking service with him by continually vociferating in all public meetings that Scipio not only was himself running away from Hannibal, but also was about to take all the remaining forces of Italy out of the country with him, deluding the young men with vain hopes, and so persuading them to leave their parents and wives, and their city too, while a victorious and invincible enemy was at its very gates. By these representations he alarmed the Romans, who decreed that Scipio should only use the troops in Sicily, and three hundred of the best men of his Spanish army. In this transaction Fabius seems to have acted according to the dictates of his own cautious disposition.
However, when Scipio crossed over into Africa, news came to Rome at once of great and glorious exploits performed and great battles won. As substantial proof of these there came many trophies of war, and the king of Numidia as a captive. Two camps were burned and destroyed, with great slaughter of men, and loss of horses and war material in the flames. Embassies also were sent to Hannibal from Carthage, begging him in piteous terms to abandon his fruitless hopes in Italy and come home to help them, while in Rome the name of Scipio was in every man's mouth because of his successes. At this period Fabius proposed that a successor to Scipio should be sent out, without having any reason to allege for it except the old proverb that it is dangerous to entrust such important operations to the luck of one man, because it is hard for the same man always to be lucky. This proposal of his offended most of his countrymen, who thought him a peevish and malignant old man, or else that he was timid and spiritless from old age, and excessively terrified at Hannibal; for, even when Hannibal quitted Italy and withdrew his forces, Fabius would not permit the joy of his countrymen to be unmixed with alarm, as he informed them that now the fortunes of Rome were in a more critical situation than ever, because Hannibal would be much more to be dreaded in Africa under the walls of Carthage itself, where he would lead an army, yet reeking with the blood of many Roman dictators, consuls and generals, to attack Scipio. By these words the city was again filled with terror, and although the war had been removed to Africa yet its alarms seemed to have come nearer to Rome.
XXVII. However Scipio, after no long time, defeated Hannibal in a pitched battle and crushed the pride of Carthage under foot. He gave the Romans the enjoyment of a success beyond their hopes, and truly
"Restored the city, shaken by the storm."
Fabius Maximus did not survive till the end of the war, nor did he live to hear of Hannibal's defeat, or see the glorious and lasting prosperity of his country, for about the time when Hannibal left Italy he fell sick and died.
The Thebans, we are told, buried Epameinondas at the public expense, because he died so poor that they say nothing was found in his house except an iron spit. Fabius was not honoured by the Romans with a funeral at the public expense, yet every citizen contributed the smallest Roman coin towards the expenses, not that he needed the money, but because they buried him as the father of the people, so that in his death he received the honourable respect which he had deserved in his life.
Comparison of Perikles and Fabius Maximus
I. Such is the story of these men's lives. As they both gave many proofs of ability in war and politics, let us first turn our attention to their warlike exploits. And here we must notice that Perikles found the Athenian people at the height of their power and prosperity, so that from the flourishing condition of the State it could scarcely meet with any great disaster, whereas Fabius performed his great services to Rome when it was in the last extremity of danger, and did not merely, like Perikles, confirm the prosperity of his country, but greatly improved it, having found it in a lamentable condition. Moreover, the successes of Kimon, the victories of Myronides and Leokrates, and the many achievements of Tolmides rather gave Perikles when in chief command an occasion for public rejoicing and festivity, than any opportunity for either conquests abroad or defensive wars at home. Fabius, on the other hand, had before his eyes the spectacle of many defeats and routs of Roman armies, of many consuls and generals fallen in battle, of lakes, plains and forests filled with the bodies of the slain, and of rivers running with blood. Yet with his mature and unbending intellect he undertook to extricate Rome from these dangers, and as it were by his own strength alone supported the State, so that it was not utterly overwhelmed by these terrible disasters. Nevertheless it would appear not to be so hard a task to manage a State in adversity, when it is humble and is compelled by its misfortunes to obey wise counsellors, as it is to check and bridle a people excited and arrogant with good fortune, which was especially the case with Perikles and the Athenians. On the other hand, considering the terrible nature of the blows which had fallen on the Romans, Fabius must have been a great and strong–minded man not to be disconcerted by them, but still to be able to carry out the policy upon which he had determined.
II. We may set the capture of Samos by Perikles against the retaking of Tarentum by Fabius, and also the conquest of Euboea by the one against that of the Campanian cities by the other, though Capua itself was recovered by the consuls, Fulvius and Appius. Fabius seems never to have fought a pitched battle, except that one which gained him his first triumph, while Perikles set up nine trophies for victories by sea and land. But again, there is no action of Perikles which can be compared to that of Fabius when he snatched away Minucius from the grasp of Hannibal, and saved an entire Roman army from destruction. That was an exploit glorious for the courage, generalship, and kindness of heart displayed by Fabius; but, on the other hand Perikles, made no such blunder as did Fabius, when out–generalled by Hannibal with the cattle. Here, although Fabius caught his enemy in a defile which he had entered by chance, yet he let him escape by night, and next day found his tardy movements outstripped, and himself defeated by the man whom he had just before so completely cut off. If it be the part of a good general, not merely to deal with the present, but to make conjectures about the future, we may remark that the Peloponnesian war ended just as Perikles had foretold, for the Athenians frittered away their strength; whereas the Romans, contrary to the expectation of Fabius, by sending Scipio to attack Carthage gained a complete victory, not by chance, but by the skill of their general and the courage of their troops, who overthrew the enemy in a pitched battle. Thus the one was proved to be right by the misfortunes of his country, and the other proved to be wrong by its success, indeed it is just as much a fault in a general to receive a check from want of foresight as to let slip an opportunity through diffidence; and both these failings, excess of confidence and want of confidence, are common to all except the most consummate generals. Thus much for their military talents.