Hunting for lower-level operatives was not the only trend that began at this time. According to the media sources available for 2009, in total as many as 527 militants and terrorists were killed at a collateral damage cost of forty civilians (and twenty-four unknown). This meant that for the year 2009 roughly 7 percent of those who were killed in the drone campaign were listed by the media as “civilians.” The following list is a breakdown of the drone strikes of 2009 with sources from the Pakistani and Western media that led to this startling conclusion:
1. January 1, S. Waziristan, five terrorists killed, no civilians23
2. January 2, S. Waziristan, four unknowns killed24
3. January 23, N. Waziristan, ten militants (four of them foreigners) killed25
4. January 23, S. Waziristan, one Taliban, four civilians killed26
5. February 14, S. Waziristan, twenty-five militants killed (among them Arab and Uzbek fighters), no civilians reported killed27
6. February 16, Kurram Agency, thirty-one people killed at a “militant hideout,” described as a “camp of Afghan Commander Bahram Khan Koch” (presumed militants)28
7. March 1, S. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians29
8. March 12, Kurram Agency, twenty-two militants killed, no civilians30
9. March 15, Bannu, North-West Frontier Province, five militants killed (including two Arabs), no civilians31
10. March 25, S. Waziristan, eight “foreign militants” killed in a convoy, no civilians32
11. March 26, N. Waziristan, four unknowns killed33
12. April 1, Orakzai Agency, fourteen Taliban and al Qaeda members killed, no civilians34
13. April 4, N. Waziristan, four to ten militants (including foreigners) killed, seven foreign women and children also reported killed35
14. April 8, S. Waziristan, three to four militants killed, no civilians36
15. April 19, S. Waziristan, three to seven militants killed, no civilians37
16. April 29, S. Waziristan, approximately four Taliban militants and two unknowns killed38
17. May 9, S. Waziristan, ten Taliban killed, no civilians39
18. May 12, S. Waziristan, eight foreigners and local Taliban killed, no civilians40
19. May 16, N. Waziristan, eight local militants and two Arabs killed, no civilians41
20. June 14, S. Waziristan, five militants killed, no civilians42
21. June 18, S. Waziristan, nine Taliban fighters killed, no civilians43
22. June 18, S. Waziristan, five killed at “hideout of Taliban commander Mullah Nazir”44
23. June 23, S. Waziristan, six militants killed, no civilians45
24. June 23, S. Waziristan, as many as seventy killed at a funeral, including eighteen civilians and approximately fifty-two described as “militants”46
25. July 3, S. Waziristan, thirteen militants killed, no civilians47
26. July 7, S. Waziristan, sixteen militants killed, no civilians48
27. July 8, S. Waziristan, fifty suspected militants killed, no civilians49
28. July 8, S. Waziristan, seventeen militants killed, no civilians50
29. July 11, S. Waziristan, eight Taliban killed, no civilians51
30. July 17, N. Waziristan, five Taliban killed, no civilians52
31. August 5, S. Waziristan, one to three Taliban (Baitullah Mehsud and his guards) and one civilian (his wife) killed
32. August 11, S. Waziristan, twelve extremists killed, no civilians53
33. August 21, N. Waziristan, twelve unknowns killed54
34. August 27, S. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians55
35. September 7, N. Waziristan, five fighters killed, no civilians reported killed56
36. September 8, N. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians57
37. September 14, N. Waziristan, four foreign militants and four unknowns killed58
38. September 24, N. Waziristan, twelve Afghan Taliban militants killed, no civilians59
39. September 29, S. Waziristan, five suspected Taliban killed, no civilians60
40. September 29, N. Waziristan, seven unknowns killed61
41. September 29, Khyber Agency, no deaths62
42. September 30, N. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians63
43. October 15, N. Waziristan, four suspected militants killed, no civilians64
44. October 24, Bajaur Agency, twenty-two terrorists killed, no civilians65
45. November 4, N. Waziristan, four unknowns killed66
46. November 18, N. Waziristan, four militants killed, no civilians67
47. November 20, N. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians68
48. December 7, N. Waziristan, three militants killed, no civilians69
49. December 8, N. Waziristan, three unknowns killed70
50. December 17, N. Waziristan, two militants killed, no civilians71
51. December 17, N. Waziristan, twelve suspected Taliban militants killed, no civilians72
52. December 18, N. Waziristan, eight Taliban killed, no civilians73
53. December 26, N. Waziristan, thirteen militants killed, no civilians74
54. December 31, N. Waziristan, three militants killed, no civilians75
Although it is based on news service reports (usually informed by local Pakistani sources), the preceding list helps explain why Obama, a president who was trying to improve America’s frayed, post–Iraq invasion image among Muslims, continued the unpopular drone strikes. Simply put, he had to have known that the CIA was waging perhaps the most precise bombing (or, more accurately, “guided-missile”) campaign in world history. Clearly the combination of high-resolution optics and spies on the ground was working to minimize civilian casualties, even as hundreds of militants and terrorists were killed with surgical precision. Many of those who were killed were involved in mass-casualty terrorism plots that would have taken the lives of many more civilians had the plotters not been killed. Certainly, Obama and the CIA felt they were saving civilian lives by killing those who murdered innocents in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Africa, and the West. The bad public relations fallout in Pakistan and the blowback of hatred for America among families of slain militants and the few slain civilians was apparently worth it.
Thus, the Obama administration made several attempts to change the widely held perception that the drones were killing predominantly civilians. One U.S. official, for example, described the drones’ much vaunted accuracy in the following exaggerated terms:
In the past year, in the neighborhood of 600 militants—including more than two dozen terrorist leaders—have been taken off the battlefield. In the same period we can’t confirm any noncombatant casualties. This is a weapon—fuelled by good intelligence—that allows us to counter an urgent and deadly threat in otherwise inaccessible places. And it’s far more precise than conventional ground operations. What’s the alternative to this kind of rigor, assuming the United States and its allies are unwilling to allow al-Qaeda and its friends to plot and murder freely?76
Another U.S. official similarly claimed that the CIA had killed two thousand militants and just fifty noncombatants in the period of 2001–2011 (i.e., a ratio of 2.5 percent civilian deaths).77 On a separate occasion Deputy Homeland Security Adviser John Brennan emphatically stated,