“First, we had no idea that the missile in question — the Pukkuksong-1—had this kind of range. Either the missile has been improved or our intelligence estimates were way off base.”
“Or it’s not the KN-11 at all,” the SecDef said, preferring the American designation. “It could be an entirely different weapon. It has nearly the same performance characteristics as our Polaris A-1, which we first deployed back in 1962.”
Jack Ryan smiled to himself. It never failed to amaze him how technologically advanced the United States was compared to the rest of the world. Most of the planet still wasn’t able to achieve what his parents’ generation had accomplished fifty years earlier.
Mary Pat continued. “Our second concern is that we had no idea that the North Koreans had acquired MIRV technology — another intelligence failure.” She frowned when she said this. As the titular head of America’s civilian intelligence community, she felt personally responsible for the current crisis.
“Third, because they’ve acquired MIRV technology, it’s only a matter of time before they move from three warheads to seven, ten, or even more on this platform. Multiple, independently targeted warheads means that each missile has more target opportunities and greater capacity to defeat any kind of ABM defense with decoys and countermeasures. That changes the strategic equation in Asia, especially when the North Koreans are able to arm them with nuclear warheads. But what’s particularly worrisome is the idea of the North Koreans deploying MIRV technology on their land-based ICBM platforms. The Taepodong-3 has a range of eight thousand miles. At that point they become a world power, like it or not.”
“And we removed all of our MIRVs from our ICBMs a few years ago,” Ryan said. He was a trained security analyst, so it didn’t take long for him to process the implications. “If we don’t stop the North Koreans from MIRVing, we’ll have to go back to it ourselves, and that will launch another nuclear arms race between us, the Russians, and the Chinese.”
“Exactly our concerns, Mr. President,” Mary Pat said as the SecDef nodded in agreement.
Ryan sighed, frustrated. Like everyone else involved at the time, he assumed that the coup ousting Choi Ji-hoon two years ago was going to solve the North Korean problem. Obviously it hadn’t.
Ryan rubbed his chin, thinking. “Can someone please tell me why the North Koreans are still hell-bent on their strategic nuclear program? They still can’t produce enough food to feed their own people.”
“We’ve been asking ourselves that same question since their first nuclear test in 2006,” the SecState said. “Power, prestige, leverage, blackmail. Pick one. Or pick all of them.”
“They also see it as a deterrent,” Mary Pat said.
The President frowned. “Deterrent? From whom?”
“From us, the South Koreans, and the West, generally. And even China, truth be told, especially after the role they played in Ji-hoon’s overthrow.”
“Nobody is planning on invading North Korea,” the SecDef said. “This idea of Western aggression is all a fiction, designed to keep the population under control.”
“Agreed,” Mary Pat said. “But that’s why their missile and nuclear programs are so important. The majority of North Koreans have no access to outside news sources, and most of them have been brainwashed to believe that the United States and our allies are aggressively seeking the chance to invade. But the North Korean people aren’t stupid. They see the scarcity of resources and they’re the ones that have suffered the most under this regime. So when they see Chairman Choi spending billions of dollars on nuclear bombs and long-range missiles instead of food and housing, it only reinforces the government’s message that the West is hostile — otherwise, why would the ‘benevolent’ government spend all that money? It’s a devil’s logic, but it works.”
“For the true believers it works. But the dissidents know better,” the secretary of state said.
Mary Pat shook her head. “But the dissidents are quickly killed or imprisoned in one of Choi’s gulags. Compared to their internal security apparatus, Stalin’s NKVD looks like a wedding planning service.”
Ryan leaned forward on the table, folding his hands. “So to bottom line this discussion, what we’re saying is that the North Korean missile and nuclear programs are about external and internal security, which really means it’s all about Choi Ha-guk staying in power. Is that right?”
The others nodded in agreement. Mary Pat added, “So long as any member of the Choi family is in power, the North Koreans will continue to pursue their missile and nuclear programs.”
“Okay. So the first question on the table is this: What can the United States do about that? How can we effect regime change unilaterally?”
“Without Chinese cooperation, we can’t — and we certainly wouldn’t want to risk a conflict with them,” Burgess said.
Ryan turned to Burgess. “Forget China for just one minute. Is it even possible for us to overthrow the Choi power structure through overt military action?”
“We’ve been war-gaming scenarios about this for over six decades — technically, we’re still in a state of war with North Korea. Under the best scenario, we would expect mass civilian casualties in South Korea and the deaths of many thousands more in the north. If ever there was a definition of a Pyrrhic victory, this would be it.”
Secretary of State Adler quickly added, “Which is why our South Korean allies are completely against any kind of offensive military action.”
“What about a complete economic embargo?” Ryan asked.
“For all intents and purposes, there is one — except the Chinese might not enforce it. Without their complete cooperation, it isn’t possible,” Adler said. “And even if it were, it would only hurt the innocent civilians. The leaders won’t suffer. If you include food in the embargo, then another mass famine would result.”
“So as far as you all are concerned, we have no unilateral options available to us to stop the North Korean missile and nuclear programs or effect regime change,” Ryan said.
Again, all heads nodded in agreement.
“The only hope we have of either is China. They hold all the cards,” the secretary of defense said.
“Which is the real reason why we’re here,” Ryan said. He turned to Mary Pat. “Thank you for the summary analysis.” He turned to the others. “Now for the question at hand.” He poured himself another cup of coffee as he said, “Scott, tell us what the Chinese have proposed.”
The secretary of state squared his shoulders. “I have received an unofficial inquiry from my Chinese counterpart regarding our openness to a face-to-face meeting between the heads of state of China, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and, of course, the United States. It would be held next month in Beijing.”
“Regarding the North Korean situation?” Burgess asked.
Adler nodded. “President Zhao’s government has expressed concern over recent developments.”
“They always ‘express concern’ after every nuclear and missile test. But it’s all hot air,” the defense secretary said. “The problem is that they’re the ones supplying most of that technology.”
“Zhao’s government is doing that?” Ryan asked.
The SecDef shrugged. “Officially, no. But someone in Zhao’s government is. Whether or not it’s sanctioned by Zhao is still a question mark.”
Mary Pat added, “The South Koreans are convinced the Chinese provided the North Koreans with cold launch capability. It only took them months to perfect it when it should’ve taken years. Same goes for the MIRV tech, we’re certain.”
“So the Chinese provided the MIRV technology and now they want a summit with us because they’re worried about it? That doesn’t make any sense,” the chief of staff said.